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Abstract 
Board accountability to shareholders is a contentious issue globally, particularly in the area of 
executive remuneration.  Scrutiny of complex executive remuneration arrangements by shareholders, 
media and regulators peaked in Australia when excessive risk-taking driven by inappropriate pay 
contracts reportedly contributed to the Global Financial Crisis.  As a result, the Australian 
Government’s Productivity Commission conducted an Inquiry into the executive remuneration 
framework in 2009.  The Productivity Commission report led to a raft of changes to executive 
remuneration regulations, including changes to the Corporations Act, the Australian Accounting 
Standards and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles.  A central goal of the overhaul of the 
executive remuneration framework was improved transparency in remuneration disclosure, in order 
to facilitate shareholder assessment of board accountability.  To achieve improved transparency, no 
additional disclosure requirements were legislated.  Instead, an accountability mechanism known as 
the two-strikes rule came into effect in 2010.  This mechanism strengthened the existing non-binding 
shareholder vote on the remuneration report by introducing a voting threshold and a ‘board spill’ 
sanction. 
The extant literature questions the legitimacy of increased transparency for achieving greater board 
accountability.  As such, regulators face concerns about the effectiveness of legislation that promotes 
transparency as the solution to the lack of board accountability for executive remuneration contracts. 
The real effect of the two-strikes rule in improving the transparency of disclosure is unclear.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of remuneration reporting in Australia from 2008 
to 2014 with a focus on the conjectured improvements in the areas of transparency and accountability 
following the introduction of the two-strikes rule.   
This research is conducted in three stages.  Media reports suggest the introduction of the two-strikes 
and spill legislation was not expected by the market, therefore the first stage of the thesis examines 
the standard setting process that was a precursor to the introduction of this accountability mechanism 
to better understand this process.  The objective of the second stage of the thesis is to assess the 
effects of the two-strikes rule, focusing on quantitative improvements in the transparency of 
remuneration disclosures following negative shareholder feedback.  Stage 3 continues to examine 
the real effects of the introduction of the accountability mechanism, by employing an emergent 
grounded theory approach to analyse the content of remuneration reports of the Australian listed 
firms that participated in the standard setting process. 
Stage 1 analysis indicates that the standard setting process involved the participation of various 
respondent groups, and each group enlisted various strategies in their attempt to convey their position 
regarding the executive remuneration framework in Australia.  Individual respondents employed an 
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honest, repeated contact approach, while Industry respondents engaged in frequent contact and were 
strategic in their responses to the Commission.  With respect to the proposed two-strikes and spill 
mechanism, all industry and professional body respondents opposed the mechanism, while 40% of 
individuals were supportive. 
Consistent with expectations, Stage 2 findings indicate that despite no new legislated requirements 
for increased transparency of disclosures on executive remuneration, total and transparent disclosure 
increased significantly concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Multivariate 
regression analysis of the relation between shareholder votes and disclosure levels indicate that 
boards respond to shareholder dissatisfaction by managing disclosure policy, increasing transparency 
when shareholder dissent is high, and decreasing transparency when shareholder dissent is low.  
Qualitative analysis in Stage 3 supports the quantitative findings of overall improvements in 
transparency between 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports, however the analysis also finds evidence 
of persistent poor disclosure practices, such as ‘boiler-plating’, sticky disclosure and ‘impressions 
management’.  Evidence of these disclosures were found in both 2008 and 2014 reports, but were 
less prevalent in 2014.  Despite lobbying against the introduction of the two-strikes rule, lobbying 
firms were found to have disclosure superior to the ASX200 firms.  Therefore, firms do not appear 
to participate in the standard setting process in an attempt to conceal poor disclosure practices. 
Overall, the analysis provides evidence that the accountability mechanism influenced board 
remuneration disclosure policy in the Australian setting.  The findings contribute to the 
understanding of the role of regulation in influencing firm disclosure policy.  This evidence can 
inform the academic literature, and may assist regulators in assessing the impact and effect of 
legislation.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In the wake of 20 years of worldwide headlines debating Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels 
and structure; there has been an international push to regulate for more transparent disclosure in 
executive remuneration reporting with the intent of improving accountability of boards to 
shareholders.1  This thesis investigates developments in CEO remuneration reporting in Australia 
focussing on improvements in the areas of transparency and accountability following the introduction 
of globally unprecedented ‘say on pay’ legislation.  
Beginning in 1998, successive Australian governments introduced extensive remuneration disclosure 
requirements and a non-binding shareholder vote in an attempt to promote shareholder activism, 
transparency and accountability (Costello, 2003).  Scrutiny of complex incentive pay arrangements 
peaked in Australia when excessive risk-taking by executives driven by inappropriate pay contracts 
contributed to the collapse of HIH and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  In response, the Australian 
Government’s Productivity Commission Inquiry (PC Inquiry) was established to evaluate the 
executive remuneration framework in 2009.  The Inquiry reported that despite extensive mandated 
disclosure requirements, transparency and accountability were still lacking in the Australian 
remuneration setting.  
The Productivity Commission (PC) reported that consultation with stakeholders revealed conflicting 
views on the state of CEO pay in Australia.  Shareholders expressed strong doubts about the existence 
of a link between executive remuneration and firm performance, and were vocal in their displeasure 
at the levels of CEO pay (PC, 2010).  In contrast, other stakeholders such as companies, disagreed, 
arguing that these views were uninformed and incorrect.2  The PC proposed that ‘measures, structures 
and practices that promote accountability and transparency create the conditions for “disinfection by 
sunlight”, which in turn can limit agency problems and achieve better outcomes over time’ 
(2010:361).  To meet the fundamental challenge of balancing the conflicting views of multiple 
stakeholders, the PC recommended the introduction of an accountability mechanism that would 
provide a feedback channel for shareholders to encourage boards to increase the transparency of 
remuneration disclosures.  
The proposed accountability mechanism consisted of a ‘two strikes and re-election resolution’ 
whereby boards would be required to stand for re-election following two years of shareholder votes 
in excess of 25% vote against the remuneration report.  This proposed accountability mechanism was 
                                                 
1 In anecdotal support for this statement, a free text search of Factiva for ‘excessive CEO remuneration’ for the years 
1995 – 2015 returned 119 866 items, while in 2004 ASIC stated that it was ‘imperative that Australia keep pace’ with 
international change such as Sarbanes-Oxley, IFRS and Southeast Asian regulatory changes (Lucy, 2004).   
2 Chapter 7 of the PC inquiry report ‘Executive remuneration in Australia’ is dedicated to the discussion of pay for 
performance and the feedback they received on this topic. 
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strongly opposed by industry and representative bodies.3  Before the release of the final report, the 
Australian Financial Review (AFR) expected that the ‘controversial two-strikes proposal’ would be 
completely re-written without the ‘board spill’ component, due to the draft report receiving 65 
responses that ‘overwhelming advocate watering down the two-strikes rule because of the risk of 
unintended consequences’ (Durkin, 2009).  Despite opposition, the two-strikes and spill mechanism 
took effect in 2011, representing an exogenous shock to the market.  The effect of the accountability 
mechanism in improving the transparency of disclosure presents an empirical question, particularly 
given that while shareholder voting is common globally, the ‘two-strikes’ legislation is unique.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of remuneration reporting in Australia from 2008 
to 2014 with a focus on the conjectured improvements in the areas of transparency and accountability 
following the introduction of the ‘two-strikes and spill’ legislation.  
1.1 Research Objectives 
Improving transparency in remuneration disclosure to promote board accountability was a central 
goal of the PC Inquiry (PC, 2009), however the introduction of the ‘two-strikes and spill’ 
accountability mechanism (hereafter, the two-strikes rule) was unexpected by the market.  Whereas 
‘more disclosure’ is often touted as the solution to governance failure (Roberts, 2009), the two-strikes 
rule was designed to change board behaviour without extending the existing prescriptive disclosure 
legislation.  Given limited empirical evidence providing economic justification for disclosure 
regulation or describing the effects of regulatory change, the globally unprecedented accountability 
mechanism potentially exposes the market to unintended consequences.  Despite the significance and 
unique nature of the two-strikes rule, its origins and effectiveness have not been examined to date and 
is therefore investigated in this research. 
To examine the origin and effectiveness of the accountability mechanism, this thesis is conducted in 
three stages.  The introduction of the two-strikes rule was unexpected by the market, therefore the 
first stage of the thesis examines how and why the accountability mechanism came into force.  Using 
a qualitative approach, the political process of the inquiry into the executive remuneration framework 
is examined.  While, ex poste, the accountability mechanism is the focus of this research, ex ante, this 
stage provides insight into the origins of the call for transparency and accountability and the 
development of the accountability mechanism.  The findings of this stage inform the subsequent 
stages of the research by providing a frame of reference for the expectations of participants in the 
                                                 
3 As demonstrated from the results of the investigation in to lobbying responses in Chapter 4 but also by the extensive 
coverage in the media, for example the articles “Spill rule reform questioned”, “Three reasons it won’t work”, “Two 
strikes vote on exec pay a recipe for chaos”, “Resist populist push on pay” appeared in The Australian Financial Review 
within one week of the release of the PC Inquiry draft report release.   
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market, and how disclosure policy of listed firms and lobbying firms is expected to evolve over the 
study period. 
The objective of the second stage of the thesis is to assess the real effects of the accountability 
mechanism, focusing on quantitative improvements in the transparency of remuneration disclosures 
following negative shareholder feedback.  In order to hold boards accountable for CEO remuneration, 
theory suggests that an ‘accountability framework’ is needed (Cooper & Owen, 2007:653).  The 
accountability framework includes three components:  the provision of an account of events (the 
remuneration report); a process that empowers shareholders to provide feedback (the annual 
shareholder vote); and an enforcement mechanism (the board spill).  Remuneration reports are the 
primary source of disclosure provided by boards to shareholders with relation to the performance and 
remuneration of the company’s executive management.  The PC Inquiry found that despite extensive 
legislated disclosure requirements, the usefulness of remuneration reports was limited due to ‘crucial 
omissions’ and ‘boiler-plating’ (PC, 2010).4  The introduction of the two-strikes rule was designed 
to give shareholders a mechanism to provide feedback to the board regarding their level of satisfaction 
with the board’s account of CEO remuneration.  The voting component of the two-strikes rule 
therefore functions as an accountability mechanism.  Stage 2 quantifies the disclosure policy of boards 
before and after the introduction of the accountability mechanism, and examines the relation between 
shareholder voting and disclosure to assess the real effect of feedback process.  
Stage 3 addresses the call by Luez and Wysoki (2016) for research that examines the costs and 
benefits of regulatory change from a qualitative perspective to properly identify the effects of 
particular changes in regulation.  This analysis uses a subsample of twenty ASX200 firms that were 
involved in lobbying the PC Inquiry, to gain a deeper, richer perspective of how remuneration 
reporting has evolved following the introduction of the two-strikes rule, and to extrapolate how 
specific disclosure practices are used by company boards to achieve (or avoid) accountability.  
In summary, the three stages of the thesis are as follows: 
Stage 1:  An examination of the political process surrounding the PC Inquiry, which resulted in the 
development of the accountability mechanism. 
Stage 2:  A quantitative analysis of the impact of the introduction of the accountability mechanism 
on firm remuneration disclosure policy. 
Stage 3:  A qualitative study examining the ‘real effects’ of the accountability mechanism on firm 
remuneration disclosure behaviour.   
                                                 
4 ‘Boiler-plating’ is defined by the Productivity Commission as using standard terms to describe remuneration 
arrangements that are ‘not particularly illuminating for investors’ in an ‘attempt to shield themselves’ (PC, 2010: 247).  
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1.2 Motivation and Contribution 
The motivation of this research is to contribute to the empirical evidence on the relative 
informativeness of regulated financial information, which Leuz and Wysoki (2016) stress is important 
given that economic arguments supporting regulation of disclosure are limited.  In 2001, Healy and 
Palepu stated that, despite its importance, empirical research on the regulation of disclosure was 
limited.  Fifteen years on, Leuz and Wysoki (2016) note that this gap in the literature is still evident 
as there is still no evidence of the economic justification for regulation.  Empirical evidence 
describing the effects of regulatory changes on disclosure outcomes, as detailed in this thesis, is an 
important first step in identifying evidence of a causal pathway from regulatory change to economic 
consequences (Leuz & Wysoki, 2016:526).  
Potential economic consequences of introducing an accountability mechanism to the executive 
remuneration framework are the likelihood of additional costs imposed on firms in the form of greater 
disclosure requirements and the additional administrative burden arising from the voting mechanism.  
Further, there are potentially operational costs that would flow on from consecutive no votes that lead 
to a board spill.  Research which links disclosure outcomes to the regulatory change, that is, linking 
changes in transparency of remuneration disclosures to the two-strikes and spill mechanism, is 
important to standard setters and regulators as it can contribute to an understanding of the costs and 
benefits of imposing additional disclosure requirements on firms.  Regulators face a fundamental 
challenge to balance the varied needs of management, boards and shareholders for disclosure and 
accountability.  However, given the conflict in the literature about the legitimacy of transparency in 
achieving accountability, regulators face concerns about the effectiveness of legislation that views 
transparency as the solution to the lack of accountability by managers and boards for the level and 
type of remuneration executives receive. 
While the two-strikes rule is unique to the Australian setting, Leuz and Wysoki (2016) suggests that 
the regulatory cost-benefit trade-offs will be similar across countries, hence studying this major 
regulatory change in Australia can provide a comprehensive understanding of the real effect of this 
type of voting mechanism on the disclosure behaviour of firms (similar versions of ‘say of pay’ 
legislation exist in the US and the UK).  Specifically, evidence of levels of transparency in disclosure 
and the response of boards to shareholder voting may indicate to regulators that an appropriate regime 
has been developed, that a need for fine tuning of the disclosure requirements exists or, as described 
by Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006), may indicate that strict, ‘black letter’ requirements are 
necessary to achieve a level of transparency acceptable to users.  Leuz and Wysoki (2016) call for 
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research such as this because evidence of the causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation in 
a novel setting is central to the economic justification of regulation. 
This research also contributes to the literature in a number of other ways.  First, lobbying activity and 
its impact on the development of regulatory frameworks has not been extensively examined.  Using 
the multi-period setting of the PC Inquiry in 2009, the first part of this thesis provides insights into 
the behaviour of lobbyists by examining the political behaviour of respondents over a number of 
periods, exploring the sequence and preference of respondents’ views.  The findings lend support to 
Amershi, Demski and Wolfson (1982) theory that respondents employ strategies when engaging with 
the regulatory setting process.  As no evidence of undue influence on the outcome of the Inquiry by 
any one respondent group was found, this research lends support to the validity of the process 
employed by regulators. 
In addition, a measure of transparency of remuneration disclosure has not been developed in prior 
research.  This research surveys experts in industry to develop a disclosure index which identifies 
‘total’ and ‘transparent’ disclosures that allows a quantitative examination of the changing disclosure 
practices of listed firms when motivated by possibility of a board spill.  Utilising the findings of the 
disclosure index, this research contributes to the disclosure literature by examining the relation 
between transparent disclosure and accountability.  Accountability is operationalised for each firm 
by the percentage of votes against the remuneration report.  This research then identifies board 
responses to shareholder feedback in the form of disclosure policy modification. 
1.3 Research Design and Findings 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the evolution of remuneration reporting in Australia from 
2008 to 2014 with a focus on the conjectured improvements in the areas of transparency and 
accountability following the introduction of the ‘two-strikes and spill’ legislation.  As described 
earlier, the thesis is conducted in three stages, which are described here in turn. 
1.3.1 Stage 1:  The Standard Setting Process 
Stage 1 is an examination of the political process surrounding the PC Inquiry conducted in 2009 that 
resulted in the introduction of the accountability mechanism designed to improve transparency and 
accountability in the Australian executive remuneration setting.  The objective of this stage is to 
extend the understanding of strategic lobbying behaviour and its impact on regulators by documenting 
the activities of respondents during the PC Inquiry.  Past failures of corporate governance systems 
have lead regulators to introduce legislation aimed at minimising business collapses.  In setting 
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legislation, regulators face a challenge to balance the competing needs of market participants.  Given 
the unique and unexpected nature of the two-strikes rule, this study investigates the political process 
surrounding the introduction of this accountability mechanism.  This qualitative study (presented in 
Chapter 4) describes how various respondent groups attempted to influence the development of the 
regulation, and provides a background as to the origins of the demand for increased board 
accountability and the resulting two-strikes rule.  The ASX listed firms identified in this examination 
are revisited in Stage 3 of the thesis to enable a closer examination of the evolution of the disclosure 
behaviour of these firms and whether the lobbying behaviour of these firms is associated with their 
disclosure policy.  
The investigation into the lobbying activity surrounding the Inquiry is conducted utilising a content 
analysis approach.  The Coombes and Stokes (1985) and Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes (1994) 
method are followed to classify respondents into six groups (industry, individual, representative 
bodies, professional bodies, academics, and government), as it is expected that the incentives for 
lobbying will differ across the groups.  Content analysis is then undertaken using an iterative process 
in four steps (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  First, the extent of lobbying activity during the Inquiry is 
documented.  Second, content analysis is undertaken of the written submissions made throughout the 
Inquiry using Leximancer and human coding techniques.  The focus of the analysis is the 170 written 
submissions that are publically available from the PC website.  Prior research has found that written 
submissions are likely to be a good proxy for direct lobbying activity in general (Georgiou, 2004).  
Third, the written submissions of the 37 respondents who made more than one written submission 
during the Inquiry are analysed with the purpose of identifying patterns or strategies that might 
underlie the lobbying activities of the various groups.  Finally, an examination is conducted of the 
alignment of the views expressed by the respondent groups during the Inquiry with the final 
recommendations of the Commission.  
The results of the content analysis provided in Chapter 4 indicate that the six respondent groups 
involved in the Inquiry adopt lobbying strategies consistent with their preference for change and their 
need to develop reputational capital.  The study finds that the final recommendations are largely 
aligned with the views expressed by the Representative Bodies and to a lesser extent with those 
expressed by the Professional Bodies.  The findings indicate that the Industry bodies were strongly 
opposed to the introduction of the accountability mechanism. 
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1.3.2 Stage 2:  Disclosure and Accountability 
The objective of Stage 2 is to examine the changes in remuneration disclosure policy of ASX200 
firms between 2008 to 2014 in response to the introduction of the legislation, and the 
operationalisation of the accountability mechanism.  Two research questions are addressed:  
RQ1:  Did disclosure policy change as a result of the conduct of the PC Inquiry, and specifically, did 
mean disclosure levels increase after the introduction of the two-strikes rule? 
RQ2:  Does a relation exist between shareholder voting on the remuneration report and alterations 
to board remuneration disclosure policy?  
To address these questions, a comprehensive disclosure index is developed to capture all 
remuneration disclosure requirements from the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (hereafter the 
Corporations Act), accounting standards and the ASX listing rules and governance guidelines (as at 
year-end 2014).  A panel of industry experts is then consulted to identify ‘transparent’ disclosure 
items, thus providing a distinction between ‘total disclosure’, ‘transparent disclosure’ and ‘black letter 
disclosure’.  In this study, disclosure contained in the remuneration report is considered to be 
transparent if the reader is able to determine the underlying economics of the executive remuneration 
contract.  This disclosure is considered more sensitive than black letter disclosure, which is a detailed 
legislated disclosure requirement that leaves no opportunity for interpretative discretion (Clarkson, et 
al., 2006).  By applying the disclosure index to score the remuneration reports of ASX200 firms, the 
remuneration disclosure policy of these firms over time can be analysed.  
To address the first research question, descriptive statistics are analysed to establish how 
remuneration disclosure behaviour varies across time.  Tests for differences in means of total and 
transparent disclosure levels, including ANOVA, Tukey’s HSD, and Kruskal Wallis tests are 
conducted to determine whether a significant change has occurred concurrent with the introduction 
of the accountability mechanism.  To formally investigate the operation of the voting component of 
the mechanism, the patterns and determinants of remuneration disclosure across the period of the 
study in response to shareholder voting are examined using regression analysis techniques.  
The results of the analysis of RQ1 are presented in Chapter 7, while results for RQ2 are presented in 
Chapter 8.  Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that even though no new disclosure 
requirements were introduced post PC Inquiry, both total and transparent disclosure levels have 
increased significantly between 2008 and 2014.  Results of post-hoc tests confirm that in all categories 
of disclosure except share-based disclosures, the largest increases occurred between the years 2010 
and 2012, which is concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Most importantly, results 
from the multivariate analysis indicate that company boards of directors appear to manage the level 
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of disclosure provided in the remuneration report in response to shareholder voting in the previous 
year.  In the year following no votes in excess of 20%, remuneration reports exhibit significantly 
higher levels of total disclosure, and even higher levels of transparent disclosures.  Interestingly, in 
the year following no votes of less than 5%, remuneration reports exhibit significantly lower levels 
of transparent disclosure.  These findings are consistent with the expectation that boards respond to 
shareholder dissent by managing the level of transparent disclosure in the remuneration report.  The 
association between shareholder dissent and changing disclosure levels is consistent with the two-
strikes rule acting as an accountability mechanism. 
1.3.3 Stage 3:  Accountability – Real Effects & Lobbying  
To complete the examination of the disclosure behaviour of listed firms following the introduction of 
the accountability mechanism, a qualitative, longitudinal critique of the disclosure behaviour of all 
twenty listed firms that lobbied the PC Inquiry is conducted (Chapter 9).  The purpose of this analysis 
is two-fold.  First, prior research suggests that qualitative research is necessary in order to fully 
appreciate the real effects of regulatory change in achieving accountability.  Second, listed firms that 
lobbied the PC Inquiry are found (in Stage 1 of the thesis) to employ lobbying strategies, and oppose 
the introduction of the accountability mechanism.  Prior research has not examined the longitudinal 
behaviour of firms that have previously unsuccessfully lobbied against say on pay regulation.  As an 
additional analysis, the disclosure behaviour of these firms is juxtaposed against the lobbying 
submissions made by these same firms, to investigate how these boards, given their opposition to the 
accountability mechanism, manage their disclosure policy.  By examining lobbying behaviour and 
resulting changes in disclosure practices over time, it may be possible to understand the motivations 
of the lobbyists and extrapolate how specific disclosure practices are used by company boards to 
achieve (or avoid) accountability. 
The purpose of this stage is to gain a more insightful appreciation of the themes, strategies and 
behaviours of remuneration disclosure policy of Australian listed firms.  As such, the content analysis 
in this stage follows the integrative model outlined by Nuendorf (2002).  Following the development 
of a codebook based on the transparent components of the disclosure index (developed in Chapter 6), 
the remuneration reports of the lobbying firms are analysed for themes and trends.  Analysis is also 
conducted on additional information; such as strike data and media reports.  These types of 
information have been identified as potentially providing meaningful data as to the reasons why firms 
adopt particular disclosure and lobbying strategies (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
The analysis in this final stage presents evidence of the real effects of the implementation of the 
accountability mechanism.  There are three main findings.  First, firms that lobbied the PC Inquiry 
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were found to have higher total and transparent scores than the full ASX200 sample used in the Stage 
2 study of this thesis, in each year.  Over 2008 to 2014, lobbying firms increased the level of total and 
transparent disclosure.  The analysis finds no evidence that firms participated in lobbying behaviour 
in an attempt to influence the legislators because they had a need to conceal poor behaviour practices.  
Second, qualitative analysis suggests that lobbying firms provide more involved discussions about 
CEO contracts and payments in 2014 than in 2008, with an overall shift from reports containing 
statements of policy, to obvious attempts by the board to explain remuneration policy.  Finally, 
despite improvements in transparency between 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports, the analysis also 
finds evidence of persistent poor disclosure practices, such as ‘boiler-plating’, sticky disclosure and 
‘impressions management’.  These poor disclosures were found in both 2008 and 2014 reports, but 
were less prevalent in 2014.   
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis are structured as follows.  Chapter 2 outlines the governance 
framework of executive remuneration in the Australian setting.  Chapter 3 presents a literature review 
of research relevant to this thesis.  Chapter 4 presents the first stage of the thesis, the analysis of 
lobbying behaviour of respondents to the PC Inquiry.  Chapter 5 outlines the theory development of 
Stage 2, while Chapter 6 outlines the research methodology including the disclosure index 
development, the sample selection and the statistical design.  Chapter 7 presents the results of the 
analysis of the first research question, while Chapter 8 presents the results of the analysis of the 
second research question.  Chapter 9 presents the third stage of the thesis, which includes the analysis 
of the disclosure behaviour of the lobbying firms, while Chapter 10 concludes by presenting 
conclusions, contributions, limitations and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Regulatory Setting 
Prior to 1986, very minimal disclosure requirements regarding executive remuneration policy or 
payments were in place in Australia.  Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s increased regulation in the 
area of executive remuneration in Australia required greater disclosure of how and why payments are 
made to executives.  Disclosure requirements applicable to executive remuneration are regulated by 
the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), the Corporations Act and indirectly by the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).  In 2010, the PC Inquiry found that disclosure requirements were 
not being met to the satisfaction of stakeholders.  To encourage boards to improve disclosure, the 
two-strikes rule was introduced.  
This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2.1 outlines the development of the Australian 
regulation in this area since the late 1990’s and section 2.2 summarises the current disclosure 
requirements of executive remuneration contracts in the audited remuneration report.  These 
regulations are the basis of the disclosure index used as a measure of total and transparent disclosure 
in this thesis.  Section 2.3 describes the detail of the two-strikes rule, which is the accountability 
mechanism that is the focus of this thesis.  Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
2.1 Development of the Regulation 
The changes in the regulatory setting in 2004 produced significant improvements in the quality and 
extent of remuneration disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2006).  Since that time, regulators have continued 
to modify the requirements of the audited remuneration report.  Entities are currently bound by three 
main sources of regulation in the area of executive compensation:  corporate governance guidelines 
issued by the ASX that are required on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) standards that are enforceable via ASIC, and the Corporations Act 2001.  
Figure 2.1 provides a timeline of the processes, inquiries and other changes.  This section outlines the 
development of the legislative requirements. 
Prior to 1986, the AASB required reporting entities to disclose the number of executives within the 
company who earned in excess of $100,000, and the number of executives in each $10,000 band 
above $100,000.  These requirements were contained in the standards AASB1017 Related Party 
Disclosures and AASB1034 Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures.  
In response to corporate excesses in the 1980’s, the government of the day had undertaken to overhaul 
company regulation and introduced several initiatives.5  Prior to 1989, company law was 
                                                 
5 The newly elected Labour government held the ‘Economic Summit’ in 1983, which lead to the ‘Wages Accord’, the 
floating of the Australian dollar on international money markets and the overhaul of long standing legislation.  New 
legislation during this time included the Industrial Relations Act 1988, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and the Social 
Security Act 1991. 
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Figure 2.1  Timeline of the development of regulation relating to executive remuneration in Australia from 1986 to 2012 
 
 
 
 
Pre 1986
Minimal disclosure 
requirements
1986
AASB1017
AASB1034
January 1990
Corporations Act
1992
Corporate Law 
Reform Act
1993
Corporate Law 
Simplification 
Program
1996
Financial Systems 
Enquiry
1997
Corporate Law 
Economic Reform 
Program
(CLERP)
1998
Company Law Review 
Act
(CLRA98)
1999
ASIC introduces
PN68
2002
ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 
formed
2003
Principles of good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations
Introduced by ASX Corp Gov 
Council
2004
CLERP (Audit Reform 
and Disclosure) Act
2004
AASB1046 issued
2005
AASB124 replaces 
AASB1017
AASB2 Share Based 
Payments issued
2009
Productivity Commission
Releases
Executive Remuneration Report
17 Recommendations 
Rec 1: no vacancy
Rec 2: ASX principles regarding 
remuneration committee
Rec 3: ASX listing rules regarding 
executives sitting on rem 
committees
Rec 4: Prohibit key mmt voting on 
their own remuneration
Rec 5: Prohibit hedging of 
unvested equity remuneration 
Rec 6: Prohit voting undirected 
proxies on remuenration
Rec 7: Require proxy holders to 
cast all directed proxies on 
remuneration reports
Rec 8: Inclusions for rem reports, 
recommends expert panel be 
established to investigate revision 
of Corporations Act
Rec 9: Confine disclosure to KMP
Rec 10: ASX CGC should require 
disclosure of exec rem advisor 
details
Rec 12: Institutional investors 
should disclose their voting on rem 
report
Rec 13: Remove cessation of 
employment trigger for taxation of 
equity
Rec 14: Electronic voting to be 
allowed
Rec 11: Rem Consultants services 
should report directly to rem 
committee
Rec 16
Rec 15: Two strikes and reelection 
provisions
Rec 17
2011
Corporations Amendment 
(Improving Accountability on 
Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Act
2011
CAMAC (corporations and 
Markets Advisory Committee)
Executive Remuneration Report
9 Recommendations
Not supported by 
Government
Administrative not 
requiring immediate 
action
ASIC advised electronic 
voting already allowable 
under Listing rules
Rec 1: s300A require general 
description of remuneration 
governance framework
Rec 7: s300A Disclosure of lapsed 
options
Rec 8: Disclosure of termination 
payments
Rec 9: Disclosure of remuneration 
outcomes, all  past, present and 
future payments
Not supported by 
Government
2012
Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Remuneration and 
Other Measures) Bill
2010
ASX CGC 
Updated listing 
rules
CURRENT REQUIREMENTS
Corporations Act 2001
Accounting Standards:
AASB2 Share Based Payments
AASB124 Related Party Disclosures 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations 
with 2010 Ammendments (2nd Edition)
Principle 8: Remunerate Fairly and 
Responsibly
Rec 2: remove requirement for 
discussion of link between rem 
policy and corporate performance
Rec 3: exclusion of sensitive 
material should be allowable
Rec4: remove reference to 
accounting standards
Rec 5: external auditor to include 
opinion re accuracy of calculations 
in remuneration report
Rec 6: amendment for more detail 
re equity remuneration
 12 
 
governed by separate state and territory bodies and was generally considered to be weak, therefore 
one of the major initiatives was an attempt to centralise and nationalise corporate regulation.  After 
the Commonwealth Government gained the agreement of all states and territories, the Corporations 
Act (1989) (Cth) was introduced and on 1 January 1991 the Australian Securities Commission 
(ASC) came into operation.6  Between 1990 and 1995, the Australian Parliament introduced more 
pages of legislation than in the preceding 90 years (Regulation Taskforce, 2006). 
The introduction of the Corporations Act (1989) was successful in ensuring that all Australian 
listed companies were governed by centralised legislation, however the wording of the Act was not 
without problems and in response to pressure from businesses that were experiencing difficulties 
in applying the new legislation, the Corporate Law Reform Bill was introduced in 1992 followed 
by the Corporations Law Simplification Program in 1993.  In 1996, a Federal election resulted in 
a change of government and this sparked a new round of consultative processes, which saw the 
introduction of the Financial Systems Enquiry in 1996 and the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP) in March 1997.  
The Financial Systems Inquiry was designed to examine competition within the banking and 
financial services industry, but in practice ran alongside CLERP.  Ultimately, the Financial Systems 
Inquiry resulted in the Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA98), which was the first time in 
Australian regulatory history that a serious attempt was made to structure disclosure of executive 
remuneration payments (Clarkson et al., 2006).  CLRA98 introduced s300A into the Corporations 
Act and required disclosure of amounts paid to ‘officers’, that is, directors and executives, including 
details of options, a discussion of the ‘broad policy’ for determining ‘emoluments’, and discussion 
of the relationship between the remuneration policy and the company’s performance.  These 
disclosure provisions were inserted into the legislation hurriedly against the backdrop of another 
Federal election and resulted in a slew of criticism from business due to undecipherable language 
and hazy requirements.  
In 1999, ASIC responded to the confusion caused by CLRA98 by issuing Practice Note 68:  New 
Financial Reporting and Procedural Requirements (PN68), which clarified some of the definitions 
that caused confusion for practitioners in s300A.  Companies were given direction on the meaning 
of ‘emoluments’ and clarification as to which ‘officers’ should be included in the remuneration 
report.  In response to the rapid changes in the legislative environment and the problems that were 
apparent in the wording and implementation of the changes, the ASX formed the ASX Corporate 
                                                 
6 In 1991, the ASC replaced the National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC), and then later in 1998, the 
ASC became the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
 13 
 
Governance Council (the ASX Council). 
The introduction of CLERP in 1997 was a consultative and legislative process designed to overhaul 
the policy framework surrounding business in Australia including in the areas of accounting 
standards, directors’ duties and corporate governance.  In 2002, CLERP resulted in a policy paper 
‘Corporate Disclosure:  Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework’, which after 
consultation ultimately resulted in the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004.  
This legislation introduced amendments that require an audited remuneration report within the 
annual report, and a non-binding shareholder vote on the report, which also resulted in the addition 
of s250R to the Corporations Act that legislates that the remuneration report be put to a vote at the 
company annual general meeting.  While shareholders now had the right to vote on the 
remuneration report, this vote was non-binding and acted as a signalling tool rather than resulting 
in direct consequences.  CLERP also addressed some of the definitional issues introduced by 
CLRA98 such as changing ‘emoluments’ to ‘remuneration’, and updating ‘officers’ to ‘company 
executives’. 
Also in 2004, the standard AASB1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities 
was introduced.  This standard required the disclosure of the aggregate remuneration, as well as 
individual components and the determinants of each component for each ‘specified director’ and 
each ‘specified executive’.  The standard did not ‘prescribe’ a specific format for these disclosures 
but suggests a tabular format in the notes to the financial statements.  The standard required 
disclosure of details of the type, amounts and basis for remuneration.  It also required a discussion 
of whether the remuneration is related to the entity’s performance and how this relation is 
implemented.  AASB1046 was amended in September 2004 (to become AASB1046A) to include an 
appendix, which detailed the measurement of equity or share-based remuneration payments.  In 
2005, a pre-existing standard AASB124 Related Party Disclosure was revised to incorporate more 
detail and replaced AASB1017, which previously only applied to directors.  In 2005, AASB2 Share 
Based Payment was also issued, requiring the recognition of share-based payment transactions in 
the financial statements.  
Following this period of rapid change across many areas of regulation, businesses were becoming 
increasingly vocal about the costs associated with compliance.  In response, the new Liberal 
government introduced the ‘Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business’ in 2005.  
Following recommendation 5.23 from the Regulatory Taskforce (2006), in 2007 the AASB124 
disclosure requirements for director and executive remuneration were incorporated into s300A of 
the Corporations Act, leaving minimal requirements for remuneration reporting in the accounting 
standards.  By the end of this period of significant regulatory change, the executive remuneration 
 14 
 
framework consisted of the ASX CGPR’s, AASB 124, AASB 2, s300A of the Corporations Act 
and the Corporation Regulations.  Each of these areas of regulation is outlined in the next section. 
2.2 Current Regulation 
2.2.1 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations  
The ASX Council was formed in August 2002 with the purpose of developing a framework for 
best practice that would apply to listed companies in Australia.  In 2003, the ASX Council 
introduced the ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations’.  
These guidelines were not mandatory however the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 adopted an ‘if not, 
why not’ approach, and required companies to report the extent to which they have complied with 
the guidelines.  These principles and guidelines have been updated several times, most recently on 
27 March 2014 (taking effect 1 July 2014).  The Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand 
(CAANZ) viewed the most recent update by the ASX Council as supporting ‘an enhanced focus 
on transparency and disclosure’ (CAANZ, 2016). 
While not mandatory, the corporate governance principles are ‘intended to provide a fair reference 
point for companies about their corporate governance structures and practices’ (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2014).  Principle 8 recommends that overall ‘the relationship between 
remuneration and performance and how it is aligned to the creation of value for security holders 
should be clearly articulated to investors’.  More specifically, Principle 8 recommends that a 
remuneration board (or committee) be established, and provides guidelines for the structure and 
responsibilities of the committee. 
Principle 8 also outlines ‘Guidelines for executive remuneration’; stating that a balance between 
fixed and performance-based remuneration should be used when remunerating executives.  The 
principle suggests that fixed remuneration should be reasonable and fair, reflecting the core 
performance requirements and expectations of the executive.  It goes on to say that fixed 
remuneration should take into account labour market conditions and should be scaled relative to 
the size of the business.  Performance-based and equity-based remuneration should be linked 
clearly to performance objectives, targets and hurdles.  This document also refers to other 
publications written by the Investment and Financial Services Association and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors for more guidance regarding remuneration guidelines.  Principle 8 
suggests that compliance to these guidelines should be disclosed in the remuneration report as 
required by the accounting standards and the Corporations Act. 
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2.2.2 Australian Accounting Standards 
The requirements for remuneration reporting in the accounting standards are outlined in AASB2 
Share Based Payment and AASB124 Related Party Disclosures.  AASB124 has been revised several 
times since its introduction in 2005, and was re-released in July 2015 to incorporate disclosures for 
not-for-profit entities.  The current version of AASB124 applies to reporting periods beginning on 
or after 1 July 2016.  Paragraph 17 states that an entity shall disclose key management personnel 
compensation in total and for each of the following categories:  short-term employee benefits; post-
employment benefits; other long-term benefits; termination benefits; and share-based payment.  
This requirement has been in place since 2005, with no alterations made during the time period that 
relates to the research in this thesis.  
The other standard that applied to listed companies from 2008 to 2014 (and still applies) was AASB2 
Share Based Payment.  AASB2 requires that the effects of share-based payment transactions in 
which share options are granted to employees be reflected in the financial statements of the entity.  
This standard requires that entities will disclose information regarding the nature and extent of 
share-based payment arrangements that existed during the reporting period including descriptions 
of types, number, exercised, outstanding and lapsed share-based transactions. 
For a period of time, remuneration disclosures were required by both accounting standards and 
legislation.  In July 2011, the accounting standards were amended, and all disclosures pertaining to 
‘key management personnel’ (KMP) were removed.  The AASB stated that these disclosure 
requirements were more in the nature of governance disclosures that are better dealt with as part of 
the Corporations Act (AASB 2011-4, 2011). 
2.2.3 Legislation - Corporations Act and Corporations Regulations  
Section 300A of the Corporations Act became the primary source of legislation pertaining to the 
mandated disclosure requirements of the remuneration report from 2011.  The Corporations Act 
and the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) (hereafter the Corporations Regulations) require 
specific and stringent requirements pertaining to executive remuneration.  Section 300A requires 
that ‘a separate and clearly identified section of the director’s report in the company’s annual 
financial report’ must include details of remuneration policy, including ‘a discussion of board 
policy for determining the nature and amounts of remuneration for key management personnel’.  
The discussion must outline the relationship between remuneration policy and the company’s 
performance, why the performance relationship was chosen and how any performance-based 
remuneration is assessed.  The Act also requires that in the absence of performance-based 
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remuneration, the reasons for not including such remuneration should also be explained. 
To assist companies in determining what constitutes an appropriate ‘explanation’ of remuneration, 
the Corporations Act is supported by the Corporations Regulations.  The Corporations Regulations 
outline specific formatting and content requirements pertaining to the relevant sections of the 
Corporations Act.  In relation to paragraph 300A of the Corporations Act, Regulation 2M.3.03 lists 
8 pages of detail required in the remuneration report.  In a clear attempt to ensure transparent 
disclosure in relation to describing remuneration policy and payments, regulation 2M.0.03 
paragraph 1 point 13 states:  
‘For each contract for services between a person and the disclosing entity (or any of its 
subsidiaries)’ there is a requirement to disclose ‘Any further explanation that is necessary in 
addition to those prescribed in paragraph 300A(1)(ba) of the Act and item 12 to provide an 
understanding of:  
(a) how the amount of compensation in the current reporting period was determined; and 
(b) how the terms of the contract affect compensation in future periods.’ 
Despite the extensive prescriptive regulation introduced during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, public 
scrutiny of CEO pay was still intense.  In response to the GFC and public concern over ‘excessive’ 
executive remuneration (Selig, 2011), in 2009 the Federal Government established the PC Inquiry 
into the Australian executive remuneration framework.  The Executive Remuneration Report 
(final) was published by the PC in 2009 and was released to the public by the government in 2010.  
This report garnered widespread media and corporate attention, and resulted in several Bills being 
presented to parliament for further changes to the Corporations Act.  Most notably, in 2011 the 
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Executive Remuneration) Bill 2011 
incorporated the two-strikes and spill legislation into the Corporations Act. 
2.3 The ‘Two-Strikes Rule’ 
The amendments to the Corporations Act, which came into force on 1 July 2011, provide for an 
accountability mechanism colloquially known as the ‘two-strikes rule’.  The avowed intention of 
the two-strikes rule was to ‘empower shareholders to hold directors accountable for their decisions 
on executive remuneration, to address conflicts of interest in the remuneration setting process, and 
to increase transparency and accountability in executive remuneration matters’ (Bradbury, 2010).  
The ‘two-strikes’ rule extends the previous non-binding shareholder vote to include ‘strike’ and 
‘board spill’ components.  
In the first instance, boards must present the annual remuneration report to shareholders as part of 
the annual report.  The board must then present a ‘Remuneration Resolution’ at the AGM, 
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requesting that the shareholders adopt the report.  Shareholders are then able to vote on the 
remuneration report at the AGM.  Votes against the resolution to adopt the remuneration report 
have generally been called ‘no votes’ in the Australian media, however terminology in the literature 
includes ‘dissenting votes’ (Bugeja, Rosa, Shan, Walter & Yermack, 2016; Clarkson, Walker & 
Nicholls, 2011), ‘rejection votes’ (Kimbro & Xu, 2016), ‘dissatisfaction votes’ (Alissa, 2015) and 
‘against’ votes (Ertimur, Ferri & Muslu, 2010).  If more than 25% of the votes cast at the meeting 
are negative and therefore do not support the resolution to adopt the remuneration report, this is 
classified as a ‘strike’.  
Division 9, s250U-Y of the Corporations Act extends the non-binding vote in s250R by legislating 
that if a company receives two consecutive years of at least 25% of votes against the remuneration 
report, that is, two strikes, a ‘spill resolution’ must be put to the shareholders at the same AGM as 
the second strike.  A spill resolution calls for a special general meeting, namely a ‘spill meeting’.  
If the spill resolution is supported by at least 50% of shareholders, the spill meeting must be held 
within 90 days.  At the spill meeting, all board members who held a board position when the strikes 
were applied must stand for re-election (excluding the CEO). 
The justification by the government for the spill component of the legislation was that if the 
company had faced significant ‘no’ votes for two consecutive years, this could be taken as evidence 
that the company has not adequately responded to shareholder concerns.  The ‘spill’ resolution 
exposes the boards of companies that do not address shareholder concerns to greater scrutiny and 
accountability through the re-election process (Bradbury, 2010).  While this mechanism was 
introduced in 2011, there is no evidence as to the effect it has had on disclosure policy or board 
accountability in Australia.  This thesis seeks to address this empirical question. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Australian companies are operating in an environment where tension exists between legislated 
requirements for full disclosure and a need to act in shareholders’ interests by protecting proprietary 
information.  Regulators appear to be advocating for a full disclosure approach, which ensures 
transparency and accountability in the remuneration process, giving shareholders access to 
information, which allows them to monitor the behaviour of the board.  Media reports indicate that 
despite the introduction of the two-strikes rule, there is ongoing concern about the pay for 
performance link and the lack of transparent disclosure explaining how and why executives are 
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paid.7  One commentator suggests ‘The drums are beating. Australian boards would be wise to 
ensure their remuneration and disclosure practices reflect the current views of shareholders… If 
they don’t make some changes to meet expectations… an onslaught of populist legislators will 
likely force change on them’ (Gordon, 2017). 
The tension exists in that the board may make decisions regarding motivating and rewarding CEOs 
using information sensitive to the company.  The company, and therefore the shareholders, may 
benefit from information pertaining to strategy, planning and financial projections being 
unavailable the market.  If pay is linked to performance in these sensitive areas, disclosure of 
company specific details and strategy may not be in the best interests of the shareholders.  This 
research investigates what response boards have made to the changes to the legislation outlined in 
this chapter, with a particular focus on whether the two-strikes accountability mechanism has 
encouraged boards to meet the mandated disclosure requirements transparently.  
The next chapter provides a review of the literature that examines the areas of concern in executive 
remuneration that the regulators are attempting to control, and the theory that underpins the 
regulator’s right to exert that control.  
                                                 
7 See ‘2016 a wake-up call for company boards on executive pay’, The Sydney Morning Herald, www.smh.com.au, 
and ‘Executive hurdles ‘must be defined’’, Michael Bennet, The Australian, Monday January 23, 2017 p20. 
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Chapter 3. Literature Review 
For many decades accounting research has grappled with the role and interactions between 
executive remuneration, disclosure, regulation and accountability.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate the developments in remuneration reporting from 2008 to 2014 with a focus on the 
conjectured improvements in the areas of transparency and accountability.  The research into the 
interaction between executive remuneration and board accountability is limited, however the 
existing empirical research examining each area independently is extensive.  While Chapter 2 has 
outlined the current Australian regulatory setting, this chapter provides a review of the areas of 
concern in executive pay that the regulators are attempting to control, and the research that 
underpins the regulator’s right to exert that control. 
As a foundation, Section 3.1 presents the theory of executive remuneration contracting relevant to 
the objectives and research questions of this thesis.  In particular, agency theory as it pertains to 
executive remuneration, and the two conflicting approaches CEO pay contracts can theoretically 
address agency problems are discussed.  Section 3.2 reviews the literature concerned with executive 
remuneration in Australia with a focus on the perceived problems.  The problems of excessive pay 
and the perceived lack of a pay for performance links are discussed at length, because it was the 
general perception by the public and the media of the existence and extent of these issues that 
ultimately resulted in the accountability mechanism.  Regulators, shareholder advocates and the 
media believe that transparent disclosure is the solution to these problems because ‘transparency’ 
allows shareholders to hold boards accountable.  The belief is that transparent disclosure allows 
the underlying economics of the remuneration contract to be seen, which in turn allows the levels 
and reasons of remuneration to be assessed.  To elaborate on these concepts and their relationships, 
Section 3.3 outlines the literature underpinning the existence, interaction and influence of 
disclosure, accountability and transparency.  Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Executive Remuneration Contracting 
The existence of executives and their remuneration contracts have their beginnings in the theory of 
the firm.  Firms can be described as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which exist 
because individuals (shareholders) consider that it is more efficient to use a ‘firm’ to satisfy their 
needs rather than for the individual to transact with multiple independent parties (Coase, 1937).  
Due to multiple shareholders investing in a firm, an agent (manager) is employed to run the firm, 
which results in the separation of the ownership and management of the capital.  This separation 
results in the ‘agency problem’, whereby the goals of those in control differ from the shareholders, 
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and because of the separation, the manager can act in a manner that benefits them personally, rather 
than always acting in the interests of the shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932, Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  In this way, the agency problem gives rise to agency costs that are those costs incurred 
because the manager does not always make decisions that are optimal for the shareholder.  
As well as minimising agency costs, a well-designed CEO remuneration contract will attempt to 
accomplish three things:  attract the right executive at the lowest cost; retain the right executive at 
the lowest cost (as well as encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time); 
and motivate executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions 
that destroy value (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004:19).  In the academic literature, views on how 
successfully executive remuneration contracts mitigate agency conflicts range from ‘perfectly’ 
under optimal contracting theory, to ‘virtually not at all’ under the managerial power approach.  
Somewhere between these two extremes is likely to be the reality.  While this study does not seek 
to investigate which theory best describes the Australian situation, understanding these theories 
inform this research in regards to the frame of reference that lobby groups use when they choose 
to lobby, which issues may be of concern to each group and why the regulator chose the two-strikes 
rule as an accountability mechanism.  Two theories are considered, the optimal contracting 
approach and the managerial power approach.  
3.1.1 Optimal Contracting and Managerial Power Theory 
Optimal contracting theory suggests that executive remuneration contracts are a remedy to the 
agency problem (Harris, 1979).  In the context of this theory, contracts are negotiated between 
boards and executives within the parameters of efficient markets to provide incentives to risk-
adverse, self-interested management to choose actions that maximize shareholder value.  The 
approach assumes that remuneration contracts are well designed as a result of arm’s length 
negotiations between boards and executives.  The result of arm’s length negotiation is an optimal 
contract where CEO pay is paid at a level that results in minimal ‘residual loss’ to the shareholder.  
If stakeholders believe executive remuneration contracts are usually optimal, it may be reasonable 
to expect that lobbyists regard increased regulation as unnecessary, and regulators would see 
widespread opposition to increasing regulation or prescriptive legislation.  This theory provides 
one possible explanation for the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  In order to ascertain whether 
the CEO contract is optimal, shareholders need access to information. By introducing an 
accountability mechanism instead of increased regulation, the regulator may be indicating that the 
solution to shareholder dissatisfaction in the market is more information about the contract.  
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The alternate theory, the ‘managerial power approach’ (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003) suggests that while 
executive contracts are written to solve agency problems these same contracts create incentives 
that allow, or encourage, executives to manipulate the process for their personal gain at the cost of 
the shareholders (Jensen et al., 2004).  Under this view, managers exert influence over the board 
and obtain arrangements that are more favourable than what could be achieved under arm’s length 
negotiations.  According to the managerial power approach, managers have more power than those 
who monitor their actions (that is, the board of directors); therefore managers can take actions that 
can distort the information available to the board.  Such actions could include the manager adding 
a buffer into budgets to artificially improve relative performance, manipulation of accounting 
figures or making investment decisions that increase short run profits at the expense of long run 
profitability thus increasing firm risk.  By creating situations where the manager looks to be 
performing above expectations and thus receives higher remuneration, the executive is said to be 
‘extracting rent’ (Murphy, 1999).  
According to the managerial power theory, executive remuneration contracts contribute to the 
agency problem and therefore remuneration levels are rarely, if ever, optimal.  Lobbying behaviour 
under the managerial power theory has alternate outcomes for external and internal stakeholders.  
External stakeholders, most notably shareholders, would have strong motivation to minimize rent 
extraction and this may result in lobbying that seeks strong or prescriptive legislation in an attempt 
to ensure accountability from the board with regards to performance hurdles and quantum of pay.  
Internal stakeholders (such as managers) who are able to extract rents in the current regulatory 
setting would consider that changes to regulation around the operation and reporting of 
remuneration contracts would be costly for them.  Research has found that managers lobby against 
regulation that has the intent of mitigating this type of behaviour (Jones, 1991; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978).  However, because rent extraction is not in the interests of other parties, 
strategic lobbying activities become necessary, thus managers of corporations that lobby on 
remuneration issues may not necessarily reveal their true preferences in their lobbying approach 
because they have an incentive to game.  
While optimal contracting theory assumes that aligned contracts result from effective arm’s length 
bargaining and/or from market constraints, the managerial power approach suggests that 
independent bargaining does not exist and managers are able to extract rents.  This view is 
supported by board capture theory (Thomas, 2004), which suggests that if the directors are 
nominated for the board by the CEO, they may feel indebted to the CEO.  The director may then 
have a conflict of interest between supporting the CEO who may have assisted the director to secure 
a paid board position, and the shareholders who they are paid to represent.  This conflict of interest 
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makes it difficult for the director to monitor and negotiate with the CEO, which may result in 
favourable remuneration outcomes for the CEO. 
The concept of board capture is supported by academic research.  In looking at US CEOs, 
Abernethy, Kuang and Qin (2015) find evidence that powerful CEOs can influence the adoption 
and choice of performance-vested stock options, which can negate the benefit of these forms of 
remuneration to shareholders.  Qu, Percy, Stewart and Hu (2016) conduct a similar study in the 
Australian setting and also find that long tenured CEOs appear to influence the granting of stock 
options with less restrictive vesting conditions such as shorter vesting periods and options without 
performance hurdles attached.  If outside parties have anecdotal evidence of this type of CEO 
influence, and therefore perceive the board to be ‘captured’, lobbying respondents may be 
motivated to lobby to introduce legislation to expose or restrict these types of behaviour. 
There are alternate plausible explanations for the existence of sub-optimal CEO remuneration 
contracts in the market.  Hart (2001) argues that the CEO contract is not satisfactorily explained by 
the optimal contracting approach as it does not take into account that the relationship between 
manager and investors is not static.  Over time eventualities arise that are not foreseeable, therefore 
the CEO contract is ‘incomplete’, in that it does not lay out all future contingencies.  Murphy (1999) 
highlights the importance of outside influences on remuneration contracts stating ‘there is ample 
evidence that politics and public perception play an important role in determining the structure and 
level of executive compensation’.  If CEO contracts are ‘incomplete’, this may have implications 
for the disclosure of the performance metrics of the remuneration contract.  In an incomplete 
contract, it may be difficult for boards and firms to be fully transparent in explaining to shareholders 
the underlying economics of the remuneration if the performance of the CEO is being evaluated 
based on his management of a yet-to-be-identified event, or if the evaluation is based on a long-
term, commercially sensitive strategy.  In the case of incomplete contracts, the link between 
performance and accountability to shareholders may only be possible via share price, with a 
minimal role for disclosure. 
In practice, executive remuneration contracting is likely to exist in between the two extremes of 
optimal contracting and managerial power.  As Bebchuk and Fried (2003:73) suggest 
‘compensation arrangements are likely to be shaped both by market forces that push toward value-
maximizing outcomes and by managerial influence, which leads to departures from these outcomes 
in directions favourable to managers’.  The tension between theories highlights the importance of 
transparency in disclosure.  Intuitively, without transparent disclosures, managers are more likely 
to be able to extract rents undetected.  Therefore, stakeholders who believe pays are excessive and 
who subscribe to the managerial rent extraction theory may be motivated to lobby for legislated 
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disclosures that provide transparency to promote accountability.  Managers who participate in rent 
extracting behaviours may wish to cover this behaviour and lobby for less disclosure.  Alternately, 
managers who believe their contract is optimal may wish to inform stakeholders (in particular, 
shareholders) via more transparent disclosures.  Similarly, stakeholders who believe the board is 
strong and reliable may want to avoid having sensitive information released, or may view more 
disclosure as expensive, which will impact negatively on their share price returns.  
By examining lobbying behaviour and resulting changes in disclosure practices over time, it may 
be possible to understand the motivations of the lobbyists and determine how these theories of 
remuneration apply in practice.  The preferences of lobbyists in the PC Inquiry are expected to be 
grounded in these theories.  The preferences of lobbyists are further developed in Chapter 4. 
However, it is also expected that in the absence of perceived or actual problems in the market, there 
would be no motivation for any stakeholder to lobby.  The following section outlines the areas in 
executive remuneration in Australia that are considered to be problematic, structure, level and pay 
for performance.  
3.2 Executive Remuneration in Australia 
Chapter 2 has outlined the extensive nature of the regulatory reforms undertaken throughout the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s.  The need for an inquiry with the scope of the PC Inquiry was 
necessary in 2009 indicates that there was a perception that persistent and extensive problems 
existed in the market for executives at that time.  This section outlines the literature that has 
examined the extent of the (perceived or real) problems in executive remuneration in Australia.  
3.2.1 Structure of CEO Remuneration in Australia 
Even though theory disagrees on ‘how’ remuneration contracts are negotiated, the structure of 
executive remuneration contracts is fairly standard internationally.  In agency theory, it is generally 
accepted that when an agent’s efforts are observable, remuneration should be based on the observed 
efforts (Demski & Feltham, 1978, Harris, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979).  When the owners are unable 
to observe an agent’s efforts and information asymmetry is high, incentive alignment is a control 
mechanism, resulting in outcome-based remuneration contracts because these contracts transfer 
some of the owner’s risk on to the risk averse agent, and this helps reduce agency costs (Bloom & 
Milkovich, 1998; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  
This explains the global rise of equity-based bonuses for CEOs.  
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Most executive remuneration contracts have a similar composition containing a cash base, an 
annual bonus, and a long-term incentive component, usually in the form of equity payments 
(Murphy, 1999:2491).  Murphy (1999) summaries the generally accepted principles that each 
component serves a purpose in reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control.  In theory, the fixed salary payment is primarily a function of market forces, 
the cash bonus is a short-term incentive to ensure management make decisions that enhance 
accounting performance, while the equity payment rewards the executive for adopting an 
appropriate risk management strategy to enhance long term firm value. 
Given that the cash bonus and equity components of the contract are usually variable and linked to 
a hurdle, Jensen et al. (2004) explain the importance of controls and corporate governance systems 
for monitoring the execution of remuneration contracts.  They outline that in the presence of over-
valued stock, equity-based compensation contracts cannot solve the agency problem.  Without 
comprehensive controls and monitoring, equity-based compensation contracts can exacerbate the 
rent extraction problem because there is no penalty to the executive for taking excessive risk to 
achieve higher value shares which result in personal gain (Jensen et al., 2004). 
The structure and level of executive remuneration is a contentious issue in the Australian setting, 
with media and academics focusing on whether remuneration should take the form of equity or 
cash, and how much is paid.  The structure of the remuneration contract underpins the amount that 
is ultimately paid to the executive, and community concern over the issue of excessive pay has 
been quoted as the reason for the PC Inquiry.  The fact that Australian executives do not get paid 
as much equity or the same level of bonuses as international (primarily American) CEOs is often a 
defence given by Australian firms for paying in the manner they do.8    
There is limited research in Australia that describes a unique structure to CEO compensation 
contracts for Australian CEOs.  Matolcsy and Wright (2007) provide descriptive evidence and 
analysis of CEO compensation for the period 1999 to 2001 and summarise the remuneration 
environment prior to the introduction of the 2004 regulations.  In Matolcsy and Wright’s (2007) 
study, 696 firm years are examined, and the firms are divided into compensation contract types:  
firms that pay cash to the CEO with no equity component and firms that pay cash and equity.  The 
approach of dividing firms on compensation type is based on earlier research by Izan, Sidhu and 
Taylor (1998) that found that Australian firms more commonly award cash remuneration than 
                                                 
8 In their report ‘Executive Remuneration in Australia’, the PC discussed executive remuneration in relation to other 
companies. They state that ‘CEO remuneration in Australia is much lower than in the United States, which is the outlier 
internationally, and appears on average to be similar to smaller European countries’. However many submissions to 
the PC Inquiry (for example KPMG, the Business Council of Australia, Woolworths, BHP and Wesfarmers) suggest 
that providing a competitive pay with overseas levels is important in order to attract and retain international talent. 
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equity.  Unlike the earlier research by Izan et al. (1998), Matolcsy and Wright (2007) find that 
equity-based compensation is common in Australia in the time period examined, with 66% of firms 
offering an equity-based element of remuneration to the CEO.  This is consistent with Deegan 
(1997) who conducted a survey of 75 Australian managers and found that approximately 44% of 
respondents were paid 100% cash remuneration, whereas the remainder of the sample were 
awarded a combination of cash and equity-based pay.  This is in contrast to the USA where almost 
all firms offer equity remuneration (Murphy, 1999).  
More recently, Rankin (2007) studied a sample of 188 companies in 2005, and finds the structure 
of executive remuneration contracts largely unchanged since the Matolscy and Wright (2007) 
study.  Using a sample taken from the top 500 Australian firms for the years 1999-2005, Matolscy 
and Wright (2011) estimate a model of efficient compensation structure and test the performance 
consequences of deviating from the efficient structure.  In that study, they find that firms that are 
most likely to have contracts that contain an equity component are:  larger firms, firms with higher 
market-to-book values, firms that are more decentralised, firms with higher market-based returns, 
and firms where the CEO owns more shares.  They do not find that firms with cash constraints are 
more likely to have an equity component.  
Walker (2010) refines the description of CEO remuneration in Australia by studying nuances in 
the structure of pay to CEOs in high-growth firms.  She finds that high-growth firms pay their 
CEOs a greater proportion of performance-based pay, and are more likely to rely on non-financial 
or market performance standards in awarding this pay.  This research also confirms that firm size 
is an important indicator of level and structure of CEO pay.  Coulton and Taylor (2002) examine 
the role of equity payments in the structure of CEO remuneration.  They find that stock options are 
routinely awarded to CEOs as a form of remuneration but were unable to identify a consistent 
approach in how they were awarded or the level of awards made.  This supports the findings of 
Matolscy and Wright (2007), and suggests that a persistent and permanent shift away from earlier 
years where 100% cash based CEO remuneration contracts has occurred in the Australian setting.  
Matolcsy, Shan and Seethamraju (2012) have examined the change from purely cash-based 
compensation structure to equity-based bonus compensation in Australian companies.  They find 
that this change in structure is partly driven by the economic characteristics of the firm, such as 
decline in firm performance.  They also find that this change can be driven by a change in CEO, 
that is, the firm capitalises on the opportunity of a CEO change to update the structure of the 
remuneration package.  This finding is supported by the ACSI (2012) CEO pay report that states 
that since 2009 incoming CEOs are appointed at a ‘much lower’ fixed salary than their predecessor.  
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These studies have provided insights into the evolving structure of remuneration contracts in 
Australia.  The rise of equity components and performance-based pay is not restricted to Australia, 
and it is now considered standard practice for large corporations to offer contracts with a fixed and 
performance-based component.  In the U.S., Martin and Thomas (2005) find that between 1992 
and 1998, for CEOs from the top 500 companies compensation from options had increased by 
approximately 335%.  They suggest that by the end of the 1990’s, stock options were the most 
important source of remuneration for CEOs.  Optimal contracting theory suggests performance-
based pay is a necessary element of an optimal contract, however it is this element of CEO pay that 
has been blamed for the rising levels of CEO pay in Australia (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  The level 
of remuneration paid to CEOs in Australia is a much-debated issue in the media, and is discussed 
in the next section.     
3.2.2 Determinants of Level of Executive Remuneration  
It can be argued that researchers cannot empirically test whether executive remuneration is 
‘excessive’, because defining ‘excessive’ is problematic.  Despite the lack of definitive proof, there 
is a widespread belief that executives in Australia are paid too much remuneration, that it is ‘unfair’ 
that executives are paid so much more than average workers, or that managers are rewarded more 
than shareholders who are the owners of the capital (PC, 2010).  The concept of excessive pay is 
important to this thesis because written submissions to the PC Inquiry indicate that concerns about 
the level of CEO pay encouraged many individuals to lobby for greater regulation of remuneration, 
which in turn required companies to defend their pay practices.  
The belief that the magnitude of executive remuneration is excessive relies on comparison with a 
relevant benchmark.  The selection of a relevant benchmark leads to contrasting views on the 
appropriate level of executive remuneration.  The existence of a global market for executives leads 
to benchmarking Australian levels of executive pay against international levels.  In comparing 
Australian executive remuneration to US remuneration a reasonable conclusion would be that 
Australian executives are paid substantially less than global standards.9  An alternate benchmark is 
to compare CEO pay to individuals in other fields who are remunerated for unique and specialised 
skill sets.  In a comparison of CEOs to highly paid athletes, Beaumont et al. (2016) find that from 
2009 to 2013, the highest paid US athletes are paid more than the highest paid US CEOs, however 
in Australia this is not the case.  
                                                 
9 However, there are well documented explanations for the difference between the remuneration of US executives and 
executives in other countries such as institutional differences in taxation, regulation and labour legislation (Conyon et 
al., 2000) as well as other differences such as the size of the markets. 
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These types of benchmarks require comparisons external to the firm; therefore an alternate 
approach favoured by some shareholders is to consider the CEO pay ratio.  This is the ratio of pay 
of the CEOs annual total remuneration to the median annual total remuneration of all company 
employees.  US companies will be required to disclose the CEO pay ratio from 1 January 2017, 
while UK companies have been required to disclose comparative information about the relation 
between CEO pay and other employee pay since 2003.10  Currently Australian companies are not 
required to disclose the CEO pay ratio, however the media collate this data.11  In Australia in 2016 
this ratio ranges from 100:1 to 15:1 (Walker, 2016), while in the US the ratio is closer to 300:1, 
and the UK reports a ratio of approximately 183:1.  While arguably this benchmark only serves to 
provide evidence of variation of pay rates, the media quote these figures in support of the opinion 
held by many shareholders globally that the level of executive pay is ‘excessive’.  
The concern that remuneration is excessive is closely aligned with the managerial power approach.  
If management are able to exert power over the board, they are able to manipulate their 
remuneration contract (Qu et al., 2016), or they may engage in risk taking behaviour to extract 
excess rents (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  This rent extraction may result in remuneration that is above 
what an efficient market can bear, which in theory, can result in company failure.  Other theories 
describe how markets can be efficient and still result in high levels of CEO pay (Thomas, 2004).  
These theories are consistent with the optimal contracting theory.  The underlying premise is that 
the market for executives is efficient and the level and structure of pay will be defined by market 
parameters. 
There are numerous academic studies across many fields that examine what determines the level 
of executive compensation.  Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) offer a general framework for 
researching executive compensation, summarising the major determinants under three main 
headings:  criteria, governance and contingencies.  Determinants included under the criteria 
category are:  performance, size, market, peer compensation, individual characteristics and 
role/position.  In the Australian setting Rankin (2007) finds that firm size and complexity, firm 
financial performance and monitoring, and governance mechanism such as the proportion of 
external directors on the board are the three main determinants to impact level of executive 
compensation.  This is largely consistent with Schultz, Tian and Twite (2013) who find total pay 
                                                 
10 The pay ratio disclosure rule is required under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, however is currently under examination by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-pay-ratio-rule-implementation.html. 
11 See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-28/australia-should-compare-ceo-and-average-worker-pay-like-the-
us/7884240. 
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is determined by firm size, however Schultz et al. (2013) also ascertain that pay level is negatively 
related to leverage and unrelated to revenue growth.  
In researching actual pay levels in Australia, Rankin (2010) finds no discernible difference in CEO 
pay level or structure between 2007 and 2008, however that cash payments to CEOs are higher in 
2009 than other years.  Finance firms pay higher levels of salary, however salary as a proportion 
of total pay in this industry is lower than other industries.  The limitations in this research lies in 
that the time period covers a period of strong growth (2006-2007) followed immediately by one of 
economic decline (2008-2009), which may detract from giving a consistent view of remuneration 
contracts over a longer term.  In spite of this, the 2008-2009 period is significant in Australian 
remuneration history as it represents a period where CEO pay, bonuses and termination payments 
peaked. 
The Australian Council of Superannuation Investors (ACSI) releases comprehensive statistics 
regarding levels and trends of CEO pay in the top 100-200 Australian listed companies each year.  
The top 200 are split because the average/median remuneration paid to ASX100 CEOs varies 
considerably from the levels paid to ASX101-200 CEOs.  
In relation to ASX100 CEOs in 2015, ACSI (2016) found that: 
• average reported remuneration was $4.99 million, which was 0.3% lower than 2014, but 
2.9% higher than 10 years prior; 
• average realised remuneration was $5.54 million, 11% higher than reported remuneration; 
• average fixed pay was $1.87 million, a decline of 7.5% since the 2009 peak of $2.02 million; 
• median fixed pay has decreased almost 12% from 2009 to 2015; 
• decreases in fixed pay over the period 2009 – 2015 can be attributed to boards paying new 
CEOs less; 
• 93% of ASX100 CEOs received a bonus. 
• the median bonus was $1.16 million, however this does not include the deferred bonus 
payments reported by 61% of CEOs receiving a bonus; and 
• average accrued bonus increased 17.6% from 2011 to $1.95 million in 2015 (the accrued 
bonus effectively doubles the reported cash bonus).  
In comparison, the ACSI report shows significant differences for ASX101-200 CEOs: 
• average reported pay for ASX101-200 CEOs was $1.78 million - much lower than ASX100 
CEOs; and 
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• 33% of ASX101-200 CEOs received no cash bonus, and the median bonus of these CEOs 
at $329,253 is substantially lower than for the ASX100 CEOs. 
While reporting remuneration amounts of ASX200 firms does not inform interested parties as to 
whether the remuneration paid to an individual CEO is ‘excessive’, it does provide some data which 
may be used by various stakeholders to make their own judgements about the level of pay made to 
individual CEOs in which they may have an interest.  Research provides conflicting opinions on 
the extent to which shareholders are concerned with the level of remuneration paid to CEOs.  
Several international studies (Conyon, Peck, Read & Sadler 2000; Ertimur et al., 2010) find 
evidence that excess CEO remuneration results in significant shareholder dissent.  In contrast, 
Grosse, Kean and Scott (2015) find no support that excess pay is associated with higher shareholder 
dissent in the Australian setting.  This is in keeping with some academic theory which suggests that 
‘if remuneration is fixed in accordance with a formal procedure, by relatively impartial decision-
makers under a structured remuneration policy, there is far less reason for concern about the actual 
amount of that remuneration’ (Hill, 1996:234).  For this reason, the academic literature is often not 
focussed on the level of remuneration, but on the relation between pay and firm performance.  
3.2.3 The Pay-Performance Relation 
Of all of the determinants of CEO remuneration, the pay-performance link is arguably the most 
widely researched and contentious.  In spite of the intuitive appeal of performance-based 
remuneration, research in the Australian setting has historically found mixed or weak results when 
attempting to identify a link between the performance of the firm and the amount of remuneration 
paid to executives.  It is unclear whether the link is weak because it doesn’t exist or because the 
information explaining the link is not available resulting in researchers using incorrect measures of 
performance.  This section discusses the research to date, focussing on the Australian setting, 
showing that as disclosure requirements increase, a pay-performance relation is identified more 
often.  
Early Australian studies on the relation between pay and performance test a variety of firm 
performance measures, including share price and accounting indicators, and find no consistent or 
significant relation between CEO remuneration and firm performance (Coulton & Taylor, 2002; 
Defina, Harris & Ramsay, 1994; Fleming & Stellios, 2002; Holland, Dowling & Innes, 2001; Izan 
et al., 1998; Matolcsy 2000; O’Neill & Iob, 1999).  These studies rely on Australian reports 
prepared prior to 1998, which suggests that the limited disclosure of detailed executive 
remuneration information during the period contributes to the inconsistent nature of the results.  
 30 
 
An alternate explanation for the failure to find strong support for a pay-performance link is that the 
individual components of the CEOs role are difficult to measure.  Brown and Samson (2003), 
summarise the ‘scope and complexity’ of the CEOs role as:  set strategy; ensure senior and middle 
managers are great performers; lead (inspire the whole organisation); manage a variety of 
stakeholders relationships (government, shareholders, unions, staff and customers); ensure 
compliance with a myriad of laws; set and implement ethical standards; manage performance; 
manage risk; manage competitiveness and performance; set and be the ‘image’ of the organisation; 
and perform a host of other tasks.  This is useful research as it highlights the scope of duties that 
the remuneration contract is endeavouring to reward. I t also gives some indication as to the 
difficulty associated with monitoring these activities, which go to the heart of the problem with ‘at 
risk’ CEO remuneration, that is, how the shareholder, via the board, monitors and rewards the CEO 
for appropriate behaviours when the scope of the role is so diverse.  Given the scope of the CEO 
role and the difficulty in measuring ‘performance’ in these tasks the incomplete contracting theory 
appears intuitively appealing.  The lack of evidence supporting a pay for performance link may not 
necessarily represent market failure, but may be a reflection of a paucity of transparent disclosure 
that adequately explains the complex and dynamic nature of the CEO role.  Transparent disclosures 
should, in theory, inform shareholders of the intricacies of the role of the executive and explain 
how remuneration is linked to these difficult to measure duties.  This thesis will examine whether 
there is evidence that this information is being transmitted more effectively over time.  
From 1998, disclosure requirements increased and studies started to find support for the existence 
of a pay-performance relation.  Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) examine ASX200 firms from 
1999-2002 and find a link between pay and accounting performance for the salary and cash bonus 
components of CEO remuneration packages, but not the equity component of the remuneration.  
Further support for a pay for performance link is found by Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou 
(2006) who measure the change in CEO cash pay associated with change in firm size and 
shareholder wealth for 722 Australian firms across the years 1990 to 1999.  They find that CEO 
pay increases by 2.74% for every 10% increase in firm size and 1.16% for every 10% increase in 
shareholder wealth.  The finding supports US research that indicates that the level of CEO 
remuneration is more closely related to firm size than firm performance, however it does 
demonstrate a weak pay for performance link.  This study also examines CEO risk aversion and 
shows that CEO pay sensitivity falls as the riskiness of the firm increases, suggesting that CEOs 
are risk adverse.12  
                                                 
12 Such evidence of CEO risk appetite appears contradictory to the view that excessive risk taking by executives 
contributed to the GFC (Hill, 2009). 
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As the regulation of remuneration disclosure becomes more stringent over time, studies find 
evidence that the pay-performance relation may be becoming stronger.  Clarkson et al. (2011) 
examine the sensitivity of CEO remuneration to firm performance between 2001-2009.  They find 
that during the early years in the study, 2001-2003, there is very little evidence of a pay-
performance relation.  The weak relation between pay and performance found over this period is 
supported by Capezio, Shields and O’Donnell (2007) who find a ‘feeble’ relation between CEO 
total reward and contemporaneous and lagged shareholder wealth.  During the second phase of the 
study period, 2004-2009, Clarkson et al. (2011) find a consistent relation between total CEO 
remuneration and total shareholder return, reporting that CEO pay is expected to increase by 1.11% 
for every 10% increase in shareholder wealth.  This is a similar finding to that presented by Schultz 
et al. (2013) who find that for a $1000 increase in market value of shares, at-risk pay increases by 
$0.06 and total remuneration increases by $0.15. 
Bugeja, Rosa, Duong and Izan (2012) find further support that CEOs are paid for performance 
when they examine the remuneration of 177 CEOs following merger and acquisition (M&A) deals 
between the years 2000 - 2007.  Using the M&A deal as a proxy for effort, skill and performance, 
a positive relation is found between the completion of the deal (that is, CEO skill) and CEO 
remuneration.  All components of CEO remuneration, that is, bonus, salary, bonus and salary, 
shares, options and total compensation, are examined, and significant increases are evident for all 
components in the year of a M&A completion and in the following year.  This is one of the first 
Australian studies that finds support for the agency theory of CEO remuneration by measuring the 
specific skill and effort required to perform the CEO role as opposed to relying on firm wide 
measures of performance.  
The availability of informative remuneration disclosure provides one explanation for the research 
reporting a pay for performance link after 2000, however recent international research suggests that 
pay for performance sensitivity may be improving over time.  International research finds that when 
a country introduces say on pay legislation, firms adjust the CEO remuneration contract improving 
their pay for performance links (Burns & Minnick 2013; Cai & Walkling, 2011).  This does not 
appear to be the case in the Australian setting with several studies finding no improvement in the 
pay for performance of firms in general, and specifically no improvement in pay for performance 
sensitivity for firms receiving negative votes under the two-strikes legislation (Bugeja, et al., 2016; 
Grosse et al., 2015; Monem & Ng, 2013).  
In summary, the early Australian evidence suggested that a pay for performance relation was absent 
when analysing CEO compensation contracts.  More recent evidence suggests that CEOs are now 
more likely to be paid based on the firm’s performance, however the support for this relation is not 
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universal.  An important consideration when assessing the pay for performance link in the 
Australian setting is the availability of data pertaining to details of amounts and components 
(including performance measures) of executive remuneration.  Under the current framework, 
information about the underlying economics of the remuneration contract should be disclosed by 
companies in the remuneration report.  For firms that exhibit more transparent disclosures, evidence 
of pay for performance should be easier to identify.  In chapter 6 and 7 the level of transparent 
disclosure is measured across time which may give an indication of whether a lack of information 
is potentially contributing to an inability to ascertain pay for performance relations in CEO 
remuneration contracts.   
3.2.4 Governance and Disclosure  
The introduction of regulation mandating in-depth disclosure over the period 2008 to 2014 in 
conjunction with increased public scrutiny and the two-strikes and spill voting legislation should 
have resulted in progressively more transparent disclosures in remuneration reports in Australia 
over the same time period.  Australian regulators have increased governance measures that enable 
access to information about components of pay, policy relating to pay, including policy surrounding 
at risk pay, and amounts of payments, including potential remuneration in the form of options.  This 
governance structure around executive remuneration could reasonably be expected to ‘solve’ the 
issues of excessive pay or unreasonable contracts, and ultimately result in the focus of the market 
moving away from executive remuneration.  In spite of the changes in regulation, perusal of the 
media and an examination of remuneration voting would suggest that the market continues to be 
concerned with the level and structure of executive remuneration in Australia.13    
Research conducted in the Australian setting prior to 2005 examining the role of governance and 
disclosure with CEO remuneration is concerned entirely with voluntary disclosure (e.g. Liu & 
Taylor, 2008), and is no longer applicable to the current Australian setting.  Other research such as 
that conducted by Coulton and Taylor (2004) provide insightful discussion into the development 
and potential impacts of the regulations that are now legislated, and is useful to researchers 
reflecting on the period of change.  Empirical studies conducted in the Australian context that 
encompass regulatory changes are limited.  
Globally, research has highlighted that increasing regulation with the intent of changing the 
structure or level of executive remuneration can result in unintended consequences for firms and 
                                                 
13 The finance media in Australia continues to report on complaints about excessive pay and inadequate disclosure.  
For example, the AFR on 7/11/2016 ran the headline ‘Australia investors vent anger over executive pay’, while The 
Australian reported on 2/09/2015 ‘CEO pay: top 10 chiefs took home $70m more than reported’. 
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for shareholders.  In examining the impact of the introduction of stronger governance mechanisms, 
Dhole, Khumawala, Mishra and Ranasinghe (2015) found that many firms experienced greater 
regulatory costs and CEO compensation increased.  In Germany, where new executive 
compensation regulation required more disclosure of pay contracts and implemented caps on bonus 
pay, Hitz and Muller-Bloch (2015) find evidence of a negative economic impact from the 
introduction of the regulation.  They find that firms with high abnormal compensation (that is, 
‘overpaid’ managers) suffer the largest market discounts, while firms with ‘underpaid’ executives 
do not experience benefits from market gains.  The authors contend that this suggests shareholders 
expected the regulation to decrease firm value as a result of making contractual arrangements less 
efficient.  This interpretation by shareholders is supported in the study by weaker pay for 
performance sensitivity in those firms.  
In 2014, in response to the GFC, the European Union introduced a cap on the value of bonuses that 
could be paid to bankers.  Murphy (2013) suggests that these restrictions will result in increased 
incentives for risk-taking, increased fixed pay, reduced incentives to create value, less 
competitiveness in the banking sector and a general degradation in the quality of bankers in the 
EU.  While these assertions are yet to be tested, it is clear that some academics do not necessarily 
view prescriptive regulation as the panacea to executive remuneration issues.  Zalewska (2014) 
supports Murphy’s view, suggesting that the controlling, prescriptive nature of the Sarbanes’ Oxley 
legislation has resulted in American boards becoming weaker, with shareholders depending on 
auditors for reliable information.  While in the UK, the Cadbury Report (1992) introduced 
governance reforms on a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ basis that lead a ‘steered and evolutionary 
transformation of British corporate culture’ resulting in British boards becoming active and 
empowered monitors of business. (This is not the chocolate report, though I did consume 
approximately my body weight in Cadbury Twirls while completing this PhD, while Prof Pete was 
partial to raspberry and white chocolate bullets).  Zalewska (2014) goes on to say that the impact 
of weaker boards in the US on executive remuneration has been the shift toward a greater reliance 
on equity linked remuneration as an attempt to resolve agency problems. 
More recently in the Australian setting, a small number of studies have examined the relation 
between governance measures and executive remuneration.  Schultz et al. (2013) examined ASX 
listed firms from 2000 – 2010 and found no evidence of a consistent relationship between the 
effectiveness of board monitoring activity and the level of CEO remuneration.  Other than some 
results that suggest large boards are less effective monitors of their CEO, Schultz et al. (2013) do 
not observe strong evidence regarding the effect of board structure on overall pay for performance 
sensitivity.  However, they do find that larger boards, more independent boards and remuneration 
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committees are associated with bonuses being more sensitive to accounting performance (using 
ROA to measure performance rather than stock price performance).  In support of these findings, 
Kent, Kercher and Routledge (2016) find that the pay for performance link is stronger when 
companies have a remuneration committee consisting of mainly independent board members.     
With a specific focus on regulation relating to disclosure in the Australian setting, Clarkson et al. 
(2006) examines CEO remuneration disclosure from 1998 to 2004.  During this period, the 
disclosure regulation surrounding executive remuneration was evolving rapidly, but business and 
media questioned the need for regulation and suggested that the quality of disclosure did not need 
to be mandated.  Clarkson et al. (2006) find that when CLRA98 was introduced a significant 
increase in the extent of CEO remuneration disclosure was evident.  This was also found during 
the period 2003 - 2004 when AASB1046 was introduced.  The results also reveal an increase in the 
extent of disclosure for the years in between, i.e. 1999 - 2003, however the increases were modest, 
and appear to be a result of public scrutiny of executive remuneration at that time.  Clarkson et al. 
(2006) draw the conclusion that allowing discretion in the area of remuneration disclosure leads to 
poor quality disclosure, and to enable high quality disclosure, clearly stipulated minimal disclosure 
requirements are needed.  Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) makes a similar observation when they 
find that in spite of increased regulation, firms did not comprehensively disclose the full range of 
information relating to equity payments as required by the accounting standards.  The research in 
this thesis aims to extend this earlier research by Clarkson et al. (2006) by examining whether, after 
the introduction of more regulation in 2011, disclosure is of higher quality.  
Following on from the 2006 study, Clarkson et al. (2011) investigate the relation between 
governance reforms in the area of remuneration disclosure and the increased sensitivity of the pay 
performance relation over the period 2001 to 2009.  In 2004, CLERP9 resulted in the introduction 
of a shareholder vote on the remuneration report resolution, significantly changing the 
remuneration landscape.  Using the pay-performance relation, the disclosure measures and the level 
of dissent, the researchers find that as a result of the improvement in remuneration disclosure, there 
appears to be a reduction in shareholder dissent, and this has been interpreted as having 
significantly impacted the strength of the pay-performance relation.  
When first introduced in 2004, the shareholder vote on the remuneration report was non-binding 
and acted as a signalling tool to management.  Following a recommendation by the PC Inquiry, in 
2011 new legislation has strengthened the shareholder vote to incorporate a two-strikes and board 
spill rule.  Monem and Ng (2013) found mixed evidence of the early impact of the two-strikes 
legislation on pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Specifically, firms receiving a strike in 2011 were 
found to have a significant negative pay for performance link.  Firms avoiding a second strike in 
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2012 were found to improve firm performance and reduce average total remuneration resulting in 
an improved (but not positive) pay for performance sensitivity.  In a small sample of 22 firms, they 
find that firms receiving two-strikes (in 2011 and then 2012) had pay for performance scores similar 
to the one-strike firms in 2011, but in 2012, in spite of reducing total CEO pay more than one-strike 
firms, still scored weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity in 2012 than firms that avoided a second 
strike.  
A theory suggested by Monem and Ng (2013) is that based on the inconsistencies in voting patterns 
over the two years, it appears that shareholders may have been going through a ‘learning process’ 
as they appear to vote more judiciously in 2012.  This idea may be supported by the large drop in 
the number of firms receiving no votes over time.  In 2011, 104 firms received strikes compared to 
70 firms receiving strikes in 2014.  It is unclear whether shareholders are ‘learning’, firms are 
changing the remuneration practices, or if firms are improving their disclosure practices, resulting 
in less information asymmetry.  This thesis will examine whether the legislation requiring more 
discussion of the CEO remuneration contract has resulted in more transparent disclosures and 
therefore lower shareholder dissent.  
In a similar study encompassing an additional two years of strike data, Bugeja et al. (2016) find 
that the two-strikes rule appears to have an impact on firms that receive a strike.  The firm receiving 
one strike make some changes to the size and composition of CEO pay.  However the research 
indicates that remuneration contracts exhibit no improvement in pay for performance link after one 
strike, and worsening pay for performance sensitivity after two strikes, which the authors propose 
may be an unintended outcome related to the imminent vote on the board spill.  Chapter Four 
describes how respondents to the PC Inquiry were very concerned about unintended consequences 
from introducing the two-strikes legislation, and Bugeja et al. (2016) indicates these concerns may 
have been justified.  Bugeja et al. (2016) also find that strike firms suffer a significant and negative 
market reaction after a strike.  While accounting profitability improves after a first strike, the 
market does not appear to value this improvement, possibly due to a belief in the market that the 
improvement is short lived due to earnings manipulation.  
To date, research has not examined the real effects of the introduction of the two-strikes legislation 
on the remuneration disclosure policy of listed firms, and whether the two-strikes mechanism 
influences the transparency or accountability of company boards to shareholders.  The next section 
discusses the theoretical basis of the concepts of accountability, disclosure and transparency as they 
relate to this thesis. 
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3.3 Accountability, Disclosure and Transparency 
Regulators, shareholder advocates and the media appear to view regulation for transparency as the 
solution to governance failures because ‘transparent’ disclosure allows shareholders to hold 
management accountable as they can see the activities of management.  Charlie McCreevy, 
European Internal Market Commissioner, suggests that with each failure of governance more 
regulation for transparency is introduced (in Roberts, 2009).  However to be transparent requires 
an ability to ‘give an account of oneself’, which requires an ability to know exactly what was done.  
The separation of boards from high level management and the strategic nature of managing firms 
doesn’t necessarily allow boards to gain in depth knowledge of ‘how’ firm performance was 
achieved.  Even if absolute transparency is possible, some research suggests that total transparency 
may of itself result in information asymmetry and agency problems. 
Accountability, disclosure and transparency are interrelated concepts that are components of a 
firm’s corporate governance framework.  Agency theory suggests that due to the separation of 
ownership and control of firms, incentives of management need to be aligned with the interests of 
shareholders via an optimal remuneration contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Shareholders 
require a sufficient level and quality of information content in communications from management 
to enable them to make decisions about the suitability of the manager’s actions, and the 
management’s compliance with the remuneration contract (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Disclosure is 
a means by which managers can communicate and justify their actions to shareholders, however 
the manager can vary the quality of these disclosures (Kothari, Li & Short, 2009; Melloni, Caglio 
& Perego, 2017; Zechman, 2010).  
Transparency is a term often associated with higher quality disclosure that enhances accountability 
of boards to shareholders.  High quality disclosure, or transparent disclosure, may facilitate 
managers’ ability to explain and justify their behaviour and actions to those to whom they are 
accountable, including shareholders (Barth, 2015).  Contrary to the long held and strong views that 
more disclosure is better (Christensen, Lee, Walker & Zeng, 2015; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; 
Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007), recent research has found evidence that ‘more’ information 
may not necessarily have positive outcomes for firms and shareholders (Johnstone, 2016; Plumlee, 
2016).  Transparent disclosure is not a cost-less activity, and full disclosure cannot be selectively 
made to shareholders and not strategic opponents, resulting in a situation where too much 
disclosure can result in lower returns for shareholders (Frantz, Instefjord & Walker, 2013).  Full 
disclosure is also problematic for individual managers due to the inherent problems with being able 
to give a full account of how and why an individual chooses a particular course of action (Messner, 
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2009; Roberts, 2009).  Therefore managers and shareholders are interested in disclosing an optimal 
level and quality of information that balances the need for accountability against the potential cost 
of loss of strategic advantage without creating a situation of moral hazard.  The challenge is for 
boards to determine how to be accountable and to what extent they owe accountability.  
3.3.1 Accountability 
Sinclair (1995) states that while nobody argues with the need for accountability, the term itself is 
not well defined in the accounting literature.  Shearer (2002) outlines a broad definition of 
accountability that suggests that the corporation is a moral agent who is ethically required to 
‘measure up’ to the demands of ‘the other’.  This definition suggests that there is a moral obligation 
that accounting systems be as responsive as possible to the duty to genuinely inform ‘the other’, 
which in this case would be shareholders (Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  Messner (2009:920) defines 
accountability as ‘the exchange of reasons for conduct’ and states that accountability is a ‘morally 
significant practice, since to demand an account from someone is to ask this person to enact 
discursively the responsibility for their behaviour’.  In order to ‘be accountable’ for the activities 
of the firm, managers need to bridge the gap between their actions and the shareholders’ 
expectations by explaining the reasons for the action, and by outlining normative grounds whereby 
these actions can be justified (Roberts, 2009).  As an extension of this, Cooper and Owen 
(2007:653) suggest that for accountability to be achieved, shareholders need to be ‘empowered 
such that they can hold the accounters to account’.  
Therefore in the context of organisations, accountability refers to managers being obligated and 
able to explain, justify and take responsibility for their decisions and actions (Cooper & Owen, 
2007).  In terms of executive remuneration payments, accountability is two-fold.  First, the board 
should be able to explain remuneration payments made to the CEO, and then justify those 
payments.  Second, the CEO should explain their decisions and actions.  It can be seen in some 
academic literature that many researchers believe that the only justification for executive 
remuneration payments is an explicit link with firm performance (for example Bebchuk & Fried, 
2005).  This may suggest that to be accountable, firms are obligated to clearly describe the 
behaviour of CEOs that have led to changes in firm performance.  Arguably, if management cannot 
explain how their behaviour impacts firm performance, or if the behaviour does not positively 
impact firm performance, this does not necessarily mean the board has not been accountable, 
however the literature at this time does not allow for an alternative measure of accountability for 
executive remuneration contracts. 
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The concept of accountability has become ubiquitous, especially in the context of executive 
remuneration disclosure where it is generally accepted that firms owe some form of accountability 
to shareholders (Ball, 2016).  The main vehicle by which firms attempt to achieve a level of 
accountability for CEO remuneration is via firm disclosure. 
3.3.2 Disclosure 
Disclosure is the dialogue that takes place between a company and its shareholders and is viewed 
as a critical part of modern economies (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  This dialogue can take the form 
of regulated reporting, voluntary communications or can be supplied through information 
intermediaries (Verrecchia, 2001).  Corporate governance frameworks create a structured dialogue 
between companies and their shareholders (Parum, 2005).  These frameworks formalise the 
requirement for accountability and have the purpose of giving shareholders access to information 
regarding the firm’s goals, actions and achievements (Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 2004).  Formal 
disclosures are guided by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital market 
intermediaries making these disclosures more credible than random or informal disclosures by the 
firm.  To this end, research findings provide support for the idea that quality disclosures ultimately 
benefit the firm (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Christensen et al., 2015).  
In contrast to these findings, firms also have incentives to conceal information from the market, or 
to disclose strictly within the guidelines of regulatory requirements (Core, 2001; Kothari et al., 
2009).  These firms include those with high levels of proprietary costs or that have private 
information they wish to keep from the market (Zechman, 2010).  Other firms, such as those that 
do not have a high requirement for external finance, have low litigation potential or that are 
experiencing low growth opportunities may not ‘hide’ information, but also do not have incentives 
to disclose information to the market (Frantz et al., 2013).  These firms may perceive the 
administrative costs of providing disclosures as not benefiting the firm and are therefore likely to 
disclose the minimum mandated amount.  
At the other end of the spectrum, some firms, such as those with high growth opportunities and a 
high need for external financing, will have incentives to reduce information asymmetry as much as 
possible (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007).  These firms may be inclined to have more disclosure, or 
provide shareholders with better quality disclosure.  It appears firms will trade off the cost of 
disclosure against the perceived benefits of reduced information asymmetry for their circumstances 
(Beatty, Berger & Magliolo, 1995; Melloni et al., 2017).  
In Australia, the Corporations Act and the Australian Accounting Standards have detailed 
requirements for executive remuneration disclosures.  While the introduction of these requirements 
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could be expected to result in high levels of transparent disclosure (Barth, 2015; Clarkson et al., 
2011), research suggests that the introduction of legislation does not in itself result in a change in 
behaviour (Cooper & Owen, 2007).  This means that while firms may be required to disclose their 
practices, this does not necessarily flow on to better remuneration practices.  Other research also 
indicates that even in highly regulated areas, firms have incentives to limit disclosure in an attempt 
to control the flow of information to parties outside of the firm (Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003; Cascino 
& Gassen, 2015; Christensen et al., 2015).  This appears, at least anecdotally, to be the case in the 
Australian setting.  Following the introduction of extensive disclosure requirements, strikes against 
remuneration reports and continued media attention would indicate that shareholders are still 
dissatisfied with either the reporting or practice of remuneration contracts in Australia.  
Given that firms need to meet legislative requirements and avoid strikes while minimising loss of 
proprietary information, it would appear that firms have incentives to optimise their disclosure.  
One way of ensuring they meet the requirements of various regulatory bodies without incurring the 
costs of disclosing sensitive information is to vary the level of disclosure quality.  In examination 
of environmental disclosure practices, prior research has found that firms will vary the level of 
quality in their disclosure practices (Clarkson, Fang, Li and Richardson, 2013), and the level of 
quality impacts firm value (Plumlee, Brown, Hayes & Marshall, 2015).  Plumlee et al.’s (2015) 
research suggests that increased quantity of disclosure does not necessarily imply better quality 
disclosure.  This finding is supported by Melloni et al.’s (2017) research, which finds that firms 
with weaker financial performance employ disclosure strategies such as increasing quantity, 
decreasing readability and manipulating the tone and content of disclosures. 
Executive remuneration disclosure is highly regulated in Australia; therefore boilerplate 
disclosures may be one means by which firms avoid legal consequences of non-compliance while 
avoiding disclosing proprietary information.  The PC Inquiry report describes ‘legalistic boiler-
plating’ as a firm’s attempt to ‘shield themselves by using standard terms to describe arrangements’ 
(PC, 2010:247).  This strategy of manipulating the quality of a firm’s disclosure is related to the 
concept of transparency.  
3.3.3 Transparency 
In general terms, ‘transparency’ is defined as ‘the ability to be seen through, and, open and honest’ 
(Webster dictionary).  Transparency and opacity lie on a continuum.  Transparency, or the lack 
thereof, became widely discussed in the academic literature and the media in the 1990’s, with 
various ensuing definitions (Ball, 2009).  In discussing transparency as it relates generally to 
politics and business, Finel and Lord (1999) state that transparency allows outsiders to ‘discern a 
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variety of important factors including relative capabilities, risk aversion or acceptance, interest and 
intentions’.  They suggest that transparency is achieved via legal, political and institutional 
structures that make details about the internal characteristics of government and society available 
to outside parties. 
In examining corporate opacity, Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) state that opacity affects the 
ability of outside investors to police opportunism undertaken by controlling shareholders, and as 
such corporate transparency is a means of mitigating agency conflicts between large and small 
shareholders.  Bushman et al. (2004) define corporate transparency as the wide spread availability 
of firm specific information to those outside publicly traded firms.  They affirm Anderson et al.’s 
(2009) position that transparency is important because the availability of information is a means of 
ensuring efficient resource allocation.  In Bushman et al.’s (2004) study, corporate transparency is 
comprised of several components, such as financial transparency and governance transparency.  
Financial transparency is defined as capturing the ‘intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures, 
and their interpretation and dissemination by analysts and the media’ (Bushman et al., 2004:2).  
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003:237) discuss the relation between the concepts of reporting quality and 
transparency, and define transparency as ‘the ability of users to “see through” the financial 
statements to comprehend the underlying accounting events and transactions in the firm’.  Barth 
and Schipper (2008) focus further on financial transparency, defining it as ‘the extent to which 
financial reports reveal an entity’s underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by 
those using the financial reports’.  Pownall and Schipper (1999:262) define transparent statements 
as those that ‘reveal the events, transactions, judgements and estimates underlying the financial 
statements, and their implications’.  
These definitions are the basis for the definition of ‘transparent disclosure’ used in this research.  
In this study, disclosure contained in the remuneration report is considered to be transparent if the 
reader is able to determine the underlying economics of the executive remuneration contract.  To 
determine the underlying economics of the remuneration payment, the shareholder reading the 
report should be able to determine what judgement and action the CEO took and how their decisions 
resulted in the remuneration that was awarded.  Providing the level of information to shareholders 
that is necessary to allow an examination of the judgement and actions of the CEO is problematic 
because it may be impractical to expect the manager to be able to give the account, or by providing 
that level of disclosure may reveal proprietary information, which in turn negatively impacts the 
value of the company, which then disadvantages the shareholder, which is in breach of the 
manager’s responsibility to the shareholder to achieve optimum returns.  These complex 
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interactions between accountability, disclosure and transparency are explored further in the next 
section.    
3.3.4 Interactions: Accountability and Transparency 
After describing the three independent concepts of accountability, disclosure and transparency, 
several issues pertaining to the relation and interaction between the concepts become apparent.  The 
relationship between transparency and accountability is not clearly articulated in academic 
literature, with some research assuming transparency subsumes accountability (Ball, 2009), while 
others see transparency as a problematic mechanism of accountability (Roberts, 2009).  The 
interactions between transparency and accountability result in a particularly complex paradox when 
contemplating them in relation to executive remuneration disclosures.  These complexities are 
discussed in this section. 
Accountability requires an individual to give an account of oneself.  The process of giving an 
account of a CEO’s actions and judgements is therefore theoretically central to achieving 
accountability through disclosure in the remuneration report.  However, expecting or requiring a 
CEO to give a transparent account of their own actions potentially gives rise to several moral issues 
or quandaries.  The first issue is that the board or CEO may not have an ability to give an exact 
account of how or why they made particular decisions.  Given the number and variety of 
judgements and issues that arise across a year of operation within a firm, it is highly unlikely that 
any individual could accurately recount the process of every decision.  If an account is made of 
‘significant’ decisions, the issue becomes how the board determines the definition of ‘significant’.  
Research suggests that obligating and expecting a CEO to provide a fully transparent discourse that 
describes, explains and justifies their every decision, though likely physically impossible, would 
result in ‘ethical violence’ (Butler, 2005).   
While it has been established in the literature that the ability to give a full account of oneself is 
inherently limited (Messner, 2009), when such an account is attempted, an alternate moral issue 
arises.  In the case where a CEO provides an account of a transaction or event, a problem may arise 
from the CEO or shareholders judging the disclosed decisions from a position of perfect knowledge 
of the lead-up, outcome and subsequent events surrounding the decision.  Many of the decisions 
made by the CEO of a firm involve subjective judgement, which, with the benefit of hindsight, 
may have been better executed, however the individual does not have that hindsight at the time of 
the decision-making (Sinclair, 1995).  Hindsight may make it difficult for managers to give an 
accurate account of ‘oneself’ at the time of the behaviour for which they are being held accountable.  
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Hindsight also means that shareholders have a different view of the validity of the decision because 
they already know the outcome. 
Following on from this idea of being ‘able’ to give a full account, even if executives could be fully 
accountable for their actions, the positive versus negative logic of transparency discussed by Finel 
and Lord (1999) suggest that full transparency of executive behaviour may not be the ideal outcome 
for all interested parties.  The positive logic of transparency suggests that transparency can have 
the effect of reliably projecting intentions, resulting in less conflict, or at least can ‘ease pressures 
for conflict escalation’ (Finel & Lord, 1999:319).  In terms of executive remuneration disclosure 
this may mean that if shareholders are fully aware of how and why executives are paid, they may 
accept the disclosed levels and structure of pay.  In contrast, the negative logic of transparency 
suggests that transparency may affect a crisis.  In their research, Finel and Lord (1999) find that 
transparency often exacerbates crises situations.  Specifically they suggest that transparency may 
make it difficult for receivers of information to distinguish between signals and noise, more 
information may allow leaders to justify pre-existing preferences, more systematic biases may be 
evident, and the flaws in uncontrolled information may hamper internal operations.  These concepts 
can be applied more broadly, and are reflected in some accounting research.  Johnstone (2016) 
argues that the economic logic that more information is always inherently ‘good’ is erroneous, and 
provides an argument that ‘more’ information can add to uncertainty that can result in less 
favourable outcomes to the firm.  While most research accepts that the greatest potential cost to 
full disclosure choice involve proprietary losses (Pownall & Schipper, 1999), Johnstone (2016) 
suggests that even ‘good’ information can have negative effects for the firms because a firm that 
offers more certain future outcomes may result in overpriced capital (which the author assumes is 
a negative outcome).   
This argument can apply to the executive remuneration setting.  In releasing specific details of what 
decisions were undertaken by executives in an attempt (successful or otherwise) to achieve firm 
performance, shareholders may not be sophisticated in the interpretation of that information 
(Bainbridge, 2006).  Incorrect interpretation of information may result in unintended or biased 
market wide opinion, impacting on cost of capital or in the Australian setting, attracting strikes 
against the remuneration report.  While the interpretation of remuneration disclosure is not 
empirically tested in this thesis, this argument creates tension around why full and transparent 
disclosure may not be embraced by all firms, and why, in spite of regulators viewing transparency 
as the panacea for all shareholder woes, transparent disclosure may not be evident in ASX200 
disclosures.  De George, Li and Shivakumar (2016) summarise this argument by suggesting that 
while most empirical evidence finds that transparent disclosure is useful to shareholders, research 
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has yet to describe how much transparency is optimal, and whether greater transparency necessarily 
promotes overall efficiency.    
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of the theoretical, empirical and analytical literature supporting 
the research in this thesis.  From the review provided in section 3.2, it is evident that the general 
consensus in the media and among shareholders is that payments made to executives are excessive 
and there is a lack of evidence of a relationship between executive pay and firm performance.  
Regulators, shareholder advocates and the media appear to view transparent disclosure as the 
solution to these problems because ‘transparent’ disclosure allows shareholders to hold boards 
accountable because they can assess the underlying economics of the remuneration contract.  
Section 3.3 outlines the difficulty in implementing an accountability regime based on transparent 
disclosure.  To ‘be transparent’ requires an ability to ‘give an account of oneself’, which requires 
an ability to know exactly what was done.  The separation of boards from high level management 
and the strategic nature of managing firms doesn’t necessarily allow an in-depth knowledge of 
‘how’ firm performance was achieved.  Even if absolute transparency is possible, some research 
suggests that total transparency may of itself result in information asymmetry and agency problems.  
Therefore, if full transparency is difficult to achieve and has potential consequences, it can be 
expected that even with the introduction of an accountability mechanism such as the two-strikes 
rule, firms will adopt a ‘level’ of transparency in executive remuneration disclosure that the board 
believes maximises accountability while minimising potential costs.   
The following chapter investigates the Australian government’s move to regulate for transparency 
and accountability in remuneration reporting, with a particular focus on the role played by lobbyists 
in the setting of the two-strikes legislation. 
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Stage 1 
The Standard Setting Process 
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Chapter 4. Lobbying & Accountability  
Given the implementation of the two-strikes rule was unexpected by the market, this chapter 
examines the development of the accountability mechanism, focussing on the early stage of the 
political process of standard setting, the PC Inquiry.  While, ex poste, the accountability mechanism 
is the focus of the thesis, ex ante, this stage provides insight into the origins of the call for 
transparency and accountability and the push for reform in Australia, which ultimately resulted in 
a unique accountability mechanism.   
The findings inform the subsequent stages of the thesis by providing a frame of reference for the 
expectations of participants in the market, and how disclosure policy of listed firms and lobbying 
firms is expected to evolve over the study period.  The study focuses on the strategy of lobbyists, 
an area that has received minimal attention in the literature, but that might highlight the intent of 
lobbyists, thereby assisting regulators to avoid unintended bias in assessing lobbying submissions.  
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.1 introduces the study, while Section 4.2 provides 
an overview of the lobbying literature and the setting.  Section 4.3 describes the method and data.  
Section 4.4 develops the expectations regarding the lobbying behaviour of the various respondent 
groups, while Section 4.5 presents the findings.  Section 4.6 discusses the alignment of the 
respondents’ preferences with the resulting recommendations, and Section 4.7 concludes.   
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to extend the understanding of strategic lobbying behaviour and its impact on 
regulators by documenting the activities of respondents during the PC Inquiry.  Executive 
remuneration in Australia has been subject to intensified scrutiny since the GFC and several high-
profile corporate collapses in the late 2000s.  “S[s]ignificant community concern about excessive 
pay practices” (Swan, 2009) and the role of executive remuneration as a possible contributory 
factor in these market failures prompted the Government to instigate a review of the regulatory 
arrangements applicable to executive remuneration.  The ensuing PC Inquiry involved the 
preparation of a comprehensive report on executive remuneration that was based on public 
consultation.  The Inquiry was commissioned in March 2009 and its final report was published in 
January 2010.   
Examination of the public response to the Inquiry has the potential to provide insights into how the 
various interested external parties either attempted to influence, or successfully influenced, 
outcomes through their lobbying efforts.  The views of firms who lobbied the PC Inquiry are of 
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particular interest to researchers and standard setters, as prior research would suggest that industry 
lobbyists are generally powerful and persuasive (Königsgruber, 2010; Mathur & Singh, 2011; Zeff, 
2002), while other research suggests that industry lobbyists appear to exert power over legislation 
that pertains to disclosure issues (Bamber & McMeeking, 2016; Currie, Robinson & Walker, 1987; 
Drutman, 2010; McLeay, Ordelheide, & Young, 2000; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). 
Ultimately, the PC’s final report led to further government inquiries, and the issuance of exposure 
drafts that resulted in changes to the legislation governing remuneration practices for Australian 
listed companies – including the controversial two-strikes and spill legislation.  The ‘two-strikes’ 
legislation was the first of its kind globally, and is unique in that relatively low levels of shareholder 
votes against the remuneration report may result in a full board spill and re-election process. 
Prior research suggests that through the process of public consultation associated with setting 
regulation, lobbyists might strategically ‘vote’ on critical issues to protect their reputation while 
trying to influence the outcome of the process (Amershi et al., 1982).  Identifying the critical issues 
and predicting strategic behaviour by respondents in a political process is challenging due to the 
unobservable and conflicting interests of respondents (Amershi et al., 1982; Booth & Cocks, 1990; 
Königsgruber, 2010).  Many studies fail to consider that strategic lobbying activity is likely 
conducted over multiple periods (Amershi et al., 1982; Georgiou, 2004).  This study attempts to 
extend current understanding of the use of strategic lobbying and the impact of such activity on 
decision makers in the context of the PC Inquiry.  Specifically, the characteristics and documented 
activities of categories of lobbyists (respondents) at different phases in the process of the Inquiry 
are identified to gain insight into the respondents preferred outcome, frequency of participation and 
voting strategy adopted.  To provide context, expectations are developed regarding the lobbying 
activities and strategies of the various groups arguing that their incentives for lobbying will depend 
on three key factors, the preference for the status quo relative to change (Chung, 1999), the 
expected cost of change versus the cost of lobbying (Mathur & Singh, 2011), and the importance 
of reputational capital (Bamber & McMeekling, 2016).  Any gaming strategies adopted by these 
lobbyists are explored, and the resultant influence on the recommendations made by the PC is 
examined.   
Section 4.2 provides an overview of the relevant lobbying literature and the role of the PC Inquiry. 
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4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Lobbying Literature 
The PC Inquiry provides a setting that presents some substantial differences to the existing 
lobbying research focused on changes to corporate reporting.  Prior studies have generally 
considered lobbying arising in response to a single type of regulatory change (for example a change 
to accounting standards) (Georgiou, 2004; Katselas, Birt & Kang, 2011; Stenka & Taylor, 2010), 
and directed towards accounting standard setters (Walker & Robinson, 1993) whereas this study 
examines lobbying in response to the PC Inquiry whose recommendations had the potential to and 
ultimately did impact corporate reporting regulations at multiple levels.  The recommendations 
were encapsulated in changes to accounting standards, corporate governance guidelines and 
corporations law.  The next major difference relates to the use of a multi-period setting.  The PC 
Inquiry presents a series of consecutive opportunities in distinctly defined different phases that 
provide an opportunity for interested parties to implement varying lobbying strategies.  Thus, 
similar to Georgiou (2004) this study is being conducted, although arguably in a more limited way, 
in the context of a multi-period ‘game’ (Amershi et al., 1982).   
Amershi et al. (1982) propose that the presence of a multi-period setting provides lobbyists with 
the opportunity to strategically ‘vote’ on critical issues in an attempt to influence the outcome 
and/or to protect their reputation.  They also suggest that rational political behaviour is likely to be 
qualitatively different in single versus multi-period settings (1982:20), and that identifying the 
critical issues and predicting strategic behaviour in what is essentially a political process is 
challenging due to the unobservable and conflicting interests of respondents.  Amershi et al. (1982) 
observe that while the majority of lobbying research assumes a single period setting, in reality the 
development of regulation more commonly occurs via a multi-period process.  They propose 
several simplified models of social choice that demonstrate potential strategies that can be 
employed in a non-cooperative, sequential ‘game’.   
Intuitively, lobbying is a two-stage decision process for respondents.   First respondents decide to 
engage in lobbying and then decide on a communication strategy to maximum their influence on 
the regulator.  Extant literature in the area of lobbying in accounting standard setting has focussed 
on the first stage - the ‘why’.  Sutton (1984) develops a rational choice model that suggests that 
self-interest determines the choice to participate in lobbying.  This model is supported by empirical 
research that determines that the decision to engage in lobbying is primarily driven by a desire to 
mitigate potential adverse effects of proposed legislation (Ang, Sidhu & Gallery, 2000; Deakin, 
1989; Gavens, Carnegie & Gibson, 1989; Francis, 1987; Stoddart, 2000).  To that end, firm size 
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and leverage are the predominant predictors of the decision to participate in the standard setting 
process, presumably because these firms perceive that the benefits of influencing regulators 
through lobbying will outweigh the associated cost (Deakin, 1989; Friedman & Heinle, 2016; 
Georgiou, 2004; Sutton, 1984; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  
While regulators rely on the perception that the standard setting process is free from observable 
bias (Larson, 2002; Kwok & Sharp, 2005), Sutton’s (1984) model is further supported by findings 
that regulators appear to be influenced by lobbying efforts (Coombes & Stokes, 1985; Tutticci et 
al., 1994; Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Cortese, Irvine & Kaidonis, 2010; Walker, 1987; Zeff, 2002).  
Bamber and McMeeking (2016) identify specific evidence of bias, with elite accounting firms 
exerting statistically less influence over regulators than other lobby groups.        
These findings are indicative of the motivation of ‘why’ firms lobby, but do not address the 
question of ‘how’.  Research that examines the strategy of lobbyists in accounting standard setting 
is limited.  The primary area of respondent strategy research pertains to the content of lobbying 
submission with a focus on the type of argument presented, with wide ranging results (Yen, Hirst 
& Hopkins, 2007).  For example, Tutticci et al. (1994) identify strategies in the types of arguments 
presented, finding that respondents vary the strength of their argument depending on their level of 
disagreement with the proposed standard.  Weetman, Davie and Collins (1996) examine the attitude 
of respondents but were unable to conclusively determine whether regulators are influenced by 
positive or negative responses in written submissions.  Stenka and Taylor (2010) demonstrate that 
non-corporate lobbyists present arguments that are general in nature and conceptually based, while 
corporate lobbyists present arguments focused on specific issues using conceptually based or 
economic consequences arguments.  Other research examining lobbying strategy in terms of 
participation includes Georgiou (2004) who illustrates that firms are more likely to lobby during 
public consultation rather than at the agenda formation stage, and Friedman and Heinle (2016) who 
predict that firms will ‘free-ride’ on other lobbyists efforts when proposed standard changes are 
likely to have uniform effects.     
The research in this chapter presents a contribution to the literature by providing a more 
sophisticated overview of lobbying strategy by addressing the complexity of ‘how’ respondents 
lobby.  By examining the frequency of lobbying, preference for change and voting strategy adopted 
by respondents, an in-depth analysis of the iterative, strategic lobbying behaviour of respondents 
in a multi-period setting is presented.  This analysis is made possible due to the two-stage process 
adopted by the PC Inquiry.   
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4.2.2 The Productivity Commission Inquiry 
The PC Inquiry was established to investigate perceived issues surrounding executive remuneration 
in Australia following the GFC.  The PC is a research and advisory body that reports to the Federal 
Government.  Its core function is to conduct public inquiries on policy or regulatory issues that 
impact Australia’s economic performance and community wellbeing.  Its independence is 
legislated via the Productivity Commission Act (1998) and it operates independently from other 
government departments.  The Governor-General appoints the Chairperson and Commissioners.  
The Commission has a reputation of being independent and thorough in its approach, having 
addressed many politically sensitive issues on prior occasions (PC, 2014:12).  While the 
Government is not required by legislation to follow recommendations presented by the PC, in 
practice more recommendations have been accepted than rejected (PC, 2012).   
The PC was charged with the task of determining the extent to which executive remuneration in 
Australia was considered ‘excessive’ and whether accountability could be achieved via more 
stringent regulation.  As conducted, the Inquiry provided for two distinct phases of public 
consultation, the first following its commission in March 2009 (Phase 1) and the second following 
the release of its Discussion Draft at the end of September 2009 (Phase 2).  During the period 19 
March 2009 to 6 November 2009, it sought public consultation on the issue of executive 
remuneration.  This consultation process consisted of a series of events that occurred over the two 
phases of the Inquiry.  Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the process. 
Figure 4.1  A summary of the public consultation process of the PC Inquiry 
 
 Inquiry Commissioned 
19 March 2009 
    
 Public Consultation 
PHASE 1 
Initial Lobbying 
(Pre Discussion Draft) 
Initial Submissions 
105 received 
25 May 2009 
Initial Public 
Hearings 
19 participants 
June - July 2009 
Roundtables 
9 Participants 
June 2009 
    
 Discussion Draft 
Released 30 September 2009 
    
  Public consultation  
PHASE 2 
Post Discussion Draft 
Lobbying 
Submissions 
65 received 
6 November 2009 
Public Hearings 
29 Participants 
Oct – Nov 2009 
Roundtables 
11 Participants 
November 2009 
    
  Final Report  
 Released 19 December 2009 Published 4 January 2010 
 
 50 
 
Public response to the Inquiry is well documented, and took the form of written submissions, public 
hearings, visits, and round table discussions.  These activities are described in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1  Definitions of the various forms (types) of lobbying activities 
Lobby Activity Definition 
Written Submission A formal written response to an ‘issues paper’ from interested parties 
outlining their views and information on the questions raised by the 
Commission. 
Public Hearing Individuals can apply to appear at a public hearing (with pre-set dates) to 
expand on their written submission.  Participants are invited to introduce 
themselves and make an opening statement, with Commissioners then 
seeking elaboration on, or clarification of, particular points.  Hearings are 
considered to be informal. 
Visits and Roundtables Informal discussions, where the Commission’s goal is to better understand 
the issues or to garner further specific information in relation to problems 
or issues raised through the course of the Inquiry.  Meetings are by 
invitation from the Commission, and are one-on-one (visit) or in small 
groups (roundtables). 
Arguably, prior to the commencement of the Inquiry, a reasonable expectation was that the various 
interested parties would hold differing views on the existence and types of problems with executive 
remuneration, and the appropriate solutions.  To that end, this setting loosely reflects the ‘unknown 
preferences game’ proposed by Amershi et al. (1982).  In the face of this expectation, the 
Commission made it clear in its Issues Paper (April 2009) that they were aware of the competing 
tensions of community concern over excessive remuneration versus reactionary or overreaching 
regulation that could result in unintended consequences for businesses in the Australian setting.  To 
manage these tensions, extensive public consultation was undertaken. 
4.3 Method and Data 
The overriding qualitative content analysis process used in this study follows the integrative model 
outlined by Nuendorf (2002), that involves developing the theory of what will be analysed, 
developing a coding scheme, coding, testing reliability, and then reporting (Nuendorf, 2002:51).  
The content analysis of the written submissions utilises a grounded approach, whereby pre-existing 
theory was not used to predict the variables or items of interest that would be collected (Neuendorf, 
2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  All results are based on data that was hand-collected, using Excel 
to code and collate data into matrix displays that were then transformed, analysed and reported 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).     
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Evidence of input into the Inquiry is directly sourced from the PC website.14  Written submissions 
are the focus of the analysis because they are publically available from the PC website whereas 
only limited information is available regarding other types of submission (visits, roundtables, or 
public hearing).  In support, it is noted that written submissions represent a significant proportion 
of submissions made by each group.15 
As a basis for analysis, Coombes and Stokes (1985) and Tutticci et al. (1994) are followed by 
classifying respondents into six groups (industry, individual, representative bodies, professional 
bodies, academics, and government), arguing that the incentives for lobbying will differ across the 
groups.  The defining characteristics of these groups, which are identified by the Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) in the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) 
Policy Statement 1 (PS1 – ‘The Development of Statements of Accounting Concepts and 
Accounting Standards’) are presented in Table 4.2.  To address the question of respondents’ 
frequency of participation, the quantitative data describing the extent and type of lobbying activity 
during both phases of the Inquiry is collated.   These statistics are based on participant information 
provided by the PC in the Inquiry draft report (PC, 2009).   
Table 4.2  Classification of respondent group categories 
Respondent Group Group Characteristics 
Industry Submissions from companies on letterhead, where the submission specifically 
states the views contained are those of an organisation conducting business 
with the intention of making a profit 
Individuals Submissions that specifically state that they are presenting a personal view, 
or who do not fall into other categories.  This may include submissions that 
are on company letterhead, but then in the content of the submission state that 
the views are those of the individual signing the submission. 
Representative Bodies Submissions from organisations whose charter is to represent the views of a 
group of individuals with a common interest or goal 
Professional Bodies Submissions from organisations that are accountants or lawyers, or 
representatives of accountants and lawyers 
Academic Submissions from individuals who identify in their submission as representing 
a view that is based on academic research, e.g., an extract from a submission 
or reference to publish academic research 
Government Submissions from government departments, government bodies, or 
government ministers 
 
  
                                                 
14 http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/executive-remuneration/submissions 
15 Similar to Georgiou (2004), we find that the views expressed in forums other than written submissions are largely a reiteration of 
views expressed in comment letters.  Further, in some cases the Inquiry sought comment from invited parties and such activities are 
unlikely to be generalisable to the broader view. Thus, the analysis is focused on the written submissions.  
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Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that in qualitative data analysis, conducting waves of data 
collection and analysis assists in developing focused and meaningful results.  Following, to address 
the questions of preference for change and strategy, several waves of data collection was 
performed.  
In the first instance, Leximancer was used to analyse the content of all written submissions for the 
purpose of identifying prominent themes and related concepts.  Whole group analysis was 
conducted for Phase 1 and Phase 2 submissions, and then for each respondent group separately.  
While the Leximancer tool uses a grounded approach and attempts to reduce researcher bias by 
employing text analysis, some researcher judgement remains as certain words needed to be 
removed from the analysis in order to obtain meaningful themes.16  The results (reported in 
Appendix A) reveal the prominent themes underlying the submissions during Phase 1 align directly 
with the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, while the prominent themes during Phase 2 align directly 
with the subset of recommendations that garner the greatest attention. 17  
Based on the Leximancer results, the first iteration of hand collection of data utilises the structure 
implied in the Inquiry, using the Terms of Reference to structure the analysis of written submissions 
received during Phase 1 and the recommendations contained in the Discussion Draft to structure 
the analysis of written submissions received during Phase 2.  Written submissions received during 
both phases of the Inquiry are separately read, coded and analysed.  This allows an examination of 
similarities and intensity in respondents’ attitudes towards issues during each phase (Holder, 
Karim, Lin & Woods, 2013).  Given the number of issues open for discussion, following Tutticci 
et al. (1994) a multiple issue, aggregate analysis approach of analysing responses is adopted.  This 
approach resulted in a conceptually clustered matrix for each phase of the Inquiry, the Phase 1 
matrix consisting of 128 responses by 105 submissions, and the Phase 2 matrix consisting of 120 
responses by 55 submissions.     
In a third wave of data collection, comparisons are made of the content and tone of written 
submissions from 37 respondents who made written submissions during both phases.  The 
codebook for this data collection was based on the Inquiry’s final recommendations.  During this 
wave, data collection involved reading the Phase 1 and 2 submissions of each company at the same 
time in an attempt to identify attitudes, patterns or strategies that might underlie the lobbying 
                                                 
16 Words removed from the Leximancer analysis were: board, company, remuneration, corporate, executive, financial, 
large, people, shareholder, manager, and business.  These concepts were removed as it was expected all submissions 
would intuitively have these themes present, and the researchers were interested in the themes as they relate to these 
words.  Some verbs were also removed, for example, saying, question, looking.  
17 Terms of Reference obtained from the Australian Government Treasury Website 
(http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/). 
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activities of the various groups.  Responses were coded, and relevant quotes were collated into a 
separate matrix.   
Due to the level of subjectivity in the data collection process, the recommended approach of Miles 
and Huberman (1994:98) is followed whereby the coding and indexing of data evolved in a layered 
approach and was more contextually and empirically grounded toward the end of the data 
collection.  In practice, this required two researchers to code a sample of submissions and compared 
results at the beginning of each ‘wave’.   Inconsistencies were discussed and a unified approach 
was documented and agreed upon.  An independent researcher also reviewed the data collection 
process and matrices to ensure reliability of the results.   
4.4 Background Expectations 
4.4.1 Overview  
The PC Inquiry into executive remuneration occurred in response to a series of market failures and 
the ensuing media attention.  Its aim was to determine whether executive remuneration contracting 
was systematically flawed, thereby necessitating government intervention.  The tensions around 
executive remuneration provided incentives for parties to lobby the PC.  Lobbying activities are a 
component of the political process that support and enable the development and setting of 
regulatory frameworks (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).   
This study is conducted as a multi-period examination that allows for a consideration of strategies 
employed by respondents during the two phases of the Inquiry.  The six groups used to classify 
respondents are ‘Industry’, ‘Individual’, ‘Professional Body’, ‘Representative Body’, ‘Academic’, 
and ‘Government’.  It is expected that the lobbying activities and strategies of these various groups 
will be defined by three core factors:  (1) their predisposition towards the need for, and desirability 
of, change relative to the status quo; (2) the relative costs and likelihood of change versus the cost 
of undertaking lobbying activities; and (3) their reputational capital.   
In the following sections, expectations are developed regarding the likely lobbying behaviour of 
each of the six respondent groups.  As a starting point, the insights provided by Amershi et al. 
(1982) are used.  They illustrate that in a two-period setting, there are two basic ‘voting’ strategies 
that players can adopt in an attempt to maximise their own welfare.  Specifically, in their setting, 
during the first period players can either ‘vote’ strategically in attempt to influence the beliefs and 
behaviours of the other players, or they can ‘vote’ honestly.  Following, all players ‘vote’ honestly 
during the second round.  On the basis of this characterisation of player ‘type’, the first 
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consideration is whether each group is likely to vote strategically or honestly during the first phase 
of the Inquiry.  This decision is arguably based on each group’s likely preference for change relative 
to the status quo and on the expected costs of change relative to the cost of lobbying.  Consideration 
is then made about whether each group is likely to lobby again in the second phase.  This decision 
is argued to be based on the strategy they adopt during the first phase in conjunction with the 
relative costs and importantly, their need to develop reputational capital.   
4.4.2 Industry Group 
The incentives for management to lobby are complex, as managers are both stewards of shareholder 
capital and employees of the firm subject to rational choice (Sutton, 1984).  While firms may decide 
not to engage in lobbying (Friedman & Heinle, 2016), in developing a lobbying position they can 
be expected to consider implications of any proposed changes to remuneration regulation for both 
the firm and themselves personally (Chung, 1999; Francis, 1987; Zeff, 2002).  As stewards, 
management consider the costs to the firm arising from increased regulation and/or increased 
disclosure requirements (Bamber & McMeeking, 2016).  They can also be expected to argue that 
disclosure of executive remuneration contract details may lead to loss of competitive advantage 
through disclosure of commercially sensitive information (Chung, 1999; Verrecchia, 2001). 
Given that changes are likely to be costly for both the firm and the individual, it is expected that 
the underlying preference of industry respondents will be the status quo.  Equally, since the purpose 
of the Commission is to investigate the need for change and to potentially make recommendations 
for change, industry respondents appear to have the greatest incentive to lobby actively and in a 
strategic fashion.  Here, for example, one possible strategic tactic would be to offer limited support 
for less costly changes during the first phase of the Inquiry in order to be seen to be supportive 
while at the same time attempting to limit its impact.  Thus, overall the expectation is that the 
Industry group respondents will lobby across both phases of the Inquiry, with their ‘true’ 
preferences more likely revealed during the second phase.  Management may also choose to 
participate during both phases in an attempt to weight their position under the premise that the more 
involved they are, the more important their views will be perceived as being. 
4.4.3 Individuals 
It is expected that Individuals will be motivated to lobby because they expect to realise benefits 
from a more efficient allocation of economic resources resulting from a change to the executive 
remuneration setting (Sutton, 1984).  As such, it is anticipated that they are likely to be shareholders 
since individuals who do not hold shares would see limited benefits from investing in lobbying 
 55 
 
activities.  Equally, shareholders who perceive executive remuneration as being determined by 
economic forces also likely perceive minimal benefit from lobbying.   
On this basis, it is believed that Individual respondents will be supportive of change.  Further, it 
seems likely that their views will align with the media’s perception of executive remuneration in 
Australia as being driven primarily by rent extraction rather than by market forces.  Thus, 
individuals are likely to lobby in favour of greater regulation with the view that greater regulation 
will result in lower remuneration and more information being available to the market, thereby 
leading the market for executives to become more efficient.  Further, it is anticipated that it is 
unlikely that Individuals will have an incentive to lobby strategically given that the purpose of the 
Inquiry is likely to be aligned with their interests.  It is therefore expected that their optimal strategy 
is to reveal their true position during the first stage and that they will be less likely to lobby more 
than once given that they have already revealed their position and the fact that lobbying activity is 
costly. 
4.4.4 Professional and Representative Bodies  
Members of Professional and Representative Bodies are likely to view themselves as authorities 
on issues relating to executive remuneration (Bamber & McMeeking, 2016).  They will typically 
be involved in some form of advisory capacity on remuneration for industry and see themselves as 
having a role to play in the Inquiry.  Importantly, when members of these groups decide to engage 
in lobbying activities, they potentially face a conflicting set of incentives involving a trade-off 
between the need to protect their clients’ economic interests and the need to protect their own 
private interests associated with the provision of services related to corporate governance and 
remuneration (Meier, Alam & Pearson, 1993; Puro, 1984; Watts & Zimmerman, 1982).   
Irrespective of motive, it is expected that members of these groups will have an incentive to 
influence the process as this may result in them effectively ‘capturing’ the political process and 
thereby increasing their role and importance in the formation and reporting of executive 
remuneration.  Further, while they may have incentives to lobby strategically, since their input will 
become known publicly, it is more likely that they will consider the reputational costs as being too 
high and thereby vote honestly in the first phase.  Finally, they are likely to lobby during both 
phases of the Inquiry in order to promote and reinforce their political points of view (Gavens et al., 
1989), and to enhance the perception of them as authorities in the field. 
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4.4.5 Academics and Government  
Academic and Government respondents are also likely to view themselves as authorities on issues 
relating to executive remuneration.  The positions adopted by lobbyists from these groups are, 
however, difficult to predict since they receive limited attention in the literature, and their views 
will likely reflect a variety of perspectives.  In this regard, the Public Interest Model theory suggests 
that these groups have incentives to present submissions that portray a professional and 
knowledgeable image, as well as a balanced view without strongly agreeing or disagreeing with 
particular issues (Mathur & Singh, 2011; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  Further, since their adopted 
position(s) will ultimately become known publicly, this removes any incentive for them to act 
strategically.  In fact, they most likely want to be seen as presenting a consistent and strong message 
that aligns with their constituents.  Finally, given the costs associated with lobbying and the fact 
that they are unlikely to lobby strategically, it is likely that they will view input during the first 
phase as sufficient and choose not to lobby during the second phase. 
4.4.6 Summary 
As reflected in the preceding discussion, the expected differences in the lobbying activities and 
strategies across the six respondent groups are considered.  The expectations relating to the 
dimensions of interest, preference towards change, lobbying strategy, and frequency of lobbying 
activity are summarised in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  Expectations of respondents’ preference, strategy and frequency of activity 
Respondent Group Preference Strategy Frequency 
Industry status quo strategic both phases 
Individuals change truthful first phase only 
Professional Bodies indeterminant uncertain both phases 
Representative Bodies indeterminant uncertain both phases 
Academics indeterminant truthful first phase only 
Government indeterminant truthful first phase only 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Lobbying Frequency 
The figures presented in Panel A of Table 4.4 fit relatively well with the expectations summarised 
in Section 4.4 regarding the frequency with which each group is likely to lobby.  Frequency 
distributions for participation by respondent group are presented in Table 4.4.  As revealed in the 
first column of Panel A, the Inquiry received input from a total of 166 different respondents during 
its two phases, comprised of 132 respondents during the first phase and 82 during its second phase, 
with 48 of the respondents providing input during both phases.  The final row of the Panel A also 
reveals that overall, the greatest number of respondents were Individuals (57 respondents) followed 
by those from Industry (40) and the Representative Bodies (39).  In contrast, there were only 12 
respondents from each of the Professional Bodies and Academic groups, and only six from 
Government. 
The first column of Panel B next reveals that the 166 respondents made a total of 290 submissions 
across the two phases of the Inquiry, with 187 submissions occurring during the first phase and 103 
submissions during the second phase.  The column also reveals that the majority of the submissions 
were written, representing 56.2% of the submissions during the first phase (105 of 187 
submissions) and 63.1% of those during the second phase (65 of 103 submissions), for an overall 
proportion of 58.6% of all submissions.  However, the remaining columns of Panel B indicate that 
the various groups relied on quite different means to communicate with the Commission.  For 
example, written submissions comprised 84.4% of those made by Individuals and 81.3% of those 
made by Academics.  In contrast, written submissions comprised only 43.3% and 38.6% of those 
made by respondents from the Professional Bodies and Industry, respectively.  Alternatively, 
respondents from the Professional Bodies made much greater use of public hearings to 
communicate their views, while the Industry group made much greater use of the roundtable forum.  
These differences are not surprising, however, given that the Commission issued an open invitation 
to the public to make written submissions whereas the other avenues for submission were limited 
to invitees.  Consistent with this interpretation, 64.0% of all roundtable submissions were made by 
respondents from the Industry group and 60.4% of all submissions through public hearings were 
made by respondents from the Professional Bodies. 
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Table 4.4  Frequency distributions for lobbying activity by respondent group 
Panel A: Frequency of participation by respondent type 
Phase Total Industry Individual Represent Bodies Prof Bodies Academic Govt 
Phase 1 132 28 43 35 8 12 6 
Phase 2 82 23 23 25 8 1 2 
 – both phases (48) (11) (9) (21) (4) (1) (2) 
Total respondents 166 40 57 39 12 12 6 
Panel B: Type (form) of contact 
Phase Total Industry Individual Represent Bodies 
Prof Bodies Academic Govt 
Phase 1        
 Written submission 105 10 44 30 6 12 3 
 Visit 31 8 0 15 4 1 3 
 Roundtable 21 14 0 2 5 0 0 
 Public Hearing 30 1 6 18 3 2 0 
 Total Phase 1 187 33 50 65 18 15 6 
Phase 2        
 Written submission 65 12 21 23 7 1 1 
 Visit 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
 Roundtable 18 11 3 2 1 0 1 
 Public Hearing 18 0 3 11 4 0 0 
 Total Phase 2 103 24 27 37 12 1 2 
Total Both Phases 290 57 77 102 30 16 8 
Panel C: Number of contacts 
Phase Total Industry Individual Represent Bodies 
Prof Bodies Academic Govt 
Phase 1        
  1 contact 93 24 37 14 3 9 6 
  2 contacts 26 3 5 14 1 3 0 
  3 contacts 10 1 1 5 3 0 0 
  4 contacts 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 
 Total Contacts 187 33 50 65 18 15 6 
Phase 2        
  1 contact 63 22 19 15 4 1 2 
  2 contacts 18 1 4 9 4 0 0 
  3 contacts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  4 contacts 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 Total Contacts 103 24 27 37 12 1 2 
Total Both Phases 290 57 77 102 30 16 8 
Finally, Panel C indicates that the majority of respondents had only one contact with Inquiry during 
either phase.  For example, as revealed in the first column, 70.5% of respondents during the first 
phase (93 of 132) and 76.8% of respondents during the second phase (63 of 82) had only one 
contact.  Across the respondent groups, most also had one contact with the Inquiry during each 
phase.  The only exception is the respondents from the Representative Bodies who displayed 
greater use of multiple avenues for providing input into the Inquiry. 
While the majority of respondents from each group made their initial contact with the Inquiry 
during its first phase, the extent of lobbying activity during the second phase is greater by 
respondents from the Industry group, and the Representative and Professional Bodies.  Specifically, 
57.5% of all Industry group respondents (23 of 40), 64.1% of all Representative Body respondents 
(25 of 29), and 66.7% of all Professional Body respondents (25 of 39) lobbied during the second 
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phase.  In contrast, only 40.4% of the Individuals (23 of 57), 8.3% of Academics (1 of 12) and 
33.3% of Government respondents (2 of 6) lobbied during the second phase.  Further, of those who 
lobbied during the first phase, 39.29% of respondents from the Industry group (11 of 28), 60% 
from the Representative Bodies (21 of 35), and 50% from the Professional Bodies (4 of 8) lobbied 
again during the second phase whereas only 20.93% of the Individuals (9 of 43), 8.33% of the 
Academics (1 of 12), and 33.33% of the Government respondents (2 of 6) did.  Thus, as 
conjectured, members from Industry, and both the Representative and Professional Bodies, lobbied 
actively during each phase of the Inquiry, with a significant proportion of respondents from these 
three groups lobbying during both phases.  Conversely, a majority of the lobbying activity by 
Individuals occurred during the first phase, and activity by Academics and Government 
respondents was almost exclusively during the first phase.  Only a relatively small proportion of 
respondents from these three groups lobbied during both phases. 
4.5.2 Lobbying Preference 
Overview 
In this section, the results are presented for a content analysis of the written submissions made to 
the Inquiry in hopes of gaining insights into the attitudes and preferences of the respondent groups, 
as well as the lobbying strategies they adopt.  Analysis is restricted to the written submissions given 
the advantage that all written submissions to both phases of the Inquiry are publically available 
from the PC website.  In contrast, transcripts are only available for a limited number of the public 
hearings and no information is available for visits or roundtables.  As noted, written submissions 
not only represent a majority (58.6%) of all contacts with the Inquiry, they also represent a 
significant proportion of submissions made by each group.  As such, they likely represent a 
reasonable basis for determining the views and preferences of the various respondent groups, as 
well as their strategies.  In support of this interpretation, in evaluating the effectiveness of various 
forms of lobbying, Georgiou (2004) concluded that written submissions are likely to be a good 
proxy for direct lobbying activity in general. 
Phase 1 Written Comments 
To provide a preliminary frame, the analysis of the 105 Phase 1 written submissions was initially 
set against the backdrop of the seven points that comprised the Inquiry’s initial terms of reference.  
As confirmation of the appropriateness of this frame, a reading of the submissions revealed that 
84.8% (89 of 105) were explicitly structured against the seven points and a further 14.3% (15 of 
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105) focused directly on the seven points but did so without an explicit structure.  Only one 
submission addressed issues outside the terms of reference.   
Since the Inquiry’s intent during Phase 1 was to seek opinions about various matters relating to 
executive remuneration, the Terms of Reference were designed to guide respondents rather than to 
solicit views on specific recommendations.  Further, given the breadth of concerns, a variety of 
issues were highlighted for discussion under each point.  As such, to provide for a meaningful 
analysis of the submissions, a refined structure using meanings-oriented analysis is developed.  
Specifically, the 105 submissions were carefully read for content and coded.  This resulted in a 
conceptually clustered matrix consisting of 128 responses by 105 submissions.  From this, the data 
was transformed, where themes with a response rate of greater than 30% were identified and then 
used to provide the final structure for the analysis.  Here, the following five key areas emerged:  (i) 
excessiveness of executive pay; (ii) sufficiency of the current system; (iii) adequacy of the pay for 
performance relation; (iv) role of disclosure and transparency; and (v) nature of future governance.  
These five key areas form the basis for the subsequent analysis of the Phase 1 written submissions.   
The results for this content analysis are presented in Table 4.5.  As revealed in the first section, 
42.9% of respondents (45 of 105) view executive remuneration as excessive, although 21.0% of 
respondents believe that it is not as bad as in the U.S.  Overall, however, only 3.8% (4 of 105) view 
executive remuneration as ‘not excessive’.  Not surprisingly, there are differences in the views 
expressed across the different respondent groups.  For example, 52.3% of Individuals, 40.0% of 
Representative Body respondents, and 50% of Academics view executive remuneration as 
excessive whereas only 30% of respondents from Industry do. 
From the second section, consistent with the views on whether executive remuneration is excessive, 
overall 58.1% of respondents view the current system of executive remuneration governance as 
insufficient, with 68.2% of Individuals, 66.7% of Representative Body respondents, and 66.7% of 
Academics holding this view.  In sharp contrast, 70.0% of respondents from Industry view the 
current system as sufficient with only 10% viewing it as insufficient.  Equally, from the third 
section, overall 44.8% of respondents indicated that they believed that the pay-for-performance 
link was either unclear and/or inadequate.  Here, Individuals, and respondents from the 
Representative Bodies and Professional Bodies voiced the greatest concern. 
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Table 4.5  Frequency distributions for responses to 5 key areas of concern identified in the initial submissions during Phase 1  
 Total 
Written 
Comments 
n = 105 
Industry 
n = 10 
 
Individual 
n = 44 
 
Represent 
Bodies 
n = 30 
Prof Bodies 
n = 6 
 
Academic 
n = 12 
 
Government 
n = 3 
 
Key Areas No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
(i) Excessiveness of executive pay               
  Pay for Australian executives is excessive 45 42.9 3 30.0 23 52.3 12 40.0 1 16.7 6 50.0 0 0.0 
  Australia's levels of remuneration are not as excessive as U.S. 22 21.0 4 40.0 4 9.1 11 36.7 1 16.7 2 16.7 0 0.0 
  Pay for Australian executives is not excessive 4 3.8 2 20.0 0 0.0 2 6.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(ii) Sufficiency of the current system               
  The current system of exec rem governance is sufficient 16 15.2 7 70.0 1 2.3 5 16.7 3 50.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
  The current system of exec rem governance is insufficient 61 58.1 1 10.0 30 68.2 20 66.7 2 33.3 8 66.7 0 0.0 
  No comment on effectiveness of current system overall 15 14.3 0 0.0 6 13.6 4 13.3 1 16.7 3 25.0 1 33.3 
(iii) Adequacy of the pay for performance relation               
  Pay for performance link is not clear or is inadequate 47 44.8 3 30.0 22 50.0 10 33.3 4 66.7 7 58.3 1 33.3 
  General comment that alignment of interests needs to be improved 22 21.0 1 10.0 13 29.6 6 20.0 0 0.0 1 8.3 1 33.3 
  No specific comment on trends 41 39.1 5 50.0 14 31.8 12 40.0 4 66.7 4 33.3 2 66.7 
(iv) Role of disclosure and transparency               
  More disclosure of executive pay is required 21 20.0 2 20.0 8 18.2 9 30.0 2 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
  More disclosure has not necessarily resulted in better information 24 22.9 4 40.0 4 9.1 11 36.7 5 83.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
  Increased transparency important 31 29.5 4 40.0 8 18.2 14 46.7 3 50.0 2 16.7 0 0.0 
  More/clearer disclosure of share-based payments is required 22 21.0 3 30.0 2 4.6 12 40.0 5 83.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
  Current system is excessively onerous 6 5.7 1 10.0 0 0.0 2 6.7 3 50.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(v) Nature of future governance.                
  Governance should be principles based, no prescriptive elements 26 24.8 7 70.0 2 4.6 13 43.3 3 50.0 1 8.3 0 0.0 
  Governance should include prescriptive measures  24 22.9 0 0.0 15 34.1 5 16.7 0 0.0 3 25.0 1 33.3 
  Combination of principles based with some prescriptive elements 8 7.6 0 0.0 2 4.6 3 10.0 1 16.7 2 16.7 0 0.0 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the data transformation and summary of the total conceptually clustered data matrix for Phase 1 submissions consisting of 128 responses by 105 submissions.  The 
total matrix is was summarised based on themes with a response rate of greater than 30% that are the five key areas  presented.
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Turning to the fourth section, respondents from the Representative and Professional Bodies groups 
were the most vocal about the adequacy of disclosure and transparency.  On the whole, these groups 
were aligned with the view that disclosure should be transparent, that more disclosure is required, but 
that greater disclosure does not necessarily result in better information.  Overall, of those that 
commented on disclosure and transparency, 20.0% believed that more disclosure was required and 
29.5% commented that increased transparency was important.  Notwithstanding, 22.9% suggested 
that increased disclosure had not necessarily resulted in a better understanding of executive 
remuneration.  Finally, 6% believed that the current system was already excessively onerous, 
requiring companies to disclose too much information. 
Finally, from the fifth section, when asked to consider any mechanisms that would better align the 
interests of boards and executives with those of shareholders and the wider community, overall 22.9% 
of respondents indicated that they believed there should be prescriptive measures put in place to 
manage the quantum and structure of executive remuneration.  Here, suggested measures included a 
cap on cash pay, or a mandated ratio between CEO pay and lowest/average worker wage.  Alternately, 
24.8% of respondents indicated that they believed governance should be principles-based while 7.6% 
indicated that they believed a combination of principles-based guidelines with some prescriptive 
elements was needed to improve the current framework. 
In summary, written submissions in response to the initial call for input into the Inquiry reveal that a 
majority of respondents viewed executive remuneration within Australia as excessive, the system of 
executive remuneration governance as insufficient, the pay-for-performance relation as unclear or 
inadequate, and saw a need for increased disclosure and transparency.  However, not all respondents 
appeared to hold the same view.  For example, as conjectured in Section 4.4, Individuals expressed 
strong concerns and clearly believed that there was a significant need for change.  In contrast, Industry 
respondents appeared to be much more comfortable with the status quo, with only 30% viewing 
executive remuneration as excessive and 70% viewing the existing system of executive remuneration 
governance as sufficient. 
Phase 2 Written Comments 
During Phase 2 of the Inquiry, the Commission sought additional input in response to its Discussion 
Draft.  In this section, analysis was undertaken of the content of the 65 written submissions received 
during this phase.  Initially the submissions were read to determine whether in principle, the 
respondents agreed or disagreed with the intermediate findings of the Commission as expressed 
through the 16 preliminary recommendations and one finding that comprised the Discussion Draft 
(Appendix B).  Following, analysis was undertaken of the 55 written submissions that made specific 
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comments on one or more of the recommendations to determine whether the respondent agreed, 
disagreed, or made no comment on each.  The results for these analyses are presented in Table 4.6.   
As revealed in Panel A, of the overall total of 65 written submissions, the greatest number were 
received from the Representative Bodies (23), Individuals (21), and Industry (12), with only seven 
submissions received from the Professional Bodies and one each from Academics and Government.  
Importantly, as can be seen in the first column, a significant majority of respondents indicated their 
support for the overall report, with 9.2% of respondents (6) offering strong support and a further 
53.8% (35) offering support but indicating that they believed that improvements were needed.  
Overall, only 3.1% of respondents (2) indicated that they were not supportive of the report, although 
33.8% (22) did not express an overview opinion on the report.  This pattern is relatively similar across 
the six respondent groups, with a majority of the respondents from each of the main groups (Industry, 
Individual, Representative Bodies, and Professional Bodies) indicating support but with the need for 
improvement.  The two respondents who were not supportive of the report were both from 
Representative Bodies. 
Continuing, Panel B summarises the views expressed within the 55 written submissions that made 
specific comments on one or more of the recommendations.  Here, only in the case of three 
recommendations did a majority of respondents express an opinion (#1 – the no vacancy rule; #8 – 
improve information content and accessibility of remuneration reports; and #15a/b – ‘say on pay’ 
legislation).  Further, of these three, the recommendation that attracted by far the greatest attention 
related to ‘say on pay’, with 85.5% of respondents expressing a view on the first part of the 
recommendation (#15a – response required for a 25% no vote) and 78.2% on the second part (#15b 
– the ‘two-strikes’ rule).  Further, this was the only recommendation that received a majority opinion, 
with 60% of respondents in agreement with #15a but 56.4% opposed to #15b. 
Turning to the responses by group, several patterns reveal themselves.  First, respondents from the 
Representative and Professional Bodies groups were broadly supportive of the discussion draft 
recommendations, with 13 of the 16 recommendations receiving majority support from 
Representative Bodies and seven receiving majority support from Professional Bodies.  Alternatively, 
only for one recommendation, Recommendation 15b – the two-strikes rule, did a majority of 
respondents from these two groups express their disagreement. 
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Table 4.6  Phase 2:  Frequency distributions for responses to the draft recommendations 
Panel A:  Degree of support for the overall draft report provided in the 65 written submissions 
 Total 
Comments 
n = 65 
Industry 
n = 12 
Individual 
n = 21 
Rep Bodies 
n = 23 
Prof Bodies 
n = 7 
Academic 
n = 1 
Gov’t 
n = 1 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Strong support 6 9.2 2 16.7 0 0.0 4 17.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Support but needs improvement 35 53.8 8 66.7 11 52.4 12 52.2 4 57.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Not supportive 2 3.1 0 0.00 0 0.0 2 8.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment on overall report 22 33.8 2 16.7 10 47.6 5 21.7 3 42.9 1 100.0 1 100.0 
Total written comments 65 100.0 12 100.0 21 100.0 23 100.0 7 100.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 
 
Panel B:  Degree of support for specific recommendations based on the 55 written submissions that included responses to 
specific recommendations 
 
Total 
Comments 
n = 55 
Industry 
n = 12 
Individual 
n = 15 
Rep Bodies 
n = 19 
Prof Bodies 
n = 7 
Academic 
n = 1 
Gov’t 
n = 1 
Recommendation N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
#1 – End the no vacancy rule 
Agree 14 25.5 0 0.00 4 26.7 9 47.4 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 16 29.1 10 83.3 0 0.0 5 26.3 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 25 45.5 2 16.7 11 73.3 5 26.3 5 71.4 1 100.0 1 100.0 
#2 – Ensure remuneration committee independence  
Agree 21 38.2 3 25.0 1 6.7 12 63.2 4 57.1 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 4 7.3 1 8.3 0 0.0 3 15.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 30 54.6 8 66.7 14 93.3 4 21.1 3 42.9 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#3 – Promote remuneration committee independence (comply or explain)  
Agree 24 43.6 4 33.3 1 6.7 14 73.7 4 57.1 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 1 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 30 54.5 8 66.7 14 93.3 4 21.1 3 42.9 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#4 – Prohibit executives and directors voting on remuneration 
Agree 24 43.6 4 33.3 1 6.7 14 73.7 4 57.1 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 1 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 30 54.5 8 66.7 14 93.3 4 21.1 3 42.9 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#5 – Prohibit executives hedging 
Agree 18 32.7 4 33.3 1 6.7 11 57.9 1 14.3 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 2 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 35 63.6 8 66.7 14 93.3 7 36.8 5 71.4 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#6 – Prohibit executives and directors voting undirected proxies on remuneration 
Agree 13 23.6 2 16.7 2 13.3 9 47.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 14 25.5 6 50.0 0 0.0 5 26.3 2 28.6 1 100.0 0 0.0 
No comment 28 50.9 4 33.3 13 86.7 5 26.3 5 71.4 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#7 – Oblige all directed proxies to be cast 
Agree 24 43.6 5 41.7 4 26.7 13 68.4 1 14.3 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 31 56.4 7 58.3 11 73.3 6 31.6 6 85.7 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#8 – Improve information content and accessibility of remuneration reports 
Agree 23 41.8 4 33.3 2 13.3 11 57.9 5 71.4 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 5 9.1 1 8.3 0 0.0 2 10.5 2 28.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 27 49.1 7 58.3 13 86.7 6 31.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#9 – Remove superfluous disclosure 
Agree 22 40.0 4 33.3 0 0.0 11 57.9 6 85.7 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 3 5.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 10.5 1 14.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 30 54.5 8 66.7 15 100.0 6 31.6 0 0.00 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#10 – Require remuneration advisors to be independent of management 
Agree 23 41.8 5 41.7 1 6.7 14 73.7 2 28.6 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 1 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 31 56.4 7 58.3 14 93.3 4 21.1 5 71.4 0 0.0 1 100.0 
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Table 4.6 Panel B continued 
 
Total 
Comments 
n = 55 
Industry 
n = 12 
Individual 
n = 15 
Rep Bodies 
n = 19 
Prof Bodies 
n = 7 
Academic 
n = 1 
Gov’t 
n = 1 
Recommendation N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
#11 – Require remuneration advisors to be disclosed (comply or explain) 
Agree 19 34.5 3 25.0 0 0.0 13 68.4 3 42.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 6 10.9 1 8.3 0 0.0 3 15.8 1 14.3 1 100.0 0 0.0 
No comment 30 54.6 8 66.7 15 100.0 3 15.8 3 42.9 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#12 – Institutional investors to disclose their voting on remuneration reporting 
Agree 18 32.7 3 25.0 3 20.0 10 52.6 1 14.3 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 4 7.3 1 8.3 0 0.0 3 15.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 33 60.0 8 66.7 12 80.0 6 31.6 6 85.7 0 0.0 1 100.0 
Draft Finding 1 
Agree 11 20.0 3 25.0 2 13.3 3 25.8 2 28.6 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 6.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 43 78.2 9 75.0 12 80.0 16 74.2 5 71.4 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#13 – Remove taxation point impediment to deferred equity 
Agree 26 47.3 7 58.3 0 0.0 13 68.4 6 85.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 1 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 28 50.9 5 41.7 15 100.0 5 26.3 1 14.3 1 100.0 1 100.0 
#14 – Confirm allowance of electronic voting 
Agree 22 40.0 5 41.7 3 20.0 11 57.9 1 14.3 1 100.0 1 100.0 
Disagree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No comment 33 60.0 7 58.3 12 80.0 8 42.1 6 85.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
#15a – 25 percent ‘no’ vote on remuneration report issues 
Agree 33 60.0 5 41.7 11 73.3 12 63.2 5 71.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 14 25.5 6 50.0 1 6.7 5 26.3 1 14.3 1 100.0 0 0.0 
No comment 8 14.5 1 8.3 3 20.0 2 10.5 1 14.3 0 0.0 1 100.0 
#15b – substantial ‘no’ vote on two consecutive remuneration reports triggers board election 
Agree 12 21.8 0 0.0 6 40.0 6 31.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Disagree 31 56.4 12 100.0 1 6.7 11 57.9 6 85.7 1 100.0 0 0.0 
No comment 12 21.8 0 0.0 8 53.3 2 10.5 1 14.3 0 0.0 1 100.0 
 
In sharp contrast, a majority of respondents from the Industry group expressed their disagreement 
with four of the recommendations and support for only one (#13).  Further, 83.3% of these 
respondents expressed their disagreement with Recommendation 1 (the no vacancy rule) and 100% 
expressed their disagreement with Recommendation 15b (the two-strikes rule), figures that are the 
strongest across all recommendations and groups.  Lastly, there appeared to be only limited 
commonality in the views expressed by Individuals, with only Recommendation 15a (response 
required for a 25% no vote) receiving a majority view.  Here, 73.3% of respondents from this group 
expressed agreement with the recommendation. 
Second, across the set of recommendations, the only controversial ones appeared to be the two parts 
of Recommendation 15 regarding the ‘say on pay’ vote and to a lesser extent Recommendation 1 
regarding the no vacancy rule.  The no vacancy rule was clearly of concern to the Industry group with 
83.3% expressing their opposition.  In contrast, this recommendation received much more limited 
attention from respondents in the other groups, with no group expressing a strong view either way. 
Most notably, the two parts of Recommendation 15 appeared to be of broad interest, although opinion 
was also clearly divided.  Overall, this recommendation had the lowest ‘no comment’ score of any 
recommendation, with 85.5% of respondents expressing a view on the first part (#15a) and 78.2% on 
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the second part (#15b).  Further, of the 55 respondents, 33 (60.0%) agreed with the first part whereas 
31 (56.4%) disagreed with the second part.  Support, however, differed markedly across the groups.  
Recommendation 15a received majority support from Individuals (73.3%), and from both the 
Representative Body (63.2%) and Professional Body (71.4%) groups.  In contrast, Industry 
respondents appear to be split on this part, with 41.7% in agreement and 50.0% disagreeing.  
Alternatively, 100% of the Industry respondents disagreed with the second part, Recommendation 
15b, as did 57.9% of respondents from the Representative Bodies and 85.7% of respondents from the 
Professional Bodies.  In contrast, only one (6.7%) of the Individuals disagreed with this part while 
40.0% expressed support. 
In summary, based on their written comments, respondents from the various groups appear to have 
reacted to the discussion draft in quite different ways.  While respondents from the Representative 
and Professional Bodies appear broadly supportive, respondents from the Industry group directed 
their efforts narrowly within the discussion draft, targeting specific recommendations that appeared 
to cause them concern, notably the two-strikes rule.  Overall, the two parts of Recommendation 15 
appeared to be the key issue, with respondents from all groups expressing a consensus on each part, 
although from contrasting perspectives.  The next section focuses on respondents who made written 
submissions during both phases of the Inquiry in hopes of identifying patterns that might underlie the 
lobbying activities of the various groups.   
4.5.3 Lobbying Strategy 
In this section, comparisons are made of the focus and tone of the written submissions of respondents 
who made written submissions to both phases of the Inquiry.  Five members of the Industry group 
made two written submissions, as did seven Individuals, 19 respondents from the Representative 
Bodies, and six from the Professional Bodies.  Only one Academic and no Government respondents 
made two written submissions, therefore the focus of this section is the 37 respondents from the four 
main groups.   
In brief, Individuals, and the respondents from both the Representative and Professional Bodies, 
tended to present a consistent message across the two phases, using Phase 1 to express their views 
and Phase 2 to re-emphasise their views on issues they saw as important.  In contrast, during Phase 
1, respondents from the Industry group tended to present an image of supporting the Inquiry while at 
the same time indicating that the current system was working relatively well.  However, during Phase 
2, they mounted strong arguments directly focused on a limited number of specific recommendations 
contained within the Discussion Draft report that they opposed.   
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These findings are consistent with prior expectations, summarised in Section 4.5.2, that while the 
underlying message conveyed by many of the groups remained unchanged, respondents from the 
Industry group appeared to change their tone, lobbying strategically during Phase 1 and then revealing 
their true underlying preferences or concerns during Phase 2.  Such findings are consistent with 
Amershi et al.’s (1982) representation wherein one type of player has the incentive to lobby 
strategically during the first round, here the Industry group, if they believe that the other respondents 
hold specific beliefs about them, namely that they likely have strong or hidden preferences, private 
information, and particular knowledge of other respondent player types.  Equally, the remaining types 
of players have limited incentives to lobby strategically in a non-cooperative game with asymmetric 
information if they believe there is a strategic player in the game and thereby lobby honestly during 
the first round. 
To illustrate this interpretation, the following material presents a series of quotes from the 
submissions made by respondents from the Industry group, Individuals, and respondents from both 
the Representative and Professional Bodies. 
Industry  
A reading of the written submissions made by respondents from Industry reveals a discernible change 
in tone from their first submission to their second submission.  Overall, submissions to the first phase 
tended to be conciliatory in nature, expressing in principle support for the Inquiry.  While most 
indicated that they would support change, they were confident that major changes would not be 
necessary.  Their strategy during this phase appeared to be to emphasise the adequacy of the current 
system, and that the non-binding vote provided enough accountability to shareholders.  One common 
theme was the need to avoid ‘unintended consequences’.  Alternatively, in responding to the 
Discussion Draft in the second phase, responses tended to be much stronger in tone and more directed.  
While respondents appeared careful not to discredit the draft recommendations in its entirety, most 
submissions explicitly stated an opposition to certain recommendations with strongly worded 
supporting arguments. 
As one example of this pattern, BlueScope Steel’s (2009) initial submission included the following 
general statements,  
“Remuneration governance standards should articulate principles that can be applied by boards 
to the competitive circumstances of their companies, and that governance requirements should 
not attempt to prescribe detailed application of principles” 
while at the same time stating that “It was appropriate to maintain the non-binding status of 
shareholder votes on remuneration reports” and also making the assertion that “Australia has been 
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largely spared from the examples in some sectors of the U.S. market of gross excesses in executive 
remuneration practices.”  In contrast, their submission in response to the Discussion Draft was much 
more directed, stating, 
“We are supportive of the recommendations to enhance the governance practices on 
remuneration matters while at the same time urging the Commission to reconsider two 
recommendations that we consider will have a detrimental impact on the ability for boards to 
operate effectively … ‘the two vote test’ and ‘end the nonexecutive director vacancy rule’.”  
Here, they argued that a spill of the board is “not appropriate as it creates instability and is 
impractical” while in terms of the no vacancy rule, they argued “the board should have the flexibility 
to determine the appropriate board size” and the rule “removes flexibility to introduce additional 
directors on a needs basis …”. 
In a similar fashion, BHP Billiton (2009) stated at the outset in its initial submission that 
“We believe Australia’s regulatory framework for director and executive remuneration is robust 
and not in need of significant change” 
and continued this theme throughout the submission, explicitly and repeatedly emphasising the need 
for flexibility and that differences are “understandable”, and concluding with the caution, 
“there is the danger that additional requirements, if proposed, may prove counter-productive in 
either making reports longer, more complex and therefore difficult to understand, or potentially 
causing unintended consequences.”  
Alternatively, in their submission during the second phase, the company started by stating 
“We welcome the thrust of the Report and note that many of the recommendations are consistent 
with BHP Billiton’s existing practices” 
but then directly targeted specific recommendations, stating, 
 “While we do not disagree with that general approach, there are two recommendations that we 
believe are worthy of being considered in a broader context:  the proposed ‘two-strikes’ rule 
and the proposed removal of ‘no vacancy’ clauses … the ‘two-strikes’ proposal focuses excessive 
attention on executive remuneration, instead of a broader examination of director accountability 
to shareholders; and any removal of the ‘no vacancy’ clause should be considered in the broader 
context of how directors may be nominated for election in Australia compared with other key 
markets …, and also compared with the thresholds for shareholders to place other items on the 
Notice of Meeting in Australia.” 
Thus, as these two examples illustrate, overall the Industry respondents appeared to have adopted a 
strategy of concealing their preferences or concerns during the first phase, preferring to portray the 
current system as functioning appropriately and cautioning the Commission against proposing 
changes that could have “unintended consequences”.  During the second phase, they then turned 
directly to the specific recommendations that they opposed, most notably the “two-strikes” and “no 
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vacancy” rules, mounting strongly worded counter-arguments as to why those recommendations were 
inappropriate. 
Individuals 
The majority of Individuals who made written submissions to both phases of the Inquiry appeared to 
feel passionately about what they considered to be the excessive level of executive remuneration.  
While the Phase 2 submissions tended to be more formal in presentation and tone, the language was 
strongly worded and direct in both phases.  As one example, Stekhoven (2009) stated in their 
submission during Phase 1 that,  
“No person is worth the enormous packages given and I hope this commission can influence this 
decadence and greed” 
while in Phase 2, they stated,  
“I hope this commission will see fit to bring executive salaries down to a reasonable level 
compared to the average employee.” 
Equally, Jacoby (2009) stated in their submission to the first phase,  
“Shareholders should have a right of veto over such excesses and it should be written into law.  
It is about time Directors and CEOs are made accountable to shareholders for their excesses by 
changing the Companies Act to make them accountable.” 
while in Phase 2, they stated,  
“The way things are the Directors and CEO are virtually looting and plundering the company 
with their excesses in salary, fees and bonus issues without accountability.  If this commission is 
serious, let us see strong action to put an end to this rorting.” 
Finally, while clearly much more moderate in their views than many of the other Individual 
respondents and leaning towards the status quo, Vanderlaan (2009) also explicitly revealed their 
preferences during the first submission and then used the second submission to reinforce these views.  
To illustrate, during the first submission, the respondent stated, 
“Taking a wider, contemporary perspective suggests that current levels of executive 
remuneration are not necessarily excessive ….  In my opinion, prior to recommending any 
change in regulation of executive remuneration, possible sources of potential costs should be 
systematically identified, analysed and evaluated, and unless Commissioners are satisfied that 
the tangible benefits for shareholders and the community generally expected from any given 
change are substantial, and clearly exceed expected costs, they should recommend that the status 
quo be maintained.”  
and followed in their second submission in response to the Discussion Draft, 
 “In my opinion … Discussion Draft is a generally measured response to shareholder and 
community concerns about executive remuneration.  However, for reasons submitted below I am 
concerned that ‘facilitating shareholder engagement’ in executive remuneration processes by 
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way of increasing the power of shareholder votes … is very likely to have the unintended 
consequence of imposing substantial losses of wealth on some shareholders, notably 
shareholders in companies that for various reasons are inherently difficult to manage.” 
Thus, overall, a reading of the written submissions made by Individuals who responded during both 
phases of the Inquiry indicates that they did not engage in gaming tactics, rather instead opted to 
express their true views during the first phase and then reiterate their position during the second phase.  
Further, they tended to exhibit the same tone and theme in both phases. 
Representative Bodies  
An in-depth reading of the written submissions made by the respondents from the Representative 
Bodies who made written submissions during both phases of the Inquiry reveals two quite different 
viewpoints.  While the majority of respondents were critical of the current system of executive 
remuneration and thereby strongly supportive of the need for major changes, a minority expressed 
the view that the current system was working reasonably well but that it could benefit from some 
more modest improvements.  Of note, however, irrespective of initial predisposition, the focus and 
perspective expressed by the various respondents largely remained consistent across the two phases.  
Almost uniformly, they explicitly revealed their position during the first phase, and then reiterated or 
reinforced it during the second phase. 
To illustrate, FSU Australia (2009) presents an example of a respondent that argued the need for 
change.  Specifically, in their initial submission, FSU stated, 
“There has been a recent period of excessive risk-taking that has demonstrated the issues of 
inappropriate incentive systems.  This has ultimately led to market failures, and indeed it could 
be said that more regulation is required to correct the market failures of the current executive 
market.” 
Their second submission then included the following statements supportive of the Discussion Draft 
including the more radical reforms that were proposed, thereby providing continued and consistent 
support for the need for change, 
“We welcome the approach that the PC has adopted to ensure that recommendations are 
evidence-based.  FSU supports most recommendations in the Discussion Draft that seek to 
reduce conflicts of interest, increase independence and improve disclosure.  There are some 
recommendations we have sought clarification on, and look forward to this being addressed in 
the final report.” 
Alternatively, Guerdon Associates represents an example of a respondent relatively supportive of the 
status quo.  Here, in its initial submission, Guerdon (2009) stated, 
“From a comparative international perspective, Australia has a well-balanced governance 
infrastructure, which, in the field of executive pay, allows the board to make operational 
decisions on pay matters to best meet their fiduciary duties while still remaining directly 
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accountable to shareholders.  In particular, there are good tools for shareholders to exercise 
constraint through non-binding votes on annual remuneration reports and director elections or 
removal.  But the system can and should be improved (see below) …” 
In its second submission, Guerdon stated that it “broadly supports most the Commission’s draft 
recommendations” but then proceeded to present counterarguments against specific 
recommendations that it viewed as unnecessarily strong, stating for example, 
“A major concern with the draft report is that some recommendations have the somewhat 
perverse effect of over-emphasising the importance of executive remuneration relative to other 
director responsibilities.  For example, the ‘two-strikes and election’ recommendation may be 
reasonable in regard to the non-binding vote on remuneration, but does not have an equivalent 
for more material issues of valid concern to shareholders”.   
 and further,  
 “While the low board representation of women indicates that current board demographics are 
not representative of the broader community, or even the executive community, removal of the 
no vacancy rule will not resolve the supply side problem.  What is required is an attack on the 
plethora of regulations and liabilities across state and federal boundaries that discourages 
otherwise qualified people from considering NED positions.” 
In this regard, Guerdon appears to have retained its view that there was no need for major change. 
Professional Bodies 
Overall, respondents from the Professional Bodies who made written submissions during both phases 
of the Inquiry also appeared to adopt a strategy of consistency, expressing their preferences during 
the initial phase and then re-emphasising their (same) views during the second phase on issues they 
saw as key.  The following statement from the submission made by Ernst & Young (2009) during the 
second phase in response to the Draft Discussion clearly illustrates this interpretation: 
“We believe that the draft recommendations predominantly balance the need for shareholder 
influence with the commercial necessity for Boards to set pay structures and quantum.  We 
observe that the draft recommendations are, for the most part, consistent with the 
recommendations we made in our public submission (and the more detailed private submission).  
This third submission provides comment on the key areas where we believe further consideration 
by the PC is justified” 
Adopting a similar approach, the submissions by KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers made during 
the second phase targeted specific recommendations that they did or did not support.  However, in 
doing so, they did not materially deviate from, or alter, their earlier stated positions but argued in a 
more directed and forceful manner. 
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4.6 Alignment between Respondent Views and Final Recommendations 
As the final step in the analysis, this study documents the alignment of the views expressed by 
respondents through their written submissions with both the Commission’s final recommendations 
and the Government’s response.  Given the intense scrutiny and controversy surrounding executive 
remuneration at the time, this study argues that it is interesting to consider the extent to which views 
expressed by the various lobby groups were ultimately reflected in the final recommendations.  The 
final recommendations parallel those contained in the Discussion Draft, with the only difference 
being the inclusion of two additional administrative recommendations (#16 and #17).18  Ultimately, 
the government expressed support for all but one of the recommendations; it did not support 
Recommendation 13 that related to the taxation point.   
Table 4.7 presents the percentage of respondents, by group and phase of Inquiry, whose written 
statements implied support for, or opposition to, each of what subsequently became the final 
recommendations.  To begin and perhaps not surprisingly given that submissions during the first 
phase were in response to the more broadly structured terms of reference, overall there is only a 
modest alignment between the views expressed in this phase of the Inquiry and the detailed final 
recommendations.  Perhaps most noteworthy was the relatively broad-based opposition to the notion 
of changing the vote, with 70% of Industry respondents, 36.7% of respondents from the 
Representative Bodies, and 83.3% of respondents from the Professional Bodies indicating that they 
viewed the current non-binding vote as providing shareholders with a sufficient voice.  Nevertheless, 
overall there appeared to be at most a modest systematic linkage between views summarised at the 
group level and the final set of recommendations that eventuated.   
Turning to the submissions made during Phase 2, given that the final recommendations are the exact 
mapping from the recommendations contained within the Discussion Draft, these figures are a repeat 
of those reported in Table 4.6 and discussed in Section 4.5.2.  As noted there, majority support was 
received from the Representative Bodies on 13 of the 16 recommendations, and from the Professional 
Bodies on seven.  These two bodies only expressed their opposition to one recommendation, 
Recommendation 15b.  Alternatively, the Industry group expressed majority support for only one 
recommendation and majority opposition to four recommendations.  Overall, there appeared to be 
relatively little commonality in the views expressed by the Individuals. 
 
                                                 
18 A detailed description of the final recommendations with government responses is available at:  
http://mfsscl.treasurer.gov.au/Ministers/ceba/Content/pressreleases/2010/attachments/033/033.pdf 
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Table 4.7  Percentage of written responses expressing an opinion on each of the final recommendations  
Recommendation Industry Individual Rep Body Prof Body Academic Government 
 1st  
Phase 
n = 10 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 12 
1st 
Phase 
n = 44 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 15 
1st 
Phase 
n = 30 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 19 
1st 
Phase 
n = 6 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 7 
1st 
Phase 
n = 12 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 1 
1st 
Phase 
n = 3 
2nd 
Phase 
n= 0 
#1 support 10.0 0.0 2.3 26.7 3.3 47.4 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   oppose 0.0 83.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#2 support 40.0 25.0 11.4 6.7 43.3 63.2 50.0 57.1 16.7 100.0 33.3 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#3 support 0.0 33.3 0.0 6.7 0.0 73.7 0.0 57.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#4 support 0.0 33.3 2.3 6.7 13.3 73.7 16.7 57.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#5 support 0.0 33.3 0.0 6.7 23.3 57.9 0.0 14.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#6 support 0.0 16.7 0.0 13.3 0.0 47.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 0.0 28.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
#7 support 0.0 41.7 0.0 26.7 3.3 68.4 0.0 14.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
   oppose 10.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#8 support 50.0 33.3 36.3 13.3 46.7 57.9 66.7 71.4 25.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 20.0 8.3 6.8 0.0 10.0 10.5 16.7 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#9 support 50.0 33.3 13.6 0.0 30.0 57.9 66.7 85.7 8.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 10.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 10.0 10.5 0.0 14.3 16.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 
#10 support 30.0 41.7 2.3 6.7 43.3 73.7 50.0 28.6 8.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#11 support 20.0 25.0 18.2 0.0 16.7 68.4 0.0 42.9 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 40.0 8.3 4.5 0.0 33.3 15.8 33.3 14.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
#12 support 0.0 25.0 13.6 20.0 0.0 52.6 0.0 14.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 0.0 8.3 2.3 0.0 16.7 15.8 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#13 support 50.0 58.3 13.6 0.0 40.0 68.4 50.0 85.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   oppose 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#14 support 0.0 41.7 9.1 20.0 20.0 57.9 16.7 14.3 8.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
#15a support 0.0 41.7 13.6 73.3 3.3 63.2 0.0 71.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 oppose 70.0 50.0 6.8 6.7 36.7 26.3 83.3 14.3 8.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 
#15b support - - - 0.0 - - - 40.0 - - - 31.6 - - - 0.0 - - - 0.0 - - - 0.0 
 oppose  100.0  6.7  57.9  85.7  100.0  0.0 
Taken together, the final recommendations presented by the PC overlay to a large extent with the 
views expressed by Representative Body respondents, and to a reasonable extent with the views 
expressed by Professional Body respondents.  Only in the instance of Recommendation 15b (the 
“two-strikes” rule) did the final recommendation run counter to their expressed views.  Thus, overall, 
there appeared to be a reasonable degree of correspondence between the views expressed by both the 
Representative and Professional Bodies, especially those of the Representative Bodies, and the final 
recommendations.  Alternatively, the correspondence between the expressed views of respondents 
from the Industry group and the final recommendations was exceedingly limited, with their views on 
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only one recommendation (#13) coinciding with the final recommendations.  As previously 
discussed, during the second phase, the strategy adopted by the Industry group was to directly and 
forcefully target the small subset of draft recommendations that they strongly opposed.  In this regard, 
their opposition to the four recommendations that became the central focus of their submissions was 
ultimately overlooked by the PC.   
Arguably, one possible interpretation of these findings is that the views of the Representative and 
Professional Bodies were afforded a different consideration to those expressed by the Industry group, 
and thus, the possibility that the Inquiry may have been in some sense ‘captured’ by the views 
expressed through submissions made by the Representative and Professional Bodies.  To gain a 
further understanding of whether this is likely the case, researchers could also investigate the private 
lobbying activities of these bodies, however these activities are likely unobservable.  Equally, the 
finding does not preclude the possibility that the views expressed by the Representative and 
Professional Bodies were simply more closely aligned with the PC’s interpretation of its 
responsibility to the broader set of stakeholders on behalf of that it was acting, and thereby no 
particular group enjoyed greater influence over the ultimate outcomes from the process.  As cautioned 
by Amershi et al. (1982), the combination of incomplete information and strategic behaviour makes 
an analysis of that players are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ a ‘delicate matter’.  Notwithstanding, it appears 
that some Industry respondents supported recommendations ultimately passed into legislation that 
resulted in reduce welfare and sub-optimal utility for those respondents.  For example, 
recommendations #8 and #10, supported by a majority of Industry respondents during Phase 1 and 
one-third of Industry respondents during Phase 2, ultimately resulted in additional disclosure 
requirements.  As suggested by Amershi et al. (1982), these respondents appear in some cases to have 
rationally voted with the majority and are therefore in principle ‘winners’, and yet likely incurred 
increased costs as a result of their choice that also rendered them as ‘losers’.  
4.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, the lobbying efforts of various respondent groups that made submissions to the PC 
Inquiry are examined in detail.  Consistent with expectations, the lobbying behaviours of the various 
groups appear to be related to their preference for change, the costs of regulatory change relative to 
the costs of lobbying, and their need to develop reputational capital.   
With regards to frequency of lobbying, the analysis reveals that there were a total of 166 respondents 
that made 290 submissions across the two phases of the Inquiry, 187 during the first phase and 103 
during the second phase.  Further, while most respondents made their initial contact during the first 
phase, consistent with prior expectations, lobbying activity during the second phase was greater by 
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respondents from industry, and the representative and professional bodies, than by the remaining 
three groups.  Finally, a majority of the submissions were written, representing 58.6% of all 
submissions.  However, the various groups relied on quite different means to communicate with the 
Commission, with individuals and academics relying extensively on written communication while 
respondents from the professional bodies also made use of public hearings and the industry group 
made use of the roundtable forum.   
With regards to lobbying strategy, respondents from the Industry group presented in a conciliatory 
manner during the first phase, although at the same time revealing a preference for the status quo.  
However, during the second phase they directly targeted specific recommendations that appeared to 
cause them concern, notably the two-strikes rule.  In this sense, they clearly adopted a strategic 
posture during their lobbying activities.  In contrast, respondents from the both the Representative 
and Professional Bodies were consistently supportive of the need for change across both phases and 
broadly supportive of the Inquiry’s recommendations.  Here, they also engaged actively during both 
phases, consistent with recognition of the importance of their reputational capital.  Finally, 
Individuals expressed strong concerns during Phase 1 about the need for change, but having done so 
were relatively less active during Phase 2.  The final recommendations are found to be largely aligned 
with the views expressed by the Representative Bodies and to a lesser extent with those expressed by 
the Professional Bodies, perhaps suggestive that the input from these two bodies was viewed 
favourably by the Commission.  In contrast, the final recommendations almost exclusively conflict 
with the strong positions adopted by the Industry group in their Phase 2 submissions where they 
explicitly voiced their opposition to four specific recommendations. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature.  The first is to our understanding of the 
strategic lobbying behaviour associated with the public consultation process in the setting of 
regulation.  Uniquely in the lobbying literature, this study exploits the multi-period nature of the 
consultation process within the Inquiry.  This is in contrast with much of the extant literature, which 
as noted by Amershi et al. (1982) and Georgiou (2004), fails to recognise that strategic lobbying 
activity is likely conducted over multiple periods.  The focus on the lobbying activities surrounding 
a single issue over multiple periods provides evidence on both the nature and the persistence of 
lobbyists’ involvement in the regulatory process.  It also sheds light on that types of lobbyists are 
likely to employ a strategy of repeated contact.  An understanding of lobbying behaviour should 
enable regulators to avoid unintended or biased outcomes. 
It also examines lobbying in a setting where recommendations have the potential to, and ultimately 
did, impact corporate reporting regulations at multiple levels, including accounting standards, 
corporate governance guidelines and corporations law.  In this sense, this setting differs from that 
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found in prior studies that have generally considered lobbying arising in response to a single type of 
regulatory change, such as a change to accounting standards (Georgiou, 2004; Katselas et al., 2011; 
Stenka and Taylor, 2010). 
As discussed previously, the interest of this analysis to the thesis is the origins of the accountability 
mechanism.  From these results it is clear that industry lobbyists strongly opposed the introduction of 
the two-strikes rule.  In Stage 3 of the thesis, the Australian listed firms that lobbied the PC Inquiry 
will be re-examined.  In that study, the opposition presented by the lobbying firms will be juxtaposed 
against the remuneration disclosure policy evident in the audited remuneration report to ascertain if 
a relation exists between the opposition to the accountability mechanism, and the firm’s remuneration 
disclosure policy.    
Prior to the specific analysis of the lobbying firms disclosure policy, Stage 2 presents an analysis of 
the impact of the introduction of the two-strikes rule on the remuneration disclosure policy of 
Australian listed firms.    
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Stage 2 
Disclosure and Accountability 
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Chapter 5. Theory Development 
Stage 2 of this thesis comprises a quantitative analysis of the implementation of the two-strikes rule, 
focussing on the effect of the legislation on firms’ disclosure policy choice and the operationalisation 
of the voting mechanism.  This chapter establishes the research methodology employed in conducting 
the quantitative analysis that consists of constructing and applying a disclosure index to generate 
disclosure scores used in univariate and multivariate analysis.  This chapter is structured as follows.  
Section 5.1 provides an overview, while section 5.2 expands the theoretical development that 
underlies the investigation of the research questions posed in Chapter 1.   
5.1 Overview 
Where market forces have resulted in undesirable economic solutions to resource allocation problems, 
regulation may be useful in resolving the issues in the market (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  However, if 
governance and regulation are not to become ad-hoc in nature, then intuitively there should be some 
measurable and persistent benefit.  The regulation governing executive remuneration evolved rapidly 
in Australia from 1984 through until 2010.  In 2011, in a globally unprecedented move to improve 
accountability of company boards to their shareholders, the two-strikes and spill legislation was 
introduced to the Corporations Act.  The PC Inquiry, CAMAC, media and government espoused 
transparency as being the essential element necessary to improve the perceived problems of excessive 
and unjustified executive remuneration.   
As a precursor to assessing the effect of the regulatory change in the market, as described by RQ2, 
this thesis examines whether changes to the level and type of remuneration disclosure have occurred 
following the PC Inquiry and the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Specifically, this study 
investigates the impact of the two-strikes rule on improving the accountability of the board by 
examining its effect on the transparency of remuneration disclosure.  The findings contribute to the 
understanding of the relative informativeness of regulated and unregulated financial information by 
providing evidence of the real effects of introducing a mechanism such as the two-strikes rule.   
This study focuses on the ‘voting’ aspect of the two-strikes rule, and examines whether shareholder 
dissent (measured as the percentage of ‘no votes’ against the remuneration resolution) has an 
association with disclosure policy.  The vote on the remuneration report is advisory only, meaning 
that if the resolution is not passed, the board is not bound to change the remuneration contracts 
described in the report, nor the remuneration paid.  This was intentional, as the PC Inquiry reported 
that CEO pay levels in Australia were comparable to European standards (PC, 2010:80), and that 
legislative requirements for disclosure were in line with other countries (PC, 2010:243).  Therefore, 
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the intent of the two-strikes rule was to ‘encourage behavioural change’ (PC, 2010:390) in disclosure 
practice by giving shareholders a mechanism that allows them to signal dissatisfaction with pay 
arrangements to the board.  Through this feedback mechanism, the two-strikes rule is intended to 
improve the usefulness of the remuneration report via improved disclosure, or in the absence of 
appropriate executive remuneration contracts, enable the shareholders to remove the board.  While 
other studies have examined the direct effect of the two-strikes rule on the level and composition of 
CEO pay, this study seeks to examine whether the two-strikes rule has improved accountability of 
the board through improved remuneration disclosure.     
The timing and outcome of the Inquiry provides a natural experiment to examine this unusual 
regulatory choice.19 As Leuz and Wysoki (2016) state, counterfactuals are usually difficult to identify, 
whereas over this time period, Australia provides a unique opportunity and setting in that to isolate 
and examine this one regulatory mechanism with minimal confounding underlying changes in 
disclosure requirements.  From 2008 through to 2014, all Australian listed firms have been subject to 
the same remuneration contract disclosure requirements and subsequently impacted by the exogenous 
shock of the two-strikes rule in 2011.  All CEOs receive remuneration payments, the details of that 
should be disclosed according to the legislation.  These disclosures should be made regardless of the 
level or structure of the remuneration.  While there is no control group in this natural experiment, 
there is an uncomplicated pre and post analysis that can be undertaken.   
This unique setting gives rise to two research questions: 
Disclosure Policy 
RQ1:  Did disclosure policy change as a result of the conduct of the PC Inquiry, and in 
particular did mean disclosure levels increase after the introduction of the two-strikes 
rule? 
Accountability 
RQ2:  Does shareholder voting on the remuneration report result in altered firm remuneration 
disclosure policy, thereby behaving as an accountability mechanism? 
The following sections elaborate on the theoretical basis of the research questions, describing the 
prior literature pertinent to the predicted outcomes and the adopted methods.   
                                                 
19 This setting mimics a natural experiment in that it allows an examination of the impact of the introduction of principles 
based regulation on the enforcement of pre-existing prescriptive legislative requirements.  Luez and Wysoki (2016) 
describe this as a ‘real-effects’ study where a non-traditional disclosure and reporting setting is examined to learn about 
the changes in behaviour of the reporting entity. 
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5.2 Research Question 1: Disclosure Policy  
After examining the issues in executive remuneration in Australia, the PC Inquiry found that while 
legislated disclosure requirements had increased substantially, boards were not providing the level or 
content of disclosure needed by shareholders to make informed decisions about the appropriateness 
of CEO remuneration (PC, 2010: 242).  This situation of information asymmetry has potential costs 
to the firm (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973) and improved disclosure is generally accepted as being one 
solution to problems associated with information asymmetry (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000).  The academic literature supports the view of the PC Inquiry that disclosure was 
only increasing at a minimal rate despite increasing legislative requirements (Clarkson et al., 2006, 
2011; and Nelson and Percy, 2008).  In line with the preferences lobbied for by industry members, 
professional bodies and some representative bodies, the PC Inquiry did not recommend increases to 
legislated remuneration disclosure requirements.  Instead, the two-strikes rule was recommended 
(also lobbied against by Industry respondents), and then, in a globally unprecedented and unexpected 
move, was introduced into legislation. 
As such, there is no regulatory reason for an expected change in the level or nature of listed firms’ 
remuneration disclosure between 2008 and 2014, as there were no new disclosure requirements.  Any 
increase in disclosure would be expected to be due to the increased compliance with existing 
regulation in response to the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Examining a sample of 124 
Australian firms from 1998 to 2004, Clarkson et al. (2006) found significant, but small, incremental 
improvements in the level of disclosure concurrent with regulatory changes that mandated more 
disclosure.  Nelson and Percy (2008) studied changes in disclosure in 153 Australian firms in 2000 
and 2002 and while they found very small increases in total disclosure (91.55% in 2000 increasing to 
93.15% in 2002) in line with the changes to regulation, they found that firms were not 100% 
compliant, and most of the variation was in the ‘sensitive’ elements of the disclosure.  The Nelson 
and Percy (2008) findings support Clarkson et al.’s (2006) proposition that firms appear to respond 
only to black letter requirements, and are not fully compliant even when requirements are mandated.  
Based on these findings, Clarkson et al. (2011) suggested that firms are unlikely to respond to 
principles based requirements.  Given the PC Inquiry did not result in more black letter disclosure 
requirements for remuneration contracts, prior research would indicate that no change in disclosure 
behaviour should be expected following the PC Inquiry.20  
                                                 
20 The PC Inquiry recommendations did result in the strengthening of the disclosure requirements for the use of 
remuneration consultants.  These requirements had previously existed under three independent sources of guidelines but 
were included in the Corporations Act following the Inquiry.  
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This expectation of no change in disclosure behaviour in the absence of additional disclosure 
requirements is juxtaposed by the introduction of the two-strikes rule, which was designed to improve 
compliance with pre-existing mandated disclosure requirements.  In support of this tactic, Ball (2001) 
suggests that the risk of endogenous litigation is more likely to force management to disclose all 
information in a timely fashion, including bad decisions and poor outcomes, than any regulation that 
is imposed by governments.  Jamal, Maier and Sunder (2005) found that a mechanism that generates 
trust may be more useful in garnering compliance with standards than legal enforcement.  Hope 
(2003) supports this view in an accounting setting, finding that a strong enforcement regime of 
accounting standards results in more consistent and overall higher levels of disclosure.  The two-
strikes rule falls somewhere between a formal legal enforcement and a socially embedded 
enforcement mechanism, and as such, even in the absence of new mandated disclosure requirements, 
higher levels of total disclosure are expected following the PC Inquiry.    
5.2.1 Transparent Disclosure 
In the final report, the PC Inquiry did not provide evidence that remuneration disclosure practices of 
Australian firms were in breach of existing legislation.21  Instead, the Inquiry said that the usefulness 
of disclosures was diminished by ‘boiler-plating and some crucial omissions’ (PC, 2010: 241).  This 
explains why, instead of recommending the government regulate for ‘more’ disclosure, the Inquiry 
advocated for ‘greater transparency’ in disclosures.  When the legislation was announced, the stated 
intent of the two-strikes rule was to ‘increase transparency and accountability in executive 
remuneration matters’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010).   
Prior to 2011, shareholders already had access to a non-binding vote on the remuneration resolution.  
The PC Inquiry indicated that since its introduction in 2004/2005, the non-binding vote had 
encouraged companies to engage with shareholders, and many firms appeared to amend remuneration 
contracts in response to shareholder voting (PC, 2010:296).   However, despite these improvements, 
overall the average level of dissenting vote was increasing, as was the instance of companies receiving 
consecutive high dissenting votes.   To resolve these issues, the PC Inquiry recommended that the 
vote be ‘strengthened’ without being made ‘binding’ (PC, 2010).  As a result, the two-strikes rule 
strengthened the existing non-binding vote by introducing the 25% ‘strike’ threshold, and the board 
spill component.  The intention of the PC Inquiry was that the ‘board spill’ would be the ultimate 
sanction to enable ‘shareholders to deal with the relatively small proportion of companies that appear 
unresponsive to their concerns’ (PC, 2010:386).         
                                                 
21 Chapter 8 of the PC Inquiry final report discusses compliance with disclosure requirements (2010: 241 – 276). 
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The two-strikes mechanism is therefore designed to improve communication between boards and 
shareholders, with the onus on boards to convince shareholders via transparent disclosures that 
remuneration arrangements are optimal.  While some research suggests the vote on the remuneration 
report is not used as intended in Australia (Monem & Ng, 2013), theoretically the voting mechanism 
provides an avenue through which shareholders can signal their level of satisfaction or dissent with 
the account of the remuneration contract provided by the board via the remuneration report.    
Given that the PC Inquiry found that CEO pay in Australia was comparable to European countries, 
media and shareholder beliefs that CEO pay is excessive or unjustified may be an information 
asymmetry problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  Alternatively, the board may have incorrectly assessed 
the usefulness of remuneration disclosures provided to shareholders (Wee, Tarca & Chang, 2014), 
and the shareholders have misjudged the level of optimality in the contract.  The purpose of the voting 
mechanism in this context is to encourage firms to address the information asymmetry problem by 
providing better, not just ‘more’, disclosure regarding the levels of remuneration and the link between 
CEO pay and firm performance.  Transparent information allows the reader of the report to 
understand the underlying economics of the remuneration payment, which in turn allows the 
shareholder to make an informed decision about the suitability of the remuneration payment (Barth 
& Schipper, 2008).  The existence of the two-strikes rule should therefore make firms improve not 
only the amount of disclosure they provide, but also the transparency of their disclosure.    
Even in the absence of the threat of a ‘board spill’, support for why firms would choose to redress the 
information asymmetry problem by changing the disclosure policy of the company to make the 
content of the disclosure more useful to shareholders can be found in the academic literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Empirical disclosure literature has found an association between improved 
disclosure and a reduction in information asymmetry (Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001), improved 
disclosure and reduced cost of equity capital (Artiach & Clarkson, 2014; Botosan, 1997) and 
specifically, a positive association exists between mandated remuneration disclosure and reduced 
agency costs (Hope & Thomas, 2008).  In addition, higher disclosure quality is associated with higher 
CEO pay (Hui & Matsunaga, 2014).  Despite these documented benefits, a firm’s disclosure policy 
has been demonstrated to be a board decision associated with a cost-benefit analysis (Wee et al., 
2014), and there is research that indicates that increasing disclosure in the market can lead to negative 
consequences such as increased executive compensation (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012).  With 
specific reference to remuneration disclosure, research finds strong motivation against full disclosure.  
For example, Frantz et al. (2013) demonstrate that because disclosure cannot be made selectively to 
shareholders, there is a cost associated with revealing proprietary information to strategic opponents 
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under a full disclosure setting.  They conclude that ‘mandating the disclosure of executive 
compensation can therefore make shareholders worse off’ (Frantz et al., 2013:29). 
The fundamental challenge facing the PC Inquiry was to balance the best interests of companies and 
their shareholders.  Prior research suggests firms may be reluctant to reveal the sensitive elements of 
the remuneration contract, however the introduction of the two-strikes rule suggest governments 
believed shareholders needed more information.  Given that under the two-strikes rule ignoring 
shareholder dissent has potential repercussions for the board, it is expected that firms will provide 
more transparent disclosure following the introduction of the rule, however the expectation is that 
due to various costs of disclosure, firms will not commit to 100% transparency.   
5.3 Research Question 2: Accountability  
From an agency theory perspective, the design of the executive compensation contract aims to align 
the interests of the manager with the shareholders by incentivising the manager to make decisions 
that benefit the firm (Murphy, 1999).  For various reasons, such as outcome uncertainty and risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the interests of managers and 
shareholders can never be perfectly aligned.  As a result, remuneration contracts have the side effect 
of incurring monitoring, bonding and residual costs that are borne in varying degrees by the manager 
and shareholder.  In addition, Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that CEOs will exert their managerial 
power over the board to extract higher than optimal pay.  As a result, the objective of shareholders 
will be to adopt an optimal contract that maximises manager alignment while minimizing agency 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
To ensure that an optimal contract is in place, shareholders need information to be able to monitor 
the contract and assess the extent of agency costs.  To enable this, the details of the contract and the 
performance of the management should be easily identified by shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  
Therefore, to reduce agency costs, an optimal contract must be in place, and to satisfy themselves that 
the contract is optimal, shareholders need transparency and accountability from the board. 
Despite the information needs of shareholders, boards are found to control the level of disclosure 
provided in the remuneration report (Clarkson et al., 2006, 2011).  Agency theory in the context of 
information economics can partially explain the variations in remuneration disclosure level across 
firms, and in turn explain why boards do not provide transparent disclosures (Meek et al., 1995).  The 
central premise of the theoretical framework of disclosure is that in deciding their disclosure policy, 
boards trade-off the related costs and benefits of revealing proprietary information to the market 
(Hayes & Lundholm, 1996; Wee et al., 2014).  One potential cost for firms of insufficient 
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remuneration disclosure may be the loss of equity investment or increased cost of equity capital, 
because investors perceive that the CEO remuneration contract is not optimal (Healy & Palepu, 2001).   
In the case where the CEO contract is optimal, but shareholders impose costs on the firm because the 
disclosure provided by the board is not sufficient to explain the optimality of contract, the board has, 
in theory, failed to be accountable to the shareholders (Richardson and Welker, 2001).  The two-
strikes rule is designed to remedy this lack of accountability by encouraging boards, through 
shareholder voting, to provide transparent disclosure in the remuneration report.  In this sense, the 
two-strikes rule is a mechanism that is part of a larger ‘accountability framework’ (Cooper & Owen, 
2007).   
Cooper and Owen (2007) define accountability as the obligation to explain, justify and take 
responsibility for decisions, actions or events.22 Cooper and Owen (2007:653) suggest that in a 
corporate setting, an ‘accountability framework’ is required to operationalise accountability.  The 
accountability framework includes three components: the provision of an account of events (the 
remuneration report); a process that empowers shareholders to provide feedback (the voting 
mechanism) to enable the process of ‘taking responsibility’; and an enforcement mechanism (Cooper 
& Owen, 2007:653).   
Under this framework, the first stage of achieving accountability is for the board to provide 
communication to the stakeholder that ‘explains and justifies’ the actions in question (Cooper & 
Owen, 2007:653).  Roberts & Scapens (1985:454) argue that accountable communication needs to 
go beyond providing technical facts, and should focus on providing disclosures that will be ‘useful’ 
to shareholders.  In providing an account of events, organisations should be ‘forthcoming with 
relevant information’ (Ball, 2009:304).  This explains the relation between accountability and 
transparency because disclosures that go beyond providing technical facts are referred to as 
‘transparent’.  As discussed in Section 3.2.3, based on Ball et al. (2003) and Pownall and Schipper 
(1999), in this study disclosure contained in the remuneration report is considered to be transparent 
if the reader is able to determine the underlying economics of the executive remuneration contract.  
Therefore, to be accountable, boards need to provide more than technical facts, in the remuneration 
report.  The report needs to disclose transparent justifications for CEO pay that the shareholders can 
use to assess the optimality of the remuneration contract.   
                                                 
22 Cooper and Owen (2007) also argue that corporations owe accountability to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and 
as such accountability cannot be achieved through by reporting reforms (such as the two-strikes rule) alone.  In this study, 
accountability is restricted to the intent of the PC Inquiry, and viewing accountability through a wider lens is outside the 
scope of this research.  
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The second component of the accountability framework is a feedback mechanism (Cooper & Owen, 
2007).  The two-strikes rule is intended to be the ‘feedback mechanism’.  The voting element of the 
rule is designed to give shareholders the opportunity to communicate to the board their level of 
satisfaction with the board’s account of CEO performance and pay (Yermack, 2010).   
The third component of the accountability framework necessitates the existence of an enforcement 
mechanism.  While a non-binding vote on the remuneration resolution has been available to 
shareholders in Australia since 2005, the PC Inquiry found that the average level of no votes was 
increasing over time, and over 5% of ASX200 companies experienced successive years of high no 
votes (PC, 2010:296).  The Inquiry viewed these statistics as evidence that boards were not 
responding to shareholder feedback.  As a result, the ‘board spill’ component of the two-strikes rule 
was introduced with the intent of encouraging boards to engage with shareholders, and providing 
shareholders with a mechanism to sanction boards that failed to address shareholder concerns 
regarding remuneration (PC, 2010:301).  The board spill element of the two-strikes rule is consistent 
with the accountability framework requirement for an enforcement mechanism (Cooper & Owen, 
2007).   
To summarise, the two-strikes rule is intended to operate in an overall ‘accountability framework’ for 
CEO remuneration contracts.  The remuneration report is the boards’ account of the CEO’s actions 
and resulting payment, the voting mechanism enables shareholders to provide feedback to the board, 
and the board spill is an enforcement mechanism to ensure board participation in the accountability 
process.     
Within this accountability framework, if the CEO remuneration contract is approaching optimality, 
however the level of shareholder dissent is high, the board could be expected to respond by increasing 
disclosure to inform the shareholder of the optimality of the contract.  By increasing transparent 
disclosure that educates shareholders as to the level of optimality of the CEO remuneration contract, 
the following year should see the level of no-votes decrease.  On this basis, it was the PC Inquiry’s 
intention of the voting mechanism was that the vote should act as a feedback loop to the board (PC, 
2010:297). 
This feedback loop suggests that the shareholders exercise their vote in response to the level of 
disclosure in the current year’s remuneration report.  At this point, research does not support the 
existence of an association between the level of remuneration disclosure and shareholder dissent.23 
Some research suggests that shareholder voting rights are problematic due to the lack of sophisticated 
                                                 
23 Computershare’s April 2017 ‘Intelligence Report’ suggests that key proxy advisors have used the opportunity of 
increased strike activity in 2016 “to draw attention to issues around governance, board diversity and remuneration”, which 
may indicate that voting on the remuneration resolution is not disclosure related. 
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knowledge held by shareholders (Bainbridge, 2006), and there are contradictory indications in the 
literature as to the drivers of shareholders voting behaviour (Monem & Ng, 2013; Alissa, 2015).  
Bugeja et al. (2016) find that since the introduction of the two-strikes rule, the level of CEO pay 
appears to be a significant driver of strikes in Australia, a finding that is supported by research 
conducted in the UK setting (Kimbro & Xu, 2016; Alissa, 2015).   Overall, the literature agrees that 
shareholders will exercise their voting power to express general dissatisfaction (Johnson, Porter & 
Shackell-Dowell, 1997; Thomas & Cotter, 2007).  To examine the operationalisation of 
accountability framework, RQ2 is examined through two sub-questions: 
RQ2a: In the year t, is the shareholder no vote inversely related to total and transparent remuneration 
disclosure?  
The board’s response following high shareholder dissent is the second question of interest in this 
study.  Research by Ertimur et al. (2010), Ferri and Maber (2013) and Alissa (2015) find that boards 
appear to respond to shareholder dissatisfaction, although not in systematic ways.  By introducing an 
enforcement mechanism to the accountability framework, the intent of the PC Inquiry was to improve 
transparency.  This suggests that a predictable board response to shareholder dissent is expected.  In 
particular:  
RQ2b: Is the disclosure in the remuneration report associated with the previous year’s dissenting 
shareholder vote? 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theory development of the two research questions and two sub-
questions that pertain to Stage 2 of this thesis.  The next chapter elaborates on the research 
methodology adopted to address these questions. 
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Chapter 6. Research Methodology 
This chapter describes the research design adopted in Stage 2, and the development of the statistical 
models used to examine the research questions and expectations outlined in Section 5.2.   
As identified in the literature review, this research examines the relationship between remuneration 
disclosure policy and the introduction of an accountability mechanism.  The first research question 
looks at whether disclosure policy has changed over time.  The second research question examines 
the accountability mechanism, focussing on the relation between disclosure policy and shareholder 
dissent.  The measurement of total and transparent remuneration disclosure is of central importance 
to this research; therefore, as a first step, this chapter outlines the development of the disclosure index 
in Section 6.1.  Section 6.2 then describes the research design, while Section 6.3 presents the sample, 
and Section 6.4 summarises. 
6.1 Index Development 
The purpose of this research is to examine the developments in audited remuneration reporting from 
2008 to 2014 with a focus on improvements in transparency and accountability.  To examine the 
changes in disclosure policy, a researcher developed disclosure index is constructed.  This index is 
used to score the disclosure levels of remuneration reports of Australian listed firms.  Transparent 
disclosure is measured by classifying each item in the index.  The index measures six categories of 
disclosure: total disclosure (DiscTOT), general remuneration report disclosure (DiscREM), share-
based disclosure (SHRBASED), transparent disclosure (TransTOT), transparent disclosure in the 
remuneration report (TransREM) and black letter disclosure (BLETTER).  This thesis utilises these 
scores as the disclosure proxy.  The notation and relationship between these categories are 
summarised in Figure 6.1.   
Figure 6.1  Summary of DISCtype categories 
DiscTOT = DiscREM + SHRBASED 
TransTOT = TransREM + SHRBASED 
DiscREM = TransREM + BLETTER 
This section describes and explains these concepts further including the development, classification 
and scoring of the disclosure index. 
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6.1.1 Development of the Index 
The development of the index follows the method employed by Clarkson et al. (2006) (see also 
Botosan, 1997; Clarkson et al., 2011).  The method involves using the relevant legislation to provide 
the base for unique, identifiable elements of disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2007).  In 
2014, Australian legislation required extensive executive remuneration disclosure, including detailed 
summaries of performance conditions and hurdles, explanations of why performance conditions are 
chosen and how achievement of hurdles is assessed.24  A copy of the full index is provided in 
Appendix C. 
The disclosure index is based on all executive remuneration disclosures required to appear in the 
audited remuneration report for 2014 annual reports, along with 4 additional researcher developed 
items.  The index includes requirements of the corporations legislation, the Australian accounting 
standards (which incorporate IFRS), and ASX listing rules.  Each individual item of disclosure is 
numbered, from 1 to 117, and is scored by a dichotomous procedure (described in full in Section 
6.2.7).  The maximum possible total disclosure score is 114. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there were extensive changes to the regulatory framework from 1986 to 
2007.  The Simpler Regulatory Bill - Remuneration Disclosures (2007) legislated that the 
remuneration disclosure requirements that had previously been outlined in the accounting standards 
were incorporated into the Corporations Act 2001, thereby becoming a legal requirement for all 
Australian listed firms.  From 2007 to 2014, there were some minor changes and additions to the 
disclosure requirements, however no major changes were introduced over this time period.  
Therefore, theoretically, firms should have been addressing all of the items in this disclosure index 
every year from 2008 until 2014. 
The disclosure of the valuation of share-based payments is a complexity in remuneration reporting in 
Australia that requires consideration.  While share-based payments are subject to extensive mandated 
requirements, the location of these disclosures within the annual report is subject to on-going debate.  
For this reason, the total index (DiscTOT) is divided into two subcategories.  DiscREM contains all 
disclosures that are unequivocally required to be disclosed within the remuneration report.  
SHRBASED contains disclosures pertaining to the valuation of share-based payments, around which 
there is some controversy as to location of disclosure.  These categories facilitate analysis of general 
remuneration disclosures (DiscREM) and share-based payment disclosures (SHRBASED) on a 
disaggregated and consolidated basis. 
                                                 
24 See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the Australian regulatory setting. 
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6.1.2 Remuneration Report Disclosure Requirements: REM 
As a starting point, the disclosure requirements of AASB124 Related Party Disclosures are used to 
provide the structure for the disclosure index.  AASB124 paragraph 17 states that disclosures must 
be made pertaining to categories of remuneration.  These categories form the basis for the section 
headings of the disclosure index:  general remuneration policy, fixed pay, short-term payments and 
long-term payments (the headings are shaded lines on the index, and do not attract a score).  By 2014, 
all details regarding what information was required to be disclosed had been removed from the 
accounting standards and incorporated into the Corporations Act, so no scored items were included 
in the index from the accounting standards. 
The content of the disclosures was then identified in the Corporations Act.  Paragraph 300A gives the 
overview of the content of the disclosures pertaining to remuneration.  Each sub paragraph point is 
parsed into individual items of disclosure and identified as separate numbers in the disclosure index.  
Paragraphs that required disclosure for two or more types of information were split into separate items 
in the index.   
An extensive part of s300A(1)(a) and (b) requires disclosure of the board’s general remuneration 
policy, and including the board’s policy in relation to the nature and amount of remuneration, and 
how remuneration relates to company performance.  This detailed section of the Corporations Act 
translates into 17 items of disclosure in the index (numbers 22 to 38) under the heading General 
Content.      
Section (1)(ba) requires disclosure of four distinct pieces of information for each ‘element’ of 
remuneration.  To identify ‘elements’, reference was made to AASB124, as discussed above, and the 
Corporations Regulations 2001, resulting in four main areas of remuneration that were identified as 
most likely to be relevant to a majority of ASX200 firms: fixed, short-term, long-term and share-
based payments.  The individual items in each of these areas are totalled to generate a group score for 
each.  These group scores are labelled FIXED (items 39 to 45), SHORT (items 46 to 57) and LONG 
(items 58 to 69).  The fourth element, share-based payments, constitutes SHRBASED of the index, 
details of which is discussed in section 6.1.4 below.     
While termination payments are identified in AASB124 as an element, they are not included with the 
same weighting as the other four areas.  This is because when considering termination payments, not 
all components of s300A(1)(ba) are considered to be likely to be relevant to the majority of firms (i.e. 
termination payments are not generally considered to be dependent on the satisfaction of a 
performance condition).  Based on this assumption, discussion of termination payments is included 
in the index under the section for general disclosure items.  Three points are included here: the 
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duration of the employment contract, the notice required, and termination payments provided (item 
numbers 76, 77 and 78).   
The Corporations Regulations 2001 section 2M.3.01 sets out ‘prescribed details of s300A’.  Item 12 
of section 2M.3.01 requires eight points of disclosure that are related to each ‘element’ of 
remuneration.  In combination with s300A, twelve items of disclosure are required for short-term 
incentive payments (index item numbers 46 to 57) and long-term incentive payments (index item 
numbers 58 to 69).  According to academic literature, fixed payments (referred to as fixed pay or base 
salary) are an amount of remuneration paid for carrying out regular duties, the level of which is set 
by market forces, and is not usually subject to a performance condition (Murphy, 1999), therefore 
only seven items of disclosure are relevant for fixed pay (index item numbers 39 to 45).   
Further, s300A(1)(a) requires that remuneration disclosures must be in a ‘separate and clearly 
identified section of the report’, therefore two points are awarded:  one for the report being included 
in the directors report, and one for a clear heading (item numbers 1 and 2).  Relating to remuneration 
consultant use, an additional seven items (index numbers 13 to 21) are created based on s300A(1)(h) 
of the Corporations Act.  The Corporation Regulations sections 2M.3.01(13) and (14) require 
additional disclosures including future remuneration contract conditions, any alternations made to 
remuneration contract, explanations of elements of pay not dependent on performance conditions, 
and the board’s policy of hedging of remuneration.  These requirements are incorporated into the 
index under the heading ‘General’.  Item number 72 was created to score whether firms provided a 
response to shareholders following a strike was included in the index based on s300A(1A)(g)(i).  This 
is the only item of disclosure not required prior to 2011.   
Based on the accounting standards, the Corporations Act and the Corporations Regulations, 68 items 
of disclosure were indexed.  These items are identified as DiscREM of the Total Disclosure Index.  
An additional eleven items are added to DiscREM, as discussed in section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. 
6.1.3 ASX Listing Requirements 
To ensure the index was comprehensive, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations 3rd Edition (ASX CGPRs) was consulted for additional disclosure items not 
covered by the accounting standards or the legislation.  The ASX CGPRs outlines recommended 
corporate governance practices for Australian listed companies.  Specifically, Principle 8 is 
‘Remunerate Fairly and Responsibly’.  While the structures in the ASX CGPRs are not mandated, 
the disclosures included are required on an ‘if not, why not’ basis.  This means that if a firm does not 
follow the guideline, they are required to explain why they don’t follow it.  Even though these 
disclosures are principles based and not directly legislated, the Corporations Act gives authority to 
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the ASX to enforce the Listing rules.  Therefore because the ASX Listing Rules require compliance 
with the ASX CGPRs, effectively, firms will not be able to operate on the Australian Stock Exchange 
if they do not meet the governance requirements.  For the purposes of this research, all firms should 
disclose ASX CGPR information, or explain why they don’t comply.   
A reading of Principle 8 reveals that in addition to items already included in the index, the ASX 
requires that listed entities establish a remuneration committee, and that details of the committee, i.e. 
the names of three independent director members, the committee’s charter, and the number of times 
the committee met during the year, should be disclosed.  These four items of disclosure are included 
in DiscREM as they relate to general remuneration disclosures.   
Based on the ‘if not, why not’ basis of the ASX CGPRs, if the firm does not have a remuneration 
committee, the firm must disclose three alternate items: the process for setting pay, how the 
appropriateness of pay is determined, and what measures are taken by the firm to ensure pay is not 
excessive.  These form an either/or option in DiscREM of the index regarding the remuneration 
committee.      
6.1.4 Share-Based Payments Disclosures: SHRBASED 
In combination, the Corporations Act s300A(1)(e), the Corporations Regulations 2M.3.01 item 14, 
and AASB2 Share-based Payment identify specific disclosure requirements for share-based payments.  
The disclosure index collates the requirements of the accounting standards, the Corporations Act and 
the Corporations Regulations to compile a list of 38 items, labelled SHRBASED. 
As mentioned previously, share-based payments are considered separately in the disclosure index due 
to the unique and problematic nature of these disclosures.  While the individual elements that need to 
be disclosed are clear when considering all avenues of legislation, the position of this disclosure 
within the annual report is not clear.   
The Corporations Act requires extensive disclosure of the executive remuneration contract, however 
the Act does not specifically refer to the disclosure of share-based remuneration, it refers to elements 
of remuneration that consist of ‘securities of a company’, that is, actual shares, not share-based.  
Share-based employee benefits are excluded from the scope of AASB119 ‘Employee Benefits’, and 
are instead covered by AASB2 ‘Share-based Payment’, which also creates uncertainty about where 
this information needs to be disclosed.  From 2004, the items in SHRBASED were required to be 
disclosed in the remuneration report as required by the accounting standard AASB124 Related Party 
Disclosures Aus29.7 – 29.29.7.3.  These requirements were controversial because the valuation 
requirements of the accounting standard were onerous and many parties felt the requirements were 
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misleading for users of financial statements.  From a disclosure perspective, these requirements were 
controversial because after the AASB disclosures were incorporated into the Corporations Act they 
were effectively required to be disclosed twice: in the remuneration report and also in the notes to the 
financial statements.   
The Simpler Regulatory Bill – Remuneration Disclosures (2007) legislated changes to the 
Corporations Act, removing the onus to make duplicate disclosures from 2008 reporting periods.  The 
intent of the Bill was to remove the requirement for the duplication of remuneration disclosures, 
including the AASB2 requirements, in both the remuneration report and the financial statements.  
Even though, in principle, the Corporations Act appears to require full disclosure of the total 
remuneration contract in the remuneration report, based on this Bill companies arguably have a 
choice.  Companies can choose to disclose details of all share-based executive payments in the 
remuneration report, as they were required to do between 2005 and 2007, or they can disclose this 
information in the notes to the financial statements.  For this reason, it is unclear whether SHRBASED 
disclosures will be included in the remuneration report or in the notes to the financial statements, and 
as such are scored separately.   
6.1.5 Additional Disclosure Items  
Once completed, a pilot test of the index was conducted.  To test the format and content of the index, 
the remuneration reports of three companies were scored across the four years by three researchers.  
Following the pilot, the structure of the sections in the index were arranged to match the logical flow 
of how the firms’ remuneration reports were presented.  In addition, five items were added to the 
index based on feedback that these items enhanced accessibility to the report, were disclosed by at 
least two firms therefore providing better levels of disclosure, and provided clarity to the level of 
disclosure the firm was providing.  The four additional items are added to DiscREM.  The researcher-
developed items are as follows: 
• Disclose if a consultant was used (to distinguish between company that stated consultant was 
used but did not provide other details such as name or fees that is recommended by the ASX 
listing rules). 
• Clawback provisions (malus) (in 2010 the CAMAC recommended disclosure of clawback 
provisions should be legislated, however that recommendation did not proceed). 
• Whether the remuneration report was included in the main index of the Annual Report (it was 
noted by the researchers that by adding a page number for the remuneration report, 
accessibility of the report was greatly enhanced). 
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• The location of the remuneration committee disclosures.  Researchers noted that firms could 
disclose the existence of the remuneration committee in the remuneration report, and refer the 
reader to the governance section of the director’s report for the detailed information pertaining 
to committee charter, membership and meetings.  In this case, these disclosures were scored, 
however an additional item was created to indicate that information contained within the 
remuneration report was more accessible. 
In total, the disclosure index identifies 117 items, reported as DiscTOT.  Due to the either/or nature 
of the committee disclosure, the maximum score possible for DiscTOT is 114.  DiscTOT is then 
subdivided into DiscREM and SHRBASED to allow analysis of share-based payments separately as 
discussed above. 
6.1.6 Transparent Disclosure 
At the conceptual level, the construct of interest is the level of transparent disclosure (as opposed to 
total level of disclosure) in order to assess accountability, however at the empirical level, transparency 
is an elusive notion.  ‘Transparent’ disclosure, not ‘simply more’ disclosure, was the intended goal 
of the two-strikes mechanism.  As described in Section 3.3.3, disclosure contained in the 
remuneration report is considered to be transparent if the reader is able to determine the underlying 
economics of the executive remuneration contract, as opposed to ‘black letter’ that is a detailed 
legislated disclosure requirement that leaves no opportunity for interpretative discretion.  The 
intention of the two-strikes mechanism was to improve the quality of disclosure by making the 
economics of the remuneration contract visible to shareholders.  To evaluate whether firms are 
generating ‘simply more’ or ‘better’ disclosure, the disclosure index has been further categorised into 
‘black letter’ and ‘transparent’ disclosure items.   
While these constructs are formally described in Section 3.3, to empirically distinguish transparent 
disclosure items, a survey of experts was conducted.25  Initially, two academic experts in the field of 
qualitative research assessed the survey for readability, understandability, and content validity 
(Moore & Benbasat, 1991).  Based on feedback from this assessment, the survey was modified and 
subject to a pilot application as a further check of reliability and validity (Van der Stede et al., 2005).   
The validated survey was then completed by nine external experts, comprising of a governance 
specialist, four specialist investors, three prepares of financial reports (accountants), and one 
academic who specialises in executive remuneration research. 
                                                 
25 The intention of the survey was not to collect data and therefore did not meet the requirements for ethical clearance or 
validation. 
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The nine experts were as follows.  The governance specialist, Ownership Matters, is an Australian 
governance advisory firm that prepares voting guidelines and specialised research reports for 
shareholders and institutional investors.  Ownership Matters prepare the Governance Concerns Index, 
and are involved in widely disseminated research such as the ACSI Annual Survey reports.  The four 
investors are fund managers with Hyperion Asset Management.  Fund managers use remuneration 
disclosures as a part of the overall assessment of the performance and suitability of companies for 
future returns.  The prepares include a public company accountant in a mid-tier accounting firm, a 
private company accountant in a large international mining firm and an accountant in an ASX200 
firm in the resources industry.  The academic has conducted research in the area of executive 
remuneration and disclosure, and is familiar with the development and application of disclosure index 
as a research tool.   
Each expert was involved in a discussion with the researcher where the purpose and use of the index 
was explained.  The experts were then given an explanation of transparent disclosure, and provided 
with a written document that explained the objective of the research, the definition of transparency, 
and provided written instructions on how to complete the index.  The experts were asked to complete 
the survey by classifying each item on the disclosure index according to the relevance of each item 
of disclosure for ‘adding transparency’ to the report as opposed to being ‘black letter’ disclosures.26  
Experts were asked to rank each disclosure item according to the following scale: 
1. Hindrance:  This information just adds unnecessary length to the document, or creates 
confusion for the reader.   
2. Irrelevant:  This information is irrelevant to your understanding (it may be useful, but not 
for this purpose). 
3. Useful but not key:  While this information is nice to have, it is not core to your analysis of 
the CEO remuneration contract. 
4. Core:  It would be very difficult to evaluate the economics of the CEO remuneration 
without this information. 
5. Critical:  This item is essential in understanding/evaluating how and why the CEO 
achieved the amount of remuneration reported. 
To categorise the index, the raw scores were first collated, by averaging the scores for the fund 
managers and accountants to gain one score for each type of expert.  The mode score of the four 
groups for each disclosure item was then calculated.  For three separate items of disclosure, the score 
awarded by the academic expert was at extreme odds with the other three groups of experts and was 
therefore excluded (for those three items only).  This approach was taken as the focus of transparency 
was deemed to be more important from the view of users and preparers as opposed to the theoretical 
view of the academic.  Based on the experts’ scores, disclosure items that received a mode score of 4 
                                                 
26 The disclosure index survey information is included at Appendix D. 
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or 5 were classified as an item of ‘transparent’ disclosure and are included in the ‘transparency score’ 
awarded to firms. 
In the case of the section of items that relate to the disclosure of the use of a remuneration consultant, 
the rankings from the experts on six of the seven items were very disparate.  On the first item (a 
researched developed item), ‘the remuneration report discloses that a consultant was/was not used’, 
one group ranked the item as ‘critical’, two ranked it as ‘core’ and the governance expert ranked the 
item as ‘irrelevant’.  For the other six items relating to the use of a consultant, the fund managers 
ranked those disclosure items as ‘Critical’ to understanding how and why the CEO received the 
reported remuneration, while the academic ranked these disclosures are ‘Core’.  The governance 
expert ranked the six consultant disclosures as ‘Irrelevant’, and the accounting experts ranked them 
as ‘Hindrance’.  To gain a better understanding of the consensus of the user/preparer expert view, the 
academic ranking is excluded.  These items of disclosure relating to remuneration consultants are 
considered to be black letter in line with the majority, however due to the range of classification by 
the experts, an analysis of the disclosures regarding the use of remuneration consultants is conducted 
and reported separately.   
As a result of the survey of experts and the subsequent ranking process, DiscREM is partitioned into 
black letter disclosures and transparent disclosures.  Of the initial 79 disclosure items in DiscREM, 
27 items are classified as transparent.  These 27 items are totalled and form the measure TransREM.   
With regards to SHRBASED, the expert panel were asked the question ‘Do you think it is sufficient 
if share-based payment calculations and details are included in a note to the financial statements?’ In 
response to this question, one investor and one accountant thought that disclosure in the notes was 
sufficient.  The seven out of the nine experts who indicated that they thought disclosure in the notes 
was not sufficient but that these disclosures should be included in the remuneration report were asked 
to classify these disclosure items using the same scale.  Of the seven experts who indicated that 
SHRBASED disclosures should be included in the remuneration report, six respondents indicated 
that every item of disclosure relating to the vesting requirements, number and price of share-based 
payments was ‘core’ or ‘critical’ in adding to transparency of the remuneration contract.  Using the 
same averaging process that was applied to generate TransREM, all of the items in SHRBASED are 
classified as transparent disclosures.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, SHRBASED disclosures 
are examined as a component of total disclosure, but also independently, due to the legislation being 
vague in its requirements as to the location in the annual report where these disclosures should be 
reported.  Total transparent disclosure, TransTOT, is the sum of TransREM and SHRBASED. 
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6.1.7 Scoring 
Each remuneration report was read and scored for each of the 117 items on the disclosure index.  
Section 300A(1)(a) sets out the requirement that the disclosures in 300A must be in a ‘separate and 
clearly identified section of the report’.  Based on this requirement, the disclosure index is only 
applied to the remuneration report, and not to the notes to the financial statements.  The governance 
statement in the annual report of the firm is only scored when the remuneration report specifically 
refers the reader to that section with regards to the remuneration committee.  Data was collated in 
Excel.  Items were scored 1 if the required information was disclosed and 0 if the item was not 
disclosed.  In the case where a disclosure item did not apply to the firm the item was given a score of 
2 to allow those items to be excluded from the final score.   
Once the remuneration report had been fully read, the index was checked for completeness.  If the 
item was scored 2 or blank, the remuneration report was electronically scanned using the ‘find’ 
function to determine whether the item was disclosed in the report.  The large majority of 
remuneration reports were scanned for the words ‘clawback’ and ‘hedging’ in order to score those 
disclosure items.  Where disclosures for SHRBASED were not included in the remuneration report, 
the notes to the financial reports were scanned to determine whether the firm made share-based 
payments, which in turn determined whether SHRBASED items were scored 0 or excluded.  To 
ensure consistency and completeness, a random selection of remuneration reports were electronically 
scanned for various terms such as ‘consultant’, ‘options’ and ‘equity’, and the scoring was checked 
and compared.     
Once scoring was completed, consistent with prior disclosure research (Clarkson et al., 2006; Lim et 
al., 2007) the total assigned score was scaled by the maximum available score for the individual firm.  
Total disclosure, therefore, is the sum of the total disclosure index across all categories for each firm, 
i, in each time period, t (DiscTOTt,i).  The total disclosure for each subcategory (DISCtype) is the total 
items disclosed for each category d to the maximum relevant items for each firm.   
The following formula is applied to each type of disclosure:  
DISC𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1
 
Where: 
ditem =1 if the item is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
td = number of disclosure items relevant to firm i 
type = category as described in Section 6.2.7. 
i  = firm 
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This process was completed for each measure of disclosure:  DiscTOT (114 possible maximum), 
DiscREM (76 possible maximum), and SHRBASED (38 possible maximum).  DiscTOT was 
classified into transparent and black letter items.  All of SHRBASED items were considered to be 
important for transparency by the panel of experts.  DiscREM was parsed into 27 items of transparent 
disclosures, reported as TransREM, and 49 items of black letter disclosure, reported as BLETTER.  
TransTOT is the total of all transparent items, with a maximum score of 65.  All analysis is based on 
these scaled measures.  The classification process results in five measures of disclosure that are 
summarised in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2  Summary of DISCtype notations and scores 
DiscTOT 
(Max = 114) = 
DiscREM 
(Max = 76) + 
SHRBASED 
(Max = 38) 
TransTOT 
(Max = 65) = 
TransREM 
(Max = 27) + 
SHRBASED 
(Max = 38) 
DiscREM 
(Max = 76) = 
TransREM 
(Max = 27) + 
BLETTER 
(Max = 49) 
6.1.8 Summary 
Section 6.2 outlines the development and classification of the disclosure index used to score audited 
remuneration reports resulting in a total remuneration disclosure score, DiscTOT.  The process for 
classifying the total disclosure index using a panel of industry experts was then described.  The next 
section discusses the sample selection for Stage 2. 
6.2 Research Design 
The first expectation in this research is that total and transparent disclosure will increase concurrent 
with the conduct of the PC Inquiry and the subsequent introduction of the two-strikes rule.  To 
examine this, a predominantly univariate analysis is undertaken.  The second research question 
examines the accountability mechanism, focussing on the relation between disclosure policy and 
shareholder dissent.  The approach taken in that instance is a multivariate regression analysis.  The 
approach to both research questions is outlined in this section. 
To examine the predicted increases in level of disclosure across the study period, first, the researcher 
developed disclosure index described in Section 6.1 is used to capture the cross-sectional variation of 
total and transparent disclosure in the remuneration reports of the sample.  The descriptive statistics 
for total and transparent disclosure are used to determine whether disclosure levels have increased.  
Then a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is performed with the disclosure score as the 
independent variable, and the year as the dependent variable.  This allows for comparison of the mean 
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levels of disclosure between each of the four years.  The F statistic for each of the dependent variables 
is interpreted.  For significant groups, a post-hoc comparison of the means using Tukey’s HSD test 
is conducted to determine significantly different years, and to allow identification of homogenous 
groups within the time series.   
This analysis will determine whether the levels of disclosure have increased, and whether any 
increases across years are concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  To complete the 
examination of the first research question, a disclosure model consistent with extant literature is 
developed to establish whether the univariate results are supported in a multivariate context.  The 
second research question is addressed by extending the model and incorporating the independent 
variable, shareholder dissent, measured by the percentage of no votes against the remuneration 
resolution.    
The models are estimated using multiple regression analysis.  Multiple regression analysis is used to 
examine this relation because it allows predictions to be made by the researcher regarding the 
dependent variable based on several independent and control variables.  The regressions are 
conducted on a pooled cross-sectional sample of Australian firms for the period 2008 to 2014.  The 
sample characteristics are discussed further in Section 5.5. 
6.2.1 Empirical Method: RQ1 Disclosure 
The first question of interest in this study is whether the disclosure policy of Australian firms has 
changed concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  To extend the univariate analysis 
of this question, following extensive prior research, a base disclosure model is developed to examine 
remuneration disclosure policy in a multivariate context (Botosan, 1997; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993).   
 The specific form of the model is: 
DISCtype:i,t = α + δt + β1Sizei,t + β2ROAi,t + β3Growi,t+ β4Auditi,t + β5Industryi + 
β6Top20i,t + β7CEOchi,t + β8 lnCEOremi,t+ β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t +δi + ε 
(6.1) 
Where: 
DISCtype:i,t = scaled disclosure score derived from the application of the disclosure index to firm 
i remuneration report in year t for disclosure type. 
δt = equal to one (1) in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Size i,t = the natural log of total assets for firm i as at the end of the financial year t.  The data 
is obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database.   
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ROA i,t = the return on assets for firm i as at the end of the financial year t, calculated as net 
income divided by average total assets.  The data is obtained from the Morningstar 
DatAnalysis database. 
Grow i,t = the book to market ratio representing growth options, measured as the book value 
of equity divided by the total equity market value (which is equivalent to shares 
outstanding times the stock price) for firm i as at the financial year-end t.  The data 
is obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database.   
Audit i,t = a categorical variable equal to one (1) when firm i reports the use of an auditor from 
one of the largest four audit firms in Australia during the year t, and zero otherwise.  
The data is obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database.   
Industry i,t = a categorical variable based on the GICS industry classification of firm i as at the 
end of the financial year t, representing firm complexity.  The data is obtained from 
the Morningstar DatAnalysis database.   
Top20 i,t = the percentage of shares held by the twenty largest shareholders on the share 
registry of firm i as at the reporting date for year t.  The data is obtained from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis database.   
CEOch i,t = a categorical variable equal to one (1) if a new CEO is appointed at firm i during 
the year t, and zero otherwise.  The data is obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Connect 4 Boardroom database.   
CEORem i,t = the natural log of the reported value of total CEO remuneration for firm i as at the 
end of the financial year t.  The data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Connect 4 
Boardroom database.   
Bonus i,t = a categorical variable equal to one (1) if the firm discloses that a short-term bonus 
payment was made to the CEO, and zero otherwise.  The data is obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Connect 4 Boardroom database.   
Options i,t = is a categorical variable equal to one (1) if the firm classifies a portion of the CEO 
remuneration as ‘options’, and zero otherwise.  The data is obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Connect 4 Boardroom database.   
Equity i,t = is a categorical variable equal to one (1) if the firm classifies a portion of the CEO 
remuneration as ‘shares’ or ‘equity’ as a separate category to ‘options’, and zero 
otherwise.  The data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Connect 4 Boardroom 
database.   
δi = the firm-specific variation in the disclosure score. 
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The dependent variable is the scaled disclosure score derived from the application of the disclosure 
index to firm i remuneration report in year t for disclosure type:  DiscTOT, DiscREM, SHRBASED, 
TransTOT, TransREM, BLETTER.  The right- hand side variables include a series of dummy variables 
equal to one (1) in year t, and zero otherwise, with 2008 excluded as the reference year, to capture 
the difference in disclosure in each year.  If the level of disclosure has increased after the introduction 
of the two-strikes rule, δt should be positive and significant for 2012 and 2014.   
Prior studies examining mandatory and voluntary disclosure, and specifically remuneration 
disclosure, indicate other factors that are related to the level of disclosure in remuneration reports.  
The general disclosure literature indicates controls for firm size, financial performance, growth 
options, governance, firm complexity and ownership structure.  Remuneration specific disclosure 
literature indicates controls for CEO change, remuneration amount and the structure of the 
remuneration package.   
Firm size has been demonstrated to be a strong driver of disclosure due to economies of scale of 
information production, and financial transparency has been demonstrated to be highest in larger 
firms (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Bushman et al., 2004).  Firm size has also been demonstrated to be 
one of the main determinants of executive pay, because larger firms seek to avoid shareholder 
activism by providing more remuneration disclosure (Conyon & Murphy, 2000).  To avoid the 
volatility of other measures such as total equity and market capitalisation, the natural log of total 
assets is used as a control for size (Bushman et al., 2004; Bugeja et al., 2016; Clarkson et al., 1999, 
2013, 2006; Gul & Lueng, 2004).  Consistent with the findings of Clarkson et al. (2006), a positive, 
significant association is expected between Size and level of remuneration disclosure.   
Theory of disclosure suggests that firms with superior financial performance signal good news 
through more disclosure (Core, Holthusen & Larker, 1999).  However overall, the extant literature 
provides inconsistent findings on the association between firm performance and overall disclosure.  
Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that these inconsistencies may relate to differences in 
management and investors’ perceptions of the level of information asymmetry present in the market.  
Evidence in the Australian setting following the adoption of IFRS finds that firm performance is 
associated with more disclosure only in specific circumstances, for example if the firm has 
experienced an improvement in performance after a year a poor performance (Wee et al., 2014).  
Research examining firm performance and remuneration disclosure has not found a significant 
association between the two (Clarkson et al., 2011; Ertimur et al., 2013).  While various proxies for 
performance are used in the literature, the use of ROA follows Meek et al., 1995, Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000 and Clarkson et al. 2011.  Duru, Iyengar and Zampelli (2012) who find that the 
conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors encourages the use of ROA as a performance metric 
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for CEO remuneration, which in turn suggests ROA is likely to be an appropriate measure of 
performance in remuneration research.  Due to the conflicting evidence in the prior research, no 
prediction is made regarding the direction of association between ROA and disclosure or dissent.   
Healy, Hutton & Palepu (1999) find that a key driver of the level of firm disclosure is the information 
environment of the firm.  Firms with higher growth opportunity have been shown to provide more 
voluntary disclosure to offset potential agency costs associated with higher information asymmetry 
(Hossain, Ahmed, & Godfrey, 2005).  Contrary to these findings, Smith and Watts (1992) found that 
the cost of monitoring executives is positively related to firm growth opportunities.  Due to the 
complexity of the CEO contract in high growth firms, disclosure is therefore lower (Smith & Watts, 
1992).  Based on the broader disclosure literature and following Clarkson et al. (2006), firm growth 
(Grow) is expected to be negatively associated with remuneration disclosure.   
The importance of firm governance on the level and quality of voluntary disclosure has extensive 
support in prior literature (Beekes, Brown & Zhang, 2015; Clarkson et al., 2006; Hope, 2003; Lim et 
al., 2007).  Chapple and Truong (2015) find that compliance with mandatory disclosure reform is 
inconsistently impacted by corporate governance.  With regards to remuneration disclosure Bassett 
et al., (2007) find a significant and positive relation between the level of remuneration disclosure and 
the quality of the auditor appointed by the firm.  Therefore, auditor quality (Audit) is expected to have 
a positive association with disclosure.   
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that it is not cost effective for small shareholders to monitor the 
firms’ management, however larger shareholders have access to the funds and technology necessary 
to directly monitor boards.  Prior research finds that increases in disclosure are associated with higher 
institutional ownership (Healy et al., 1999), however this is not a clear association because alternate 
research suggests this is only the case in some situations (Bushee & Noe, 2001).  Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) find that institutional investors can actively monitor the process of evaluating and rewarding 
managerial performance without the need for public disclosures.  This finding is supported by Tasker 
(1998), who finds that institutional investors can access the information through private channels and 
would prefer the information not be made public.  Recent Australian research suggests that this theory 
holds for remuneration disclosures, that is, if the firm is closely held, the CEO’s performance and 
behaviour can be monitored without reliance on the remuneration report (Bugeja et al., 2016).  
Therefore, firm ownership (Top20) is expected to be negatively related to disclosure.   
Prior evidence indicates that boards use a change in CEO to revise the remuneration contract resulting 
in better disclosure, especially where a previous contract may have been perceived by shareholders 
as suboptimal as a result of undue CEO influence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012).  CEO change 
(CEOch) is expected to have a positive association with disclosure. 
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The relation between the firm’s overall disclosure policy choices and the structure of CEO 
remuneration has been extensively examined in prior literature (Bugeja et al., 2016; Bugeja et al., 
2012; Clarkson et al., 2011; Core et al., 1999; Correa & Lel, 2016; Ertimur et al., 2010).  However, 
the direct relationship between CEO pay and the disclosure about that pay has received limited 
attention.  The natural log specification is applied to mitigate the impact of outliers in the sample.  
Based on the broader disclosure literature that suggests that more complex and larger contracts are 
more difficult to explain, CEO reported remuneration (CEOrem) is expected to have a negative 
association with disclosure.   
Prior research has found an association between higher information asymmetry and the use of equity 
incentives (Core et al., 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993).  However, when examining remuneration 
disclosure, research findings indicate that as the equity proportion of total remuneration increases, 
remuneration disclosure transparency decreases (Hogan & Jonas, 2016).  To avoid problems 
associated with various methods of valuing equity, prior research adopts the approach of applying 
categorical variables to identify the components of the remuneration contract (Aboody & Kasznik, 
2000; Miller & Piotroski, 2000; Nagar et al., 2003).  The association between structure and disclosure 
is undetermined in the literature; therefore no prediction is made regarding the direction of association 
between CEO remuneration structure (Bonus, Option, Equity) and Disclosure. 
Consistent with extensive prior research, industry type (Industry) is included as a proxy for 
proprietary costs and firm complexity.  Some prior research indicates that complex firms and those 
with high proprietary costs make fewer disclosures (Verrecchia, 1983).  In contrast, other research 
suggests that voluntary disclosure by some firms may provoke other firms to increase disclosure (Dye 
& Sridhar, 1995).  Research that focuses on remuneration disclosure is conflicted regarding the role 
of industry membership on disclosure strategy.  The findings of Nelson et al. (2010) and Frantz et al. 
(2013) are consistent with the theory of proprietary costs, suggesting that sensitive information in 
remuneration contracts is not disclosed consistently across industry groups.  Consistent with this 
view, disclosure level is expected to vary between Industry. 
Based on the prior literature, RQ1 is examined using panel data for the sample period 2008 to 2014 
by estimating a generalised linear regression model estimated using GLS with clustered firm effects 
as specified in Equation 6.1.  To summarise, it is expected that the firm’s level of disclosure should 
be positively correlated with firm size, ROA, the appointment of an auditor from a top firm and CEO 
change.  Disclosure is expected to be negatively correlated with firm growth opportunities, top 20 
shareholder percentage and CEO remuneration.  Based on the remuneration literature, the structure 
of CEO remuneration is expected to determine a firm’s disclosure policy choice, however the 
direction of the influence is undetermined. 
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6.2.2 Empirical Method:  RQ2 Accountability 
Once the nature of firm disclosure policy is established, the base disclosure model is extended to 
examine the second research question.  The documented behaviour of shareholders in say-on-pay 
settings indicates that many of the controls for disclosure are also predictors of shareholder dissent.  
Therefore, the analysis of RQ2a, the association between the level of shareholder dissent and 
remuneration report level of disclosure is estimated using the following model: 
NOVOTEi,t = α + β1DISCtype:i,t + β2RULE + β3NOVOTEi,t-1 + β4Sizei,t + β5ROAi,t + β6Growi,t + 
β7Auditi,t + β8ShRett + β9Top20i,t + β10 CEOchi,t + β11lnCEOremi,t + β12 Bonus + β13Options + 
β14Equity + β15Term +δi + ε 
 (6.2) 
where: 
NOVOTE i,t = the reported percentage of no votes recorded against the remuneration resolution at 
the annual general meeting of firm i in year t.  The data is obtained from Ownership 
Matters Pty Ltd, with missing values hand collected from published ASX firm 
announcements. 
DISCtype:i,t = the scaled disclosure score derived from the application of the disclosure index to 
firm i remuneration report in year t. 
type:  DiscTOT, TransTOT, TransREM. 
RULE = a dummy variable to define the introduction of the two-strikes rule, equal to one for 
years 2012 and 2014, zero otherwise. 
NOVOTEi,t-1 = the reported percentage of no votes recorded against the remuneration resolution at 
the annual general meeting of firm i in year t-1.   
ShRet i,t = the firm stock return above the market risk premium, calculated as (the stock price 
in year t+1 divided by the stock price in year t) divided by the market risk premium.  
The data is obtained from the DataStream database.   
The control variables Size, ROA, Grow, Audit, Industry, Top20, CEOch, lnCEOrem, Bonus, Options 
and Equity are as previously defined. 
In theory, the two strikes rule afforded shareholders the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with 
remuneration arrangements.  Under this conjecture, β1 should be inversely related to shareholder 
dissent.   
The PC Inquiry found that the underlying economics of remuneration contracts were not 
fundamentally flawed in Australia; however, disclosure of the arrangements was insufficient.  The 
means by which shareholders express dissatisfaction is by voting on the resolution to pass the 
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remuneration report at the AGM.  Therefore, following prior studies, this research uses the percentage 
of shareholder votes against the report as a proxy for shareholder dissatisfaction with remuneration 
disclosure.  As the timing of the vote is of importance, care is taken to ensure that the dates pertaining 
to voting are matched with the current remuneration report.  For example, if a firm has a 31 December 
year end, care is taken to ensure the vote conduced at an AGM early the following year is matched 
appropriately.  Similar care is taken to match lagged shareholder dissent, which is the percentage of 
votes against the remuneration resolution in the prior year. 
Despite the findings of the PC Inquiry, prior research does not provide strong support for a relation 
between shareholder dissent and remuneration disclosure.  Several studies indicate that shareholder 
voting does not always relate to the remuneration resolution, and that shareholders can use the voting 
mechanism as a protest vote against other issues (Bainbridge, 2006; Monem & Ng, 2013; Yermack, 
2010).  To control for this potential protest vote, abnormal shareholder returns are included to capture 
issues unrelated to the remuneration report, as the market is expected to price all other information 
available in the market (Bugeja et al., 2016; Yermack, 2010).  Shareholder return is expected to have 
an inverse relation with shareholder dissent.  Following prior research that finds that negative 
shareholder votes have a lasting effect, the previous year’s dissenting vote is also included (Bugeja 
et al., 2016; Monem & Ng, 2013).   
The intent of the PC was that the strengthening of the shareholder vote would provide greater 
accountability; therefore RULE is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of the legislation.  In 
the event that shareholders vote in response to levels of disclosure following the introduction of the 
two strikes rule, a positive coefficient is expected on RULE. 
Having considered the relation between disclosure and shareholder dissent, Equation 6.2 is then 
respecified to examine RQ2b.  The analysis of RQ2a, the association between the level of shareholder 
dissent and remuneration report level of disclosure is estimated using the following model: 
DISCtype:i,t = α + δt + β1NOVOTEi,t-1 + β2Sizei,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Growi,t + β5Auditi,t + β6Top20i,t + 
β7CEOchi,t + β8lnCEOremi,t + β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t + β12Termi,t + δi + ε 
 (6.3) 
All variables are as previously defined. 
Equation 6.3 examines the board response to shareholder dissent; therefore the no vote from the 
previous year is included.  Within the context of this model, if the extent of the prior year’s 
shareholder dissent impacts the current year remuneration disclosure, β1 is expected to be positive 
and significant.   
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6.2.3 Robustness Testing 
In addition to the primary analysis, a series of sensitivity analysis are conducted.  Sensitivity tests for 
Equation 6.1 are performed to establish the robustness of the primary results.  In particular, alternate 
measures of the explanatory variables Size, Performance and Compensation are included in the model 
due to the range of alternate proxies used in prior literature to explain the level of firm and 
remuneration disclosure.  As additional sensitivity analysis, reclassification of industry groups is 
undertaken.   
In all analysis utilising Equation 6.2 and Equation 6.3, year dummy variables are replaced with RULE, 
an alternate dummy variable to define the introduction of the two-strikes rule, equal to one for years 
2012 and 2014, zero otherwise.  This dummy refines the examination of the changes in disclosure 
policy before and after the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Consistent with prior studies, 
NOVOTE is also replaced with STRIKE.  STRIKE is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the NOVOTE 
was 25% or above and 0 otherwise. 
6.3 Sample Selection and Characteristics 
To investigate the disclosure behaviour of Australian listed firms, the disclosure index developed in 
Section 6.1 is applied to the remuneration reports of a subsample of ASX200 firms in the years 2008, 
2010, 2012 and 2014.  The process of selecting the ASX 200 sample and descriptive statistics are 
outlined in section 6.3. 
6.3.1 ASX200 Listed Firms Sample Selection 
ASX200 firms are chosen for examination as prior literature suggests a firm’s disclosure policy 
choice and the subsequent quantity and quality of disclosure are largely influenced by firm size (Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993).  In particular, Bushman et al. (2004) found that overall financial transparency 
tends to be higher in larger firms likely as a result of those firms benefiting from economies of scale 
when producing disclosure.  Larger firms are also found to be relatively stable over time (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993) and thus more likely to survive the full sample period.  The stability of larger firms 
suggests that exogenous shocks are less likely to impact their disclosure policy choice, meaning that 
a change in disclosure level or quality resulting from a change in legislation may be more easily 
detected in larger firms.   
To select the sample, the full ASX200 list was downloaded for the years 2008 and 2014.  As the study 
examines changes in disclosure behaviour over this time period, firms needed to be ASX200 in both 
years.  This resulted in in 61 firms being excluded from the study because they had missing years of 
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remuneration reports or were delisted before 2014.  Six non-Australian firms for which ASX is a 
secondary exchange are excluded, due to the potential complexity of those firms being required to 
satisfy two sets of disclosure requirements.  Finally, 15 firms are excluded because they were not 
required to present an audited remuneration report due to the structure of their entity.  This process 
resulted in a sample of 118 Australian firms that had published audited remuneration reports for each 
year of interest.   
The disclosure index is applied to the years 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014.  This study period is chosen 
to cover the period before, during and after the implementation of the changes to the remuneration 
framework.  The study begins in 2008 because many of the ambiguities present in the legislation 
during the introduction of substantive black letter requirements was resolved by the introduction of 
the Simpler Regulatory Bill - Remuneration Disclosures (2007).27  By the 2008 reporting period, all 
listed firms had been subject to the disclosure requirements of the Corporations Act for more than 
one reporting period, and therefore it can be expected that remuneration disclosure policies should be 
established by 2008.   
Disclosure has been demonstrated in prior literature to be sticky (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Chen, 
DeFond, & Park, 2002; Lansford, Lev & Tucker, 2013), therefore a close examination of the firms’ 
remuneration report in every second year is expected to capture ongoing changes in levels of total 
and transparent disclosures.  The introduction of the two-strikes rule had been flagged by the PC 
Inquiry in 2009, was legislated in 2010 and came into effect for the 2011 reporting period, therefore 
the 2012 and 2014 remuneration reports are expected to reflect any changes in disclosure policy 
choice concurrent with the introduction of the rule.  The disclosure index is therefore applied to 118 
firms at four points over a seven year time period, resulting in a balanced panel of 472 firm year 
observations of disclosure.    
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample 118 firms represent 59% of the 2008 ASX200.  Descriptive statistics for control 
variables are presented in Table 6.1 for each of the four years in that data is collected.  These statistics 
indicate that the characteristics of firms included in the sample are diverse, however appear to be 
relatively consistent over the time period 2008 to 2014. 
The firms’ mean asset value increases from $27,700m in 2008 to $39,800m in 2014.  In 2008, firm 
ROA ranged from -0.195 to 0.371 with an average of 0.084.  This range contracted somewhat in 
2014, -0.187 to 0.214, with a lower average of 0.047.  Book to market (BTM) ratio is a proxy for the 
                                                 
27 The issues surrounding the regulatory setting are discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
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firm’s growth options, and is measured as the book value of equity divided by the total equity market 
value.  In 2008 BTM averaged 0.624.  It peaked at 1.117 in 2012, but by 2014 the average was 0.96.  
Shareholder returns is the value of the firm stock return above the market risk premium, calculated 
as (the stock price in year t+1 divided by the stock price in year t) divided by the market risk premium.  
Shareholder returns demonstrated volatility across the period.  In 2008 mean return was -0.019, 
increasing to 0.043 in 2010, dropping to -0.081 in 2012, and in 2014 increasing again to 0.069.   
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics:  ASX200 sample 
Year 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Panel A: Continuous measures     
Assets ($million)     
Mean 27,700 31,400 35,300 39,800 
Median 3,390 3,531 3,417 3,045 
Std. Dev. 95,800 114,000 128,000 147,000 
Minimum 124 172 157 137 
Maximum 657,000 686,000 763,000 883,000 
ROA     
Mean 0.084 0.071 0.062 0.047 
Median 0.073 0.062 0.058 0.054 
Std. Dev. 0.075 0.062 0.058 0.066 
Minimum -0.195 -0.052 -0.096 -0.187 
Maximum 0.371 0.340 0.251 0.214 
Growth     
Mean 0.624 0.764 1.117 0.960 
Median 0.530 0.619 0.843 0.695 
Std. Dev. 0.458 0.580 1.379 1.228 
Minimum -0.049 0.076 0.103 0.094 
Maximum 2.477 3.867 12.877 12.077 
Shareholder Returns     
Mean -0.019 0.043 -0.081 0.069 
Median 1.083 0.004 -0.046 -0.019 
Std. Dev. 0.432 0.347 0.280 0.503 
Minimum -0.713 -0.830 -0.792 -0.919 
Maximum 2.655 1.537 1.038 2.976 
Top 20 Shareholders %     
Mean 66.87 69.20 70.84 71.37 
Median 69.65 72.36 72.87 74.21 
Std. dev. 15.02 13.68 13.94 14.01 
Minimum 24.15 34.89 37.75 39.23 
Maximum 90.58 92.37 98.70 94.79 
No vote %     
Mean 11.39 12.02 6.98 7.11 
Median 5.72 5.27 3.88 3.44 
Std. Dev. 15.43 15.91 7.90 11.60 
Minimum 0.39 0.21 0.13 0.35 
Maximum 92.40 70.54 47.65 75.21 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
(number; percentage)     
Big4 Auditor 111 112 114 115 
 94.07 94.92 96.61 97.46 
CEO change  20 10 14 17 
 16.95 8.47 11.86 14.41 
Strike 17 20 1 7 
 14.41 16.95 0.1 5.93 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest and the control variables for the ASX200 
sample period 2008 to 2014.  
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Table 6.1 reveals a broad spread of ownership in the sample.  In 2008, Top 20 Shareholders on 
average held 66% of shares, ranging from a minimum holding of 24% to a maximum of 90%.  The 
average and spread does not appear to shift across time, with the range in 2014 starting at a minimum 
of 39% increasing to a maximum of 94%.  The average of Top 20 shareholding in 2014 was 71% that 
is not greatly dissimilar to the 2008 average of 66%. 
No vote percentage is based on the results of the voting conducted at the firm’s AGM.  The mean 
voting percentage has dropped from the 2008/2010 period to the 2012/2014 period.  In 2008, average 
reported no vote was 11.39% dropping to 7.11% in 2014.  Similarly, the rate of strikes (that is, a no 
vote in excess of 25%) has dropped from a high of 20 firms recording a strike in 2010, to 5 in 2012, 
and 7 in 2014. 
A large majority of firms engaged a top 4 auditor in each year of interest, peaking at 97% of firms 
using a top 4 audit firm in 2014.  The rate of turnover of CEOs was inconsistent across the time 
period, with higher turnover rates in 2008 (16.95%) and 2014 (14.41%). 
GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) is a standardised international industry classification 
system.  Industry classification has been used to proxy for firm complexity and also for proprietary 
costs of the firm (Verrechia, 1983).  The industry in that a firm operates has also been shown to impact 
the pay-performance link due to obvious industry-specific issues such as labour demand forces 
(Fleming & Stellios, 2002).  Due to the potential importance of the industry specific factors, the GICS 
Sector of each firm, as well as the finer classification of GICS Industry Group where relevant are 
examined.   
Table 6.2 indicates that all 11 GICS Sectors are represented in the sample, and 21 of the GICS 
Industry Groups are represented. 
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Table 6.2  Industry representation:  ASX200 sample  
GICS Sector No. % GICS Industry Group (if applicable) No. % 
Consumer Discretionary 17 (14.41) Consumer Durables & Apparel 2 (1.69)  
 
 
Consumer Services 6 (5.08)  
 
 
Media 5 (4.24)  
 
 
Retailing 4 (3.39) 
Consumer Staples 6 (5.08) Food & Staples Retailing 3 (2.54)  
 
 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 3 (2.54) 
Financials 17 (14.41) Banks 6 (5.08)  
 
 
Diversified Financials 8 (6.78)  
 
 
Insurance 3 (2.54) 
Health Care 6 (5.08) Health Care Equipment & Services 5 (4.24)  
 
 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
1 (0.85) 
Industrials 23 (19.49) Capital Goods 11 (9.32)  
 
 
Commercial & Professional Services 7 (5.93)  
 
 
Transportation 5 (4.24) 
Information Technology 2 (1.69) Software & Services 1 (0.85)  
 
 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 1 (0.85) 
Energy 9 (7.63) 
 
 
 
Materials 27 (22.88) 
 
 
 
Real Estate 8 (6.78) 
 
 
 
Telecommunication Services 1 (0.85) 
 
 
 
Utilities 2  (1.69) 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 presents the breakdown of the ASX200 sample by GICS sector and industry group. 
Descriptive statistics of CEO remuneration are presented in Table 6.3.  These statistics illustrate that 
the structure of CEO pay is consistent across the sample with most firms paying a cash salary, short-
term bonus and a long-term incentive payment.  The spread of total reported pay is diverse, ranging 
from a minimum of $143,239 to $51.5 million in 2008, and from -$386,999 to $15.4 million in 2014.  
In spite of the large maximum payment made to the CEO at Macquarie Group (MQG) in 2008 of 
$51.5 million, the average reported total CEO remuneration is consistent across the time period.  The 
minimum reported total CEO remuneration in 2014 is a negative amount (-$386,999.00) reported by 
UGL Limited.  This ‘negative’ payment is a reflection of performance rights that were measured at 
fair value when granted, but have subsequently been reversed as the criteria required for the options 
to vest to the CEO have not been satisfied.  In that same year, the CEO was awarded a cash salary of 
$2,062,225, but the reversal of previously reported options of $2,500 million negated that payment.28  
  
                                                 
28 This is an illustration of an issue with reporting the fair value of share-based payments at the time the options are issues 
which is debated by industry, representative bodies and the media, an elaboration of which is outside of the scope of this 
thesis. 
 110 
 
Table 6.3  Descriptive statistics: CEO remuneration ASX200 sample 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Reported total     
Observations 117 118 118 118 
Mean 4,408,727 3,746,649 3,934,656 3,907,624 
Median 2,754,395 2,769,267.50 2,904,433.50 3,115,264 
Std. Dev. 5,652,554 2,846,276 2,815,858 2,847,649 
Minimum 143,239 247,702 262,042 (386,999) 
Maximum 51,507,342 
 
16,157,746 
 
13,718,021 
 
15,420,598 
 Cash salary     
Observations 117 118 118 118 
Mean 1,370,598 1,409,280 1,517,700 1,480,720 
Median 1,376,147 1,376,987 1,455,673 1,424,626 
Std. Dev. 720,102 710,713 728,753 668,054 
Minimum 76,620 14,461 164,085 262,964 
Maximum 3,154,827 3,279,338 3,346,091 3,349,587 
Short-term incentive     
Observations 95 99 92 96 
Mean 1,727,226 1,166,719 1,029,461 985,918 
Median 864,960 1,000,000 750,500 845,306 
Std. Dev. 4,818,942 1,022,584 840,408 790,990 
Minimum 100,000 12,000 40,000 8,887 
Maximum 45,950,719 
 
7,649,513 4,163,000 4,354,688 
Total long-term incentive 
 
    
Observations 117 116 116 118 
Mean 1,119,091 1,117,808 1,225,877 1,138,220 
Median 622,792 509,009 687,152 622,832 
Std. Dev. 1,626,730 1,435,439 1,460,790 1,469,803 
Minimum (1,849,000) (901,200) (1,633,256) (2,500,729) 
Maximum 9,306,769 9,273,430 6,630,607 6,508,926 
Termination payment     
Observations 10 4 11 14 
Mean 2,828,298 1,189,105 2,088,120 2,096,367 
Median 1,707,234 1,227,213 1,505,000 1,267,094 
Std. Dev. 2,825,224 575,325 1,879,553 3,345,135 
Minimum 454,626 449,200 215,566 205,560 
Maximum 9,100,000 1,852,793 6,965,764 13,600,000 
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the reported values of total and categories of CEO remuneration as reported on the 
Thomson Reuters Connect 4 Boardroom database. 
The maximum total reported CEO pay ranges from $4,408.7m in 2008 to 3,907.6m in 2014, with the 
mean total reported CEO pay $3,907,624.00 in 2014. 
Across the period, approximately 80% of firms pay a short-term bonus each year.  Short-term bonus 
payments decrease across the period from a mean of $1.7 million in 2008 to $985,918 in 2014.  Most 
firms award a long-term incentive payment each year (all firms in 2014), however the form of the 
long-term incentive payment is varied, taking the form of cash, options and equity payments.  The 
mean total long-term incentive payment remains constant across the study period ranging from $1.119 
million in 2008 to $1.138 million in 2014. 
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6.4 Summary  
This chapter has outlined the research method for Stage 2 of this thesis.  The development of the 
disclosure index has been explained, and the sample selection and descriptive statistics of the ASX200 
sample described.  Chapter 7 presents the results of the analysis associated with RQ1 of this thesis.     
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Chapter 7. RQ1 Disclosure:  Results 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the first research question.  This chapter is 
structured as follows.  Section 7.1 recaps the details of the research question.  Section 7.2 presents 
the results of the univariate analysis, while Section 7.3 presents the multivariate results.  Section 7.4 
concludes the chapter.   
7.1 Introduction 
The first research question outlined in Section 5.2 is as follows: 
RQ1:  Did disclosure policy change as a result of the conduct of the PC Inquiry, and in 
particular did mean disclosure levels increase after the introduction of the two-strikes 
rule? 
To address this question, all total and transparent disclosure scores, descriptive statistics, tests of 
mean differences in the scores, and independent t-tests between groups are conducted to investigate 
whether the increases in disclosures are significant from 2008 to 2014.  To gain further insights into 
differences in remuneration disclosure, following Plumlee et al. (2015), the data is parsed into 
specialised types of disclosure, specifically:  disclosure by industry group; disclosure scores as they 
relate to remuneration category; details of the remuneration committee; disclosure relating to the use 
of a remuneration consultant; and the length of reports.    
7.2 Total Disclosure  
As detailed in Chapter 6, the disclosure index used in this research has been researcher developed 
from the legislated remuneration disclosure requirements.  The total disclosure index score is 
comprised of two sections: DiscREM and SHRBASED.  DiscREM contains all relevant remuneration 
disclosures pertaining to the board’s remuneration policy and the amounts of remuneration paid to 
the CEO.  SHRBASED contains items of disclosure relating specifically to the valuation of share-
based remuneration payments that the firm can choose to disclose in the notes to the financial 
statements.  SHRBASED disclosures are considered separately primarily because the Corporations 
Act does not specifically state that these disclosures must appear in the remuneration report.  The 
structure of the index gives rise to three measures of disclosure: total disclosure (DiscTOT), 
remuneration report disclosures (DiscREM), and disclosures pertaining to share-based payments 
(SHRBASED).  The results of these measures are presented in Table 7.1 Panel A.   
 113 
 
 
Table 7.1 Results:  RQ1 ANOVA on total disclosure 
Panel A Descriptive statistics 
Variable 2008 2010 2012 2014 
DiscTOT     
Mean 42.78 47.51 57.05 61.78 
Median 43.36 48.43 57.21 62.33 
Std. Dev. 10.07 9.37 10.08 10.30 
Minimum 8.85 28.32 28.87 24.69 
Maximum 69.16 71.68 85.84 91.07 
DiscREM     
Mean 48.46 54.34 66.98 71.65 
Median 49.33 56.00 68.00 73.61 
Std. Dev. 11.25 11.21 11.70 11.20 
Minimum 13.33 30.67 32.79 32.76 
Maximum 70.27 79.10 89.33 94.59 
SHRBASED     
Mean 31.12 32.44 35.73 41.03 
Median 28.95 31.58 34.21 40.01 
Std. Dev. 14.86 12.86 13.53 13.78 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 100.00 60.53 81.58 84.21 
Panel B 4 x 1 ANOVA on mean year disclosure score 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares DF 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
DiscTOT   
   
Between 26675.65 3 8891.88 89.578 (<0.001) 
Within 46455.70 468 99.26 
 
 
Total 73131.35 471 
   
DiscREM      
Between 41204.06 3 13734.69 106.795 (<0.001) 
Within 60188.54 468 128.61 
 
 
Total 101392.60 471 
   
SHRBASED   
   
Between 6900.42 3 2300.14 12.117 (<0.001) 
Within 88842.09 468 189.83 
 
 
Total 95742.51 471 
   
Panel C: Tukey HSD pairwise comparison p-values 
DiscTOT 
  2014 2012 2010 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.002 
2010 0.000 0.000  
2012 0.002   
DiscREM 
 2014 2012 2010 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2010 0.000 0.000  
2012 0.009   
SHRBASED 
 2014 2012 2010 
2008 0.000 0.051 0.882 
2010 0.000 0.259  
2012 0.017   
Table 7.1 presents results based on the measure of the extent of remuneration disclosure in the remuneration reports of the ASX200 
sample.  Measures of disclosure are based on the scoring index described in Section 6.2, and variable definitions are as defined in 
Section 6.3. 
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The mean of DiscTOT scores increase each year starting at a low of 31.12% in 2008, increasing to 
32.44% in 2010, then 35.73% in 2012, to a high of 41.03% in 2014.  These results indicate that levels 
of total disclosure have monotonically increased during this period.  The minimum and maximum 
scores exhibit a wide spread each year, and do not appear to get closer as time goes on.  In 2008 the 
minimum score was 8.85%, and the maximum of 69.16%, in 2010 the scores ranged from 28.32% to 
71.68%, in 2012 the scores ranged from 28.87% to 85.84%, while in 2014 the minimum score was 
34.69% ranging up to a maximum of 91.07%.  The standard deviation of scores was approximately 
10% for each year, suggesting that while all firms increased their disclosure, they did so consistently 
across the sample.   
As outlined earlier, DiscTOT is comprised of DiscREM and SHRBASED.  Both sections show 
increases in all measures over most years.  DiscREM scores increase in each period from 48.46% in 
2008, to 54.34% in 2010, to 66.98% in 2012, to a high of 71.65% in 2014.  In 2008, DiscREM 
minimum was 13.33%, while in 2014 the minimum had improved to 32.76%.  The maximum 
DiscREM in 2008 was 70.27% increasing to 94.59% in 2014. 
SHRBASED mean scores were 31.12% in 2008, 32.44% in 2010, 35.73% in 2012 and 41.03% in 
2014.  In each year, at least one firm made no share-based payment disclosures.  The maximum 
disclosure score in 2008 was 100%.  This maximum dropped to 60.53% in 2010.  This is unsurprising 
given that scores are scaled according to the relevance of the disclosure items to each firm, suggesting 
that some firms may not have made complicated share-based payments in 2008 and were able to meet 
the full requirements of disclosure in that year.  In 2012, the maximum SHRBASED score increased 
to 81.58%, and increased again in 2014 to 84.21%.   
The descriptive statistics for the disclosure index suggest that mean scores for DiscTOT, DiscREM 
and SHRBASED increased between each period, that is, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014.  To confirm this 
increase is not random, and that each year’s mean is significantly different from each other, a 4 x 1 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted, with ‘year’ as the categorical variable and DiscTOT, 
DiscREM and SHRBASED, as the dependent measure.  The results of the ANOVA presented in 
Table 7.1 Panel B indicate that the null hypothesis that all four year’s means are equal is rejected for 
each measure of disclosure, and it can be concluded that at least one of the year’s mean is significantly 
different from the others in each area of disclosure measured (DiscREM: F = 106.795, p-value 
<0.001; SHRBASED: F=12.117, p-value <0.001; and DiscTOT: F=89.578, p-value <0.001).    
In isolation the ANOVA result does not indicate that years are statistically different from each other.  
Therefore, to examine more carefully the change in mean disclosure for each year, this study follows 
prior research (Clarkson, Emby & Watt, 2002) and conducts a post hoc testing using Tukey’s honest 
significance difference (HSD) pair-wise comparison for each disclosure measure, the results of that 
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are presented in Table 7.1 Panel C.  The Tukey test considers each pair of time-points and reports the 
p-values for the difference between the two years.   
The results for DiscTOT indicate that in all cases the group means are different across all time periods.  
Comparing the means for pairs 2008/2010, and 2012/2014, the reported p-value is <0.001, while for 
all other pairs of years the p-value <0.01.  Similarly for DiscREM disclosure, the reported p-value for 
all paired years is less than 0.01.  These results are all significant at the 0.01 significance level and 
indicate that in all cases the group means are different across all time periods, suggesting that the 
mean disclosure in each year are statistically different from every other year.   
The Tukey’s HSD test results for SHRBASED are divided, indicating that in some pairs the means 
are not significantly different.  Importantly, the years 2008 and 2010 are each significantly different 
from 2014 (p-value<0.01), which is concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  The 
reported p-values between pairs of years 2008/2010 (p-value=0.882), 2008/2012 (0.051) and 
2010/2012 (p-value= 0.259) are not significant, therefore the mean disclosure in these years are not 
unequal.  The reported p-value for year pair 2012/2014 is 0.017, and therefore the null that the mean 
disclosure for those two years are not different can also be rejected at the 0.05 significance level.  The 
range of results for SHRBASED is not surprising given the lack of clarity in the regulation about 
where these disclosures need to appear.  If firms had made a choice to disclosure share-based 
payments in the notes to the financial statements and not the remuneration report, it could be expected 
that firms would maintain a constant disclosure policy these items, and therefore the means of these 
disclosures would not exhibit an increase in line with the conduct of the PC Inquiry.   
Taken together, these results indicate the mean levels of DiscTOT and DiscREM disclosures over the 
years 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, are significantly different, which is not inconsistent with the intent 
of the PC Inquiry and the subsequent introduction of the two-strikes rule in 2011.  In 2014, mean 
disclosure scores relating to SHRBASED were significantly different from all other years.   
7.3 Transparent Disclosure  
Chapter 6 describes in detail the process used to classify each item of the disclosure index as 
‘transparent’ or ‘black letter’.  Transparent disclosure items (TransTOT) are those which, according 
to a panel of industry experts, enabled the reader of the remuneration report to determine the 
underlying economics of the executive remuneration contract.  The expert panel rated all items in 
SHRBASED of the total index as transparent; therefore there is no distinction between SHRBASED 
in total or transparent disclosure.  The scores for SHRBASED are not repeated in this section.  The 
items in the category DiscREM that are deemed to be transparent items are labelled TransREM.  The 
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remaining items in DiscREM are described as ‘black letter’, that is, they are stand-alone items of 
disclosure that are ‘facts’, or do not require explanation, e.g. the name of the CEO or the amount of 
fixed salary.  These items are reported as BLETTER.  The results of the partitioned transparent 
disclosure scores are presented in Table 7.2 Panel A.   
The mean scores for TransTOT increase each year from 42.57% in 2008, 49.02% in 2010, 57.75% in 
2012, to a high of 65.80% in 2014 that indicates that transparent disclosure has increased during this 
time frame concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  
 
Table 7.2 Results:  RQ1 ANOVA on transparent disclosure means 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics      
Variable 2008 2010 2012 2014 
TransTOT     
Mean 42.57 49.02 57.75 65.80 
Median 42.11 50.00 56.25 66.67 
Std. Dev. 14.51 13.34 13.03 12.76 
Minimum 0.00 16.67 25.00 19.44 
Maximum 86.96 79.17 91.67 95.83 
TransREM     
Mean 40.65 49.41 61.92 70.56 
Median 40.74 50.93 62.96 70.37 
Std. Dev. 16.96 16.37 16.20 15.98 
Minimum 0.00 14.81 22.22 25.93 
Maximum 88.89 88.89 92.59 96.30 
Panel B: 4 x 1 ANOVA on mean year transparent disclosure scores 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares DF 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
TransTOT  
Between 36417.16 3 12139.05 67.321 (<0.001) 
Within 84388.45 468 180.32   
Total 120805.61 471    
TransREM 
Between 62038.59 3 20679.53 77.048 (<0.001) 
Within 125610.93 468 268.40   
Total 187649.52 471    
Panel C: Tukey HSD pairwise comparison p-values 
TransTOT 
 2014 2012 2010 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.002 
2010 0.000 0.000  
2012 0.000   
TransREM 
 2014 2012 2010 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2010 0.000 0.000  
2012 0.000   
Table 7.2 presents results based on the measure of the extent of transparent remuneration disclosure in the remuneration reports of 
the ASX200 sample.  Measures of disclosure are based on the scoring index described in Section 6.2, and variable definitions are as 
defined in Section 6.3. 
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The minimum and maximum scores exhibit a wide spread each year.  In 2008 the transparent 
disclosure scores ranged from 0.00% to 86.96%, in 2010 the minimum to maximum range was 
16.67% to 79.17%, in 2012 the scores ranged from 25.00% to 91.67%, while in 2014 the minimum 
score dropped from 2012’s minimum to 19.44%, but ranged up to 95.83%, the highest score in the 
time frame.    
TransREM mean scores also increase in each period from 40.65% in 2008, to 49.41% in 2010, to 
61.92% in 2012, to a high of 70.56% in 2014.  In 2008, TransREM minimum score was 0.00%.  In 
2014 the minimum had improved to 32.76%, a higher minimum score than TransTOT.  The maximum 
TransREM in 2008 was 88.89% increasing to 96.30% in 2014. 
The descriptive statistics for the disclosure index suggest that mean scores for TransTOT and 
TransREM have increased between years.  Of particular note is the large jump in mean score for both 
measures from 2010 to 2012:  TransTOT increased by 8.73%, while TransREM increased by 12.51%.  
These increases occur at a time consistent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.   
As with the total disclosure measures, to confirm the increases across years in transparent disclosure 
scores are not random and that each year’s mean is significantly different from each other, an 
ANOVA is conducted, with year as the categorical variable, and TransTOT and TransREM as the 
dependent measures.  The results of the ANOVA are presented in Panel B of Table 7.2 indicate that 
the null hypothesis that all four year’s means are equal is rejected for each measure of disclosure, and 
it can be concluded that at least one of the year’s mean is significantly different from the others in 
each area of disclosure measured (TransTOT: F= 67.321, p-value <0.001 and TransREM: F = 77.048, 
p-value <0.001).    
To consider the group means for TransTOT and TransREM across the four years, a Tukey HSD 
pairwise comparison is conducted, the results of that are presented in Table 7.2 Panel C.  The results 
for TransTOT and TransREM for all years are significant at the 0.01 level.  Taken together, these 
results indicate the mean levels of TransTOT and TransREM disclosures over the years 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2014, are significantly different from each other, indicating that transparent disclosure 
increased significantly across the time period consistent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule 
in 2011.   
7.3.1 Robustness 
The ANOVA and Tukey HSD tests require that the assumption of normality is met for each year of 
interest.  Given that ANOVA is not very sensitive to deviations from this assumption, in the case of 
balanced design it is advisable to conduct further analysis.  The Kruskal Wallis test is a non-
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parametric test used here for robustness, as it is similar to ANOVA, however allows the assumption 
of normality to be relaxed (distribution-free).  As a further robustness, median scores are used in this 
analysis, as mean values can be affected by sampling fluctuations and outliers.  Median values are 
not sensitive to skewed data or extreme scores.   
The results of the Kruskal Wallis test (not tabulated) are all significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
the median ranks of each variable for each year are not equal.  This supports the earlier evidence 
provided by the ANOVA that all categories of disclosure scores (total and transparent) are 
independent from each other in each year (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014):  DiscTOT χ2=183.086, 
p<0.001; DiscREM χ2=199.918, p<0.001; SHRBASEDχ2=40.583, p<0.001; TransTOT χ2=147.695, 
p=0.0001; TransREM χ2=154.541, p<0.001.  Similarly, the nonparametric K-sample tests on the 
medians are all significant at the 1% significance level, supporting the earlier findings of the Tukey 
HSD test.   
7.4 Disclosure by Industry 
Many prior studies indicate that belonging to a particular industry group impacts a firm’s disclosure 
policy choice (Clarkson et al., 2013; Dye, 1985; Dye & Sridhar, 1995; Lim et al., 2007; Meek et al., 
1995; Verrechia, 1983).  Based on this prior research, the disclosure behaviour of firms within 
industry groups, the change in total disclosure and transparent disclosure from the beginning of the 
study to the end of the study is examined.  Table 7.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the total 
(DiscTOT) and transparent disclosure (TransTOT) for 2008 and 2014, for the total sample and for 
each industry group.29   
The results of t-tests indicate that the change in Total Disclosure from 2008 to 2014 is significant at 
the 1% level for the 8 industry groups.  The changes between the means of Transparent Disclosure 
are significant in 7 of the 8 industry groups at the 1% level, and the change in the Consumer Staples 
group transparent disclosure is significant at the 5% level.  The changes in the combined group are 
also significant at the 5%, however this result has limited interpretative power. 
  
                                                 
29 Industry groups Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and Utilities are combined due to the low 
number of firms in those groups (2, 2 and 1 respectively). 
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Table 7.3 Descriptive statistics:  ASX200 disclosure by industry 
   DiscTOT TransTOT 
  #Firms 2008 2014 Change 2008 2014 Change 
Total Sample  118       
 Mean  42.78 61.78 19.00** 42.57 65.80 23.23** 
 Median  43.36 62.33 18.96 42.11 66.67 24.56 
 Std. Dev.  10.07 10.30 0.24 14.51 12.76 (1.74) 
 Minimum  8.85 24.69 15.84 0.00 19.44 19.44 
 Maximum   69.16 91.07 21.91 86.96 95.83 8.88 
Consumer Discretionary 17           
 Mean  39.81 57.39 17.58** 37.85 61.96 24.12** 
 Median  38.89 57.27 18.38 37.50 61.70 24.20 
 Std. Dev.  10.83 7.08 (3.75) 14.84 9.79 (5.06) 
 Minimum  8.85 45.13 36.28 0.00 45.83 45.83 
 Maximum   60.32 69.03 8.71 70.00 79.17 9.17 
Consumer Staples 6          
 Mean  45.28 64.36 19.08** 46.53 67.71 21.18* 
 Median  47.35 63.72 16.37 48.96 67.71 18.75 
 Std. Dev.  11.87 7.91 (3.95) 18.94 11.84 (7.10) 
 Minimum  23.01 56.64 33.63 12.50 56.25 43.75 
 Maximum   58.41 74.56 16.15 70.83 79.17 8.33 
Energy 9           
 Mean  46.76 64.76 18.00** 44.68 69.68 25.00** 
 Median  46.02 62.83 16.81 41.67 66.67 25.00 
 Std. Dev.  4.52 7.27 2.76 7.07 7.52 0.45 
 Minimum  38.94 59.29 20.35 35.42 62.50 27.08 
 Maximum   53.15 83.33 30.18 54.17 85.42 31.25 
Financials 17           
 Mean  49.11 65.51 16.40** 51.05 69.19 18.15** 
 Median  51.82 64.91 13.09 54.17 66.67 12.50 
 Std. Dev.  8.15 8.37 0.22 12.31 10.90 (1.41) 
 Minimum  32.74 42.48 9.73 27.08 43.75 16.67 
 Maximum   63.39 80.19 16.80 75.00 89.58 14.58 
Health Care 6           
 Mean  42.26 66.54 24.29** 43.40 69.40 26.00** 
 Median  45.13 64.16 19.03 50.00 69.79 19.79 
 Std. Dev.  9.13 12.26 3.13 15.56 16.43 0.88 
 Minimum  25.22 54.29 29.07 16.67 52.08 35.42 
 Maximum   50.44 83.04 32.59 58.33 87.23 28.90 
Industrials 23           
 Mean  38.32 60.27 21.95** 37.85 63.94 26.09** 
 Median  39.82 61.61 21.78 39.58 64.58 25.00 
 Std. Dev.  11.20 10.69 (0.51) 15.90 12.40 (3.50) 
 Minimum  15.87 37.17 21.30 12.50 33.33 20.83 
 Maximum   69.16 77.88 8.72 86.96 83.33 (3.62) 
Materials 27           
 Mean  43.00 61.82 18.82** 41.90 65.65 23.75** 
 Median  43.36 62.86 19.49 41.67 65.71 24.05 
 Std. Dev.  10.04 10.84 0.81 14.94 13.96 (0.98) 
 Minimum  27.43 39.82 12.39 14.58 37.50 22.92 
 Maximum   65.49 91.07 25.58 72.92 95.83 22.92 
Real Estate 8           
 Mean  40.02 56.22 16.20** 40.36 60.50 20.14** 
 Median  40.27 61.00 20.73 38.54 69.79 31.25 
 Std. Dev.  6.25 15.33 9.08 9.83 21.08 11.25 
 Minimum  30.30 24.69 (5.61) 27.08 19.44 (7.64) 
 Maximum   49.56 70.18 20.62 56.25 81.25 25.00 
Telecom., Utilities, IT 5           
 Mean  45.54 65.57 20.03* 49.21 71.70 22.48* 
 Median  43.75 69.44 25.69 47.92 72.92 25.00 
 Std. Dev.  10.13 12.30 2.17 13.23 10.08 (3.14) 
 Minimum  33.04 47.79 14.75 31.91 60.42 28.50 
 Maximum   57.47 76.32 18.84 62.50 83.33 20.83 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01(two tailed) 
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of industry on total disclosure and 
transparent disclosure for each year.  A significant industry effect is indicated for total disclosure 
(DiscTOT) in 2008 (F=2.00, p=0.0402), and to a lesser extent in 2010 (F=1.79, p=0.0716), with no 
significance in 2012 (F=1.33, p=0.2234) or 2014 (F=1.18, p=0.3101).  No significant difference 
between industry groups is shown for transparent disclosure at the 5% significance level (2008:  
F=1.53, p=0.1394; 2010: F=1.24, 0.2737; 2012 F=1.45, p=0.1675; 2014 F=0.69 p=0.7273).  A Tukey 
HSD analysis reveals that in 2008, the Industrial group was significantly different from the Financial 
industry group (t=-3.49, p=0.028), however no other industry groupings were significant at the 5% 
level of significance. 
Looking to individual industry groups’ disclosure behaviour, the Materials and Industrials groups 
contain the largest number of firms (27 and 23 respectively), followed by Consumer Discretionary 
and Financials that contain 17 firms each.  In 2014, Materials recorded the highest total (91.07%) and 
transparent (95.83%) disclosure scores.  The mean total (61.82%) and transparent (65.65%) scores 
for Materials are similar to the whole sample means of 61.78% and 65.8%, indicating that in spite of 
the maximum scores, as a whole the Materials disclosures scores are not unusually high.  On a whole, 
firms in the Materials industry group do not appear to exhibit a disclosure policy that substantially 
different from the full sample. 
The Industrials group reports the highest total disclosure score (69.16%) and the lowest no-vote 
percentage (0.39%) in 2008.  This trend continues in 2014, with 77.88% total disclosure score and a 
low 1.04% minimum no-vote percentage.  Similar to the Materials group, the mean scores for Industry 
in 2014 are in line with the full sample, with total disclosure 60.27%, transparent disclosure 63.94 
and no-vote percentage 11.44%.   
While there is some evidence to suggest that industry groups may have had an impact on disclosure 
policy choice in 2008, by 2014 industry membership does not appear to influence disclosure policy 
choice.  Taken together, the disaggregation of disclosure scores into industry groups suggests that 
membership of a particular industry group does not appear to influence a firm’s disclosure policy 
choice.  All industry groups have improved remuneration disclosure significantly between 2008 and 
2014, which is consistent with results for the total sample. 
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7.5 Disclosure by Remuneration Category  
In this section, the disclosure scores are partitioned into the category of remuneration that the index 
items relate to: remuneration policy, fixed salary, short-term bonus, long-term bonus, general 
disclosures, remuneration committee and remuneration consultant.  The partitions are framed around 
the requirements of the legislation as described in Section 6.2, and are based on the 76 items that 
constitute DiscREM in the index.  The descriptive statistics for these categories are presented in Table 
7.4 below.  As indicated by the change in mean disclosure between 2008 and 2014, all categories of 
disclosure have consistently increased over the time period.  Based on the reported F-statistics, 
equality of mean disclosure scores for all categories across the four years is rejected at less than the 
0.1 level.  Further analysis reveals that while the pattern of disclosure across the seven categories 
varies in some years, the mean scores between 2010 and 2012 are significantly different from each 
other (at the 5% level) in all categories except Committee.  The significant difference in mean 
disclosures between 2010 and 2014 is concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.   
Panel A of Table 7.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the categories that relate to disclosures 
specific to remuneration policy and payments.  These categories are discussed in more detail in sub-
sections one to five below.  Panel B presents mean disclosure scores and detailed results for 
Remuneration Committee and Remuneration Consultant disclosures.  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
these areas of disclosure have unique characteristics that warrant further investigation.  These 
discussions are presented in Section 7.6 and 7.7. 
7.5.1 Board Policy 
The Board Policy category of disclosure relates to items 22 to 38 of the disclosure index.  This 
category requires disclosure pertaining to the overall remuneration policy of the firm and includes 
discussions about the board’s policy for determining the overall amount and nature, along with 
requiring an explanation of the pay for performance relation. 
In 2008, Board Policy disclosure ranged from 5.88% to 88.24%, while in 2014 it ranged from 41.18% 
to 94.12%.  The scores in Table 7.4 indicate that mean disclosure in this area has increased by 20.32% 
from 2008 to 2014.  ANOVA results indicate that the change in means in each year is significant at 
the 0.01 level (F=49.88, p=0.0000).  Tukey HSD analysis (summarised by the homogenous subsets 
reported in the final column of Table 7.4) reveals that all year pairs except 2012/2014 are significantly 
different from each other at less than 0.05 significance level. 
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Table 7.4  Descriptive statistics: ASX200 remuneration category disclosure 
Category 
(Index item numbers) 
Max 
score 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Change 
(08/14) 
F test 
(p value) 
Homogenous subsets  
(a = 0.05) 
PANEL A         
Board Policy 
(22-38) 17        
 Mean  52.79 59.56 69.29 73.11 20.32 49.88 {08}, {10}, {12,14} 
 Median  52.94 58.82 70.59 76.47 23.53 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  16.50 14.93 12.80 12.18 -4.33   
 Minimum  5.88 17.65 35.29 41.18 35.29   
 Maximum  88.24 88.24 94.12 94.12 5.88   
Fixed Salary 
(39 - 45) 7        
 Mean  52.42 57.63 65.62 68.16 15.74 21.89 {08,10}, {12,14} 
 Median  42.86 57.14 57.14 71.43 28.57 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  16.18 16.91 17.34 16.85 0.67   
 Minimum  28.57 28.57 28.57 28.57 0.00   
 Maximum  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Short-term Bonus 
(46 - 57) 12        
 Mean  48.61 55.54 64.93 70.37 21.76 45.80 {08}, {10}, {12}, {14} 
 Median  50.00 54.17 66.67 66.67 16.67 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  15.60 15.95 16.12 14.33 -1.26   
 Minimum  0.00 25.00 33.33 33.33 33.33   
 Maximum  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Long-term Bonus 
(58 - 69) 12        
 Mean  59.58 66.31 75.30 79.90 20.32 34.47 {08}, {10}, {12,14} 
 Median  66.67 66.67 75.00 83.33 16.67 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  18.44 18.17 15.60 14.12 -4.32   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 41.67 41.67 41.67   
 Maximum  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
General 
(1 - 4 & 70 - 79) 14        
 Mean  49.76 54.27 61.80 69.39 19.63 33.98 {08,10}, {12}, {14} 
 Median  53.85 53.85 61.54 69.23 15.38 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  15.63 15.29 16.35 17.00 1.37   
 Minimum  15.38 15.38 20.00 23.08 7.69   
 Maximum  84.62 84.62 100.00 100.00 15.38   
PANEL B         
Committee 
(5 - 12) 4 or 5        
Mean  66.61 70.85 77.63 78.81 12.20 8.54 {08,10}, {10,12}, {12,14} 
No committee  5.01 0.01 0.01 0.00  (<0.01)  
Disc in rem report  27.12 30.51 43.22 45.76    
Firms disclosing 100%   50.85 56.78 63.56 66.95    
Consultant 
(13 - 21) 9        
Mean  9.51 15.44 57.71 62.08 52.57 122.86 {08,10}, {12,14} 
No disclosure  44.92 30.51 11.86 11.02  (<0.01)  
Disclose name only  16.10 28.81 77.96 83.90    
Disclose name and fees  0 3.33 60.49 56.09    
Total disclosures  9.51 15.44 57.71 62.14    
Firms disclosing 100%  0.00 1.69 28.81 27.12    
ANOVA F-test for equality of means across four years (p-values in parentheses). 
Index item numbers pertain to line numbers of the item in the disclosure index that is presented in Appendix C.  
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7.5.2 Fixed Salary 
The Fixed Salary category of disclosure relates to the amount of remuneration paid to the CEO that 
is market driven, and is generally seen as being a payment for base-line performance.  It relates to 
items 39 to 45 in the index.  Disclosure pertaining to fixed salary has increased slightly across the 
time period.  Mean disclosure has increased from 52.42% in 2008 to 68.16% in 2014.  While test 
statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of equal mean values for all years can be rejected at less 
than 0.01 level, the homogenous subsets demonstrate that this does not hold for 2008/2010 and 
2012/2014, indicating a significant increase between 2010 and 2012 concurrent with the introduction 
of the two-strikes rule.    
7.5.3 Short-term Bonus 
Disclosures pertaining to disclosure of Short-term Bonus payments are captured by items 46 to 57 in 
the index.  The range of disclosure within each year is pronounced.  In 2008, the minimum disclosure 
is 0.00% increasing to 100%.  By 2014, the minimum disclosure is 33.33% increasing to 100%.  Total 
change in mean disclosure between 2008 and 2014 is 21.76%.  As reported by the homogenous 
subsets, Tukey HSD analysis suggests that all four years mean disclosure measures are each 
significantly different from all other mean disclosure measures at less than the 0.1 per cent level.     
7.5.4 Long-term Bonus 
The Long-term Bonus category of disclosure relates to items 58 to 69 of the disclosure index.  This 
category requires disclosure pertaining to any remuneration payment made to the CEO that is 
dependent on long-range performance hurdles.  As with Short-term Bonus disclosure, there is a broad 
range of disclosure scores in this category.  In 2008, the minimum disclosure is 0.00% increasing to 
100%.  By 2014, the minimum disclosure is 41.67% increasing to 100%.  Unlike the Short-term 
Bonus disclosure scores, Tukey HSD analysis suggests that not all years’ mean disclosure scores are 
independent, with 2012/2014 mean scores are not significantly different from each other.  In spite of 
that similarity, the Tukey results suggest the null hypothesis of equal means between 2010 and 2012 
can be rejected at less than the 5% level, which is again concurrent with the introduction of the two-
strikes rule.     
7.5.5 General 
Consistent with other categories of remuneration disclosure, the mean disclosure scores in the General 
category indicate a steady sustained increase across the four years.  Mean disclosure increases from 
49.76% in 2008 to 69.39% in 2014.  The null hypothesis of equal means between 2008/2010 cannot 
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be rejected at the 0.05 significance level, however mean disclosure for 2010, 2012 and 2014 are 
significantly different from each other.    
7.6 Remuneration Committee 
Since 2003, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGPR) include 
guidelines for the establishment and conduct of a listed company’s remuneration committee.  The 
structure of remuneration committees was one focus of the PC Inquiry, however there were no 
changes to the disclosure requirements.  Companies are required to adopt the ASX CGPR principles 
on an ‘if not, why not’ basis, which means that if the company does not comply with a guideline, they 
must disclose why they have not done so.  Companies must ensure that the ‘market receives an 
appropriate level of information about the entity’s governance arrangements’ to enable shareholders 
to make appropriate investment decisions (ASX, 2010:3), and go on to suggest that the establishment 
of a remuneration committee is ‘an efficient and effective mechanism to bring the transparency, focus 
and independent judgement needed on remuneration decisions’ (ASX Governance, 2010).  The 
disclosures pertaining to the CGPR are a requirement for listed companies under ASX Listing Rule 
4.10.3. 
Overall, the mean disclosure scores for committee disclosures are increasing each year 2008 to 2014.  
Panel B in Table 7.4 shows that the amount of total change between 2008 and 2014 is the lowest of 
all reported sub-categories at 12.20%.  Despite the relatively low increases, as stated earlier, the 
reported F-statistic for equality of mean disclosure scores categories across the four years is rejected 
at less than the 0.1 level.  Further analysis reveals that the pattern of committee disclosure is quite 
different from the other categories.  The Tukey HSD results reveal homogeneous groups between 
2008/2010, 2010/2012 and 2010/2014, however 2008/2014 are significantly different from each 
other.   
The number of firms not disclosing whether they had established a remuneration committee in their 
remuneration report dropped from six firms (5.05%) in 2008 to just one firm (<1%) in 2010, possibly 
due to the strong emphasis put on the importance of establishing a remuneration committee by the 
ASX CGPR.  By 2014, all firms in the ASX200 sample had disclosed in their remuneration report 
that they had established a remuneration committee.   
Even though all firms had established a remuneration committee by 2014, only 45.76% disclosed 
information about the committee in the remuneration report in that year.  The 2003 ASX CGPR 
directed that committee disclosures should be made in the governance section of the annual report, 
but by 2010, the ASX CGPR indicated that s300A of the Corporations Act should be addressed, and 
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specific committee information should be cross-referenced.  Due to this lack of clarity, if committee 
disclosures were not found in the remuneration report, the corporate governance section of the annual 
report was electronically scanned to locate this information and the relevant scores were made in the 
index.   
Some companies do not appear to disclose specific details as recommended by Principle 8, despite 
the requirement of the ASX to disclose, or if they don’t disclose, to explain why not.  In 2014, only 
66.95% of firms met 100% of the disclosure requirements, with most firms meeting on average 
78.81% of total disclosure requirements.  No firms were found to explain why they had not established 
a committee or why they did not disclose this information. 
These findings do not provide support for the introduction of the two-strikes rule as a mechanism for 
improving compliance with disclosure requirements.  However, these findings are consistent with 
earlier research that suggests that firms do not tend to abide by principles based disclosure 
requirements (Clarkson et al., 2006), and that mandated legislation is necessary to ensure strict 
compliance.   
7.7 Remuneration Consultant 
The PC Inquiry final report recommended that the disclosure of specific details of ‘expert advisors’ 
should be mandated.  This recommendation was legislated at the same time as the two-strikes rule.  
The Corporations Act requires companies to disclose the use of a remuneration consultant if the 
consultant made a ‘recommendation’.  The legislation goes on to say that if the consultant provided 
any other kind of advice to the company, that information should also be disclosed.  This, in effect, 
means that all firms should disclose if a remuneration consultant was contracted during the year.  
Panel B of Table 7.4 outlines the results of the disclosure relating to remuneration consultants. 
During the period 2008 – 2014, disclosure pertaining to the use of remuneration consultants has 
increased substantially, with 44.92% making no disclosures relating to the use of a consultant in 2008, 
to only 11% making no reference to consultants in 2014.  In 2014, 83.9% of firms engaged a 
remuneration consultant, however only 18% stated that they relied on a recommendation from the 
consultant.  While companies were meeting the requirement to disclose the use of a consultant, some 
companies did not disclose all of the information required.  Section 300A(h)(iv) & (i) required that 
the amount and nature of consideration payable for any advice is to be disclosed, however of the 
companies that indicated a consultant was engaged, 44% of companies did not disclose the fees paid 
to the consultant.  This is higher than the findings of Ownership Matters (2013) who found in the 
2012 reporting period just over 30% of companies in the ASX200 disclosed the identity of their 
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consultant but did not disclose the fees paid.  This lack of disclosure can be partially explained by a 
lack of clarity in the Corporation Act that suggests that details about consultants need only be 
disclosed if a ‘recommendation’ is made by the consultant.   
The disclosure regarding remuneration consultants is legislated in the Corporations Act, therefore the 
missing disclosure is evidence that companies are choosing not to disclose in spite of the risk of 
criminal prosecution for non-compliance.  Even though in practice prosecution for a single omission 
such as this is unlikely, this lack of disclosure appears to be unusual because theory would suggest 
that remuneration disclosures are withheld because either the manager is hiding a rent extraction 
scheme, or the information is considered sensitive in nature (Verrecchia, 1983; Nelson et al., 2010; 
Frantz et al., 2013).  It could be expected that in general, the cost of remuneration advice would be 
market driven and based on a standard fee for service arrangement.  Therefore it would appear to be 
unlikely that this information should vary greatly between listed firms of a similar size, and is unlikely 
to be classified as sensitive in nature. 
If the fee information is not sensitive in nature, the alternate explanation for the non-disclosure of 
consultant fees could be that executives are extracting rents via the use of a consultant.  Armstrong, 
Ittner and Larcker (2012) found that firms with weaker governance that used a remuneration 
consultant are more likely to pay higher than expected remuneration to the CEO.  In contrast, Murphy 
and Sandino (2017) find that the use of a consultant is associated with more complex incentive plans, 
which in turn result in higher levels of pay.  While prior research doesn’t find conclusive evidence 
that ‘conflicted’ consultants facilitate management rent extraction, the combination of the firm 
disclosing the name of the consultant without disclosing the fees paid suggests the relation between 
remuneration consultants and rent extraction by executives requires further attention. 
7.8 Share-based Payments Disclosures 
As discussed previously, SHRBASED disclosures are treated independently in this research.  Panel 
B disclosures relate to the valuation of equity instruments that are a component of the CEO 
remuneration contract.  These disclosures can be classified by five headings relating to number, price, 
fair value, accounting measures (other) and general information pertaining to the equity items.  Table 
7.5 presents the descriptive statistics for these disclosure categories, along with the results of the 
ANOVA and Tukey HSD analysis undertaken. 
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Table 7.5  Descriptive statistics: Equity instrument disclosures 
Category 
(Index item numbers) 
Max 
score 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Change 
(08/14) 
F test 
(p value) 
Homogenous subsets  
(a = 0.05) 
General  
(80 - 82) 3        
 Mean  77.29 85.84 90.64 94.15 16.87 8.96 {08,10}, {10,12,14} 
 Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  33.11 28.45 21.95 17.87 -15.24   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
 Maximum  100.00 10.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Number  
(83 - 89) 7        
 Mean  55.01 59.82 64.10 77.99 22.98 17.46 {08,10}, {10,12},{14} 
 Median  57.14 57.14 57.14 85.71 28.57 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  29.09 26.26 25.82 19.22 -9.86   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 14.29   
 Maximum  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Price  
(90 - 100) 11        
 Mean  28.21 29.70 31.67 36.23 8.01 3.31 {08,10,12},{10,12,14} 
 Median  27.27 27.27 27.27 27.27 0.00 (0.0200)  
 Std. Dev.  19.53 18.58 20.89 22.85 3.33   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
 Maximum  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Fair Value 
(101 - 108) 8        
 Mean  25.28 26.64 30.70 34.17 8.89 6.48 {08,10,12}, {12,14} 
 Median  20.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 10.00 (<0.01)  
 Std. Dev.  17.40 15.27 16.92 17.96 0.56   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
 Maximum  100.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 0.00   
Other 
(109 - 117) 9        
 Mean  3.13 2.88 3.53 4.74 1.61 0.84 {08,10,12,14} 
 Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.4700)  
 Std. Dev.  10.37 8.54 7.73 11.30 0.94   
 Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
 Maximum  57.14 57.14 42.86 57.14 0.00   
ANOVA F-test for equality of means across four years (p-values in parentheses). 
Index item numbers pertain to line numbers of the item in the disclosure index that is presented in Appendix C. 
 
The results indicate SHRBASED disclosures do not follow the trend witnessed in other reported 
partitioning of the data.  While the F-test results indicate that the null hypothesis of equal means is 
rejected at the 5% significance level, several random homogenous subsets are identified by the Tukey 
HSD testing.  Unlike earlier pairs of means that indicated clear division between 2014 means and all 
other years, 2014 mean disclosure scores are not clearly unequal to any other year for SHRBASED 
disclosures.  The results presented in this section indicate that while firms appear to be increasing the 
amount of share-based payment related disclosure in the remuneration report, there does not appear 
to be a clear indication that this increase is concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule in 
2011. 
7.9 Page Number Analysis 
Feedback from lobbying respondents to the PC Inquiry suggested that over time ‘the usefulness of 
remuneration reports to investors has been constrained by their length and complexity’, with many 
respondents saying they found the reports to be ‘impenetrable’ (PC, 2010:247).  As an additional 
analysis, the page length of remuneration reports is examined.    
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The data pertaining to number of pages in the ASX200 remuneration reports indicates that between 
2008 and 2014 the average length of the audited remuneration report rose from 12 to 18 pages, a 50% 
increase (see Table 7.6).  The longest remuneration report throughout the duration of the study was 
in 2010, which was 55 pages produced by MQG, and the shortest was 2 pages published by Cabcharge 
in 2010.  Prior research finds that increasing amounts of disclosure does not necessarily result in an 
increase in quality of disclosure (Plumlee, 2016), and recent research suggests that in some areas of 
disclosure, firms with poor governance and poor performance will adopt a strategy of producing less 
concise disclosures in an attempt to conceal their poor performance (Melloni et al., 2017).  The PC 
Inquiry report suggested that in the case of Australian listed firms, the increasing length of 
remuneration reports may not be an attempt to obscure poor performance, but was a reflection of the 
complexity of executive remuneration contracts (PC, 2010:247).  The results presented in Table 7.6 
suggest that the trend for lengthier remuneration reports continued for at least four years after the PC 
Inquiry. 
Table 7.6  ASX200 firms:  Number of pages in remuneration report 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 Change % 
Mean 12.00 14.17 16.67 18.35 52.92 
Median 11.00 14.00 16.50 18.00 63.64 
Std Dev. 5.97 6.78 6.79 6.70 12.23 
Minimum 3 2 5 4 33.33 
Maximum 50 55 46 40 -20.00 
7.10 Cross-sectional Correlations 
The correlation matrix of the total disclosure score and independent variables is presented in Table 
7.7.  These results indicate that CEO remuneration and firm assets are highly correlated, and each is 
highly significantly correlated with the dependent variable, disclosure.  These relations are to be 
expected given the findings of prior literature that indicates that firm size is the main determinant of 
level of CEO pay, and the dependent variable is measuring compensation disclosure.  Following 
Petersen (2009), the regression analysis will include firm cluster effects to control for some of the 
concerns arising from these correlations.  Other significant correlations are consistent with prior 
literature, which suggests that multicollinearity presents a limited threat to the regression analysis. 
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Table 7.7  Correlation coefficients for total disclosure score and control variables 
 DiscTOT lnAssets ROA Grow Top20 % CEOrem ShrRtn Audit CEOch NOVOTE 
DiscTOT 1 0.401** -0.130** 0.037 -0.061 0.411** 0.034 0.112* 0.001 -0.122** 
lnAssets 0.390** 1 -0.227* 0.078 -0.086 0.749** 0.005 0.145** -0.001 -0.053 
ROA -0.116* -0.210** 1 -0.534** 0.107* -0.049 0.146** -0.006 0.030 -0.100* 
Grow -0.012 -0.043 -0.317** 1 0.115* -0.147** -0.355** 0.080 0.011 0.082 
Top20 % -0.079 -0.179** 0.089 0.007 1 -0.088 0.032 -0.007 -0.039 -0.139** 
lnCEOrem 0.407** 0.690** -0.040 -0.186** -0.096* 1 0.096* 0.182** 0.126** 0.038 
ShrRtn -0.006 -0.046 0.053 -0.266** 0.073 -0.030 1 -0.069 0.003 -0.054 
Audit 0.110* 0.130** 0.020 0.048 -0.019 0.211** -0.171** 1 0.017 0.006 
CEOch 0.010 0.009 0.058 0.021 -0.050 0.152** 0.026 0.018 1 0.014 
NOVOTE -0.086 -0.061 -0.110* 0.130** -0.017 0.052 -0.070 -0.004 -0.024 1 
Table 7.7 presents Spearman Rank correlations above the diagonal, and Pearson correlations below.  ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
7.11 Determinants of Disclosure 
The analysis presented in this section extends the univariate analysis examining the changes in 
disclosure policy during the period of the conduct of the PC Inquiry and the subsequent introduction 
of the two-strikes rule (RQ1).  The univariate analysis has indicated that mean and median disclosure 
levels have increased significantly in each subsequent year from 2008 to 2014.  The analysis in this 
section examines whether the univariate results are supported in the multivariate context.   
Table 7.8 presents the regression results for estimating Equation (6.1), Models (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) 
and (6) where the dependent variable is the disclosure score for the various parsing of disclosure 
(Disc):  DiscTOT, DiscREM, SHRBASED, TransTOT, TransREM and BLETTER respectively.  
Equation (6.1) is estimated using panel data of 471 firm-year observations for the sample period 2008 
to 2014 as developed in Section 5.3.2.  The advantage of panel data is that it allows the investigation 
of dynamic relationships (Bond, 2002).  One disadvantage of panel data is the potential presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity (Petersen, 2009).  Due to the nature of panel data, this study uses a 
generalised least squares random effects estimator.  Applying ordinary least squares regression to 
panel data may result in biased standard errors and inefficient coefficient estimates due to the presence 
of correlated residuals across time and firms.  Petersen (2009) demonstrates that an effective solution 
to control for time and firm correlations is to estimate the regression coefficients for panel data using 
generalised least squares including dummy variables for each year, and to then cluster by firm.  This 
approach is applicable when there are more than five firms in the panel, therefore this is the method 
adopted in this study (Petersen, 2009).   
The analysis is conducted using the STATA statistical package.  While all regressions were estimated 
with Industry dummy variables and controls for intra-firm effects (following Petersen, 2009),  
  
 130 
 
Table 7.8  Results:  RQ1 Determinants of disclosure 
DISCtype:i,t = α +δt + β1Sizei,t + β2ROAi,t + β3Growi,t+ β4Auditi,t + β5Industryi + β6Top20i,t + β7CEOchi,t  
+ β8 lnCEOremi,t+ β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t +δi + ε 
(6.1) 
Robust z-statistics in italics. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Industry was dropped from the analysis due to high collinearity with firm effects.  Industry was 
reintroduced without firm effects in sensitivity analysis, but did not alter the following results. 
The regression results of all models excluding (3) show a good fit for the model.  The overall R 
squared range from 44% to 58.8%, which suggests that the disclosure score variations for DiscTOT, 
DiscREM, TransTOT, TransREM and BLETTER are explained by the control variables.  Consistent 
with expectations discussed in Chapter 5 and results from the univariate analysis, the R squared of 
14.6% on model (3) suggests that SHRBASED disclosures appears to be driven by factors that are 
not consistent with the other elements of the remuneration report. 
Year dummies are included in the regression analysis with 2008 excluded as the reference year.  
Excluding SHRBASED, all types of disclosure increase in each year.  The coefficients for 2012 and 
2014 indicate a positive and strong significant association in all Models, and therefore with all 
 
Pred DiscTOT DiscREM SHRBASED TransTOT TransREM BLETTER 
Variables Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2010.year + 4.604*** 5.698*** 1.180 6.097*** 8.429*** 4.231*** 
  8.91 9.388 1.148 8.787 9.443 6.788 
2012.year + 14.120*** 18.111*** 4.660*** 14.573*** 20.456*** 17.340*** 
  16.154 17.664 3.907 12.229 13.824 16.505 
2014.year + 18.797*** 22.677*** 9.765*** 22.401*** 28.930*** 19.907*** 
  19.478 21.107 7.42 17.779 18.04 18.582 
Size + 2.248*** 2.538*** 2.379*** 2.775*** 3.426*** 2.124***  
 4.359 4.573 3.537 4.093 4.472 4.078 
ROA + 1.833 1.467 -1.092 -7.085 -1.409 2.313  
 0.272 -0.183 -0.150 -0.962 -0.135 0.297 
Grow - -0.679** -0.469 -0.694* -0.515 -0.176 -0.557  
 -2.064 -0.983 -1.739 -1.382 -0.377 -0.943 
Audit + 4.912* 7.283** -0.805 8.469** 11.837*** 5.331*  
 1.823 2.285 -0.269 2.523 2.716 1.943 
Top20 - -0.067* -0.061 -0.018 -0.067 -0.059 -0.065  
 -1.700 -1.343 -0.331 -1.166 -0.838 -1.569 
CEOch + -1.196* -0.81 -0.614 -1.389 -1.028 -0.543  
 -1.748 -0.990 -0.470 -1.557 -0.870 -0.615 
CEOrem + 0.889 1.873** -2.195** 0.818 1.460 2.149***  
 1.215 2.271 -2.153 0.880 1.231 2.71 
Bonus - -0.322 0.004 0.75 -0.431 0.215 -0.102  
 -0.337 0.004 0.605 -0.420 -0.174 -0.090 
Options - 0.157 0.048 1.894 0.954 0.907 -0.416  
 0.200 0.055 1.468 0.858 0.720 -0.479 
Equity - -0.13 -0.259 1.957* 0.84 0.639 -0.578  
 -0.179 -0.298 1.820 0.881 0.489 -0.660 
Term  0.386 -2.503 3.005* 2.996* 1.647 -4.012**  
 0.247 -1.485 1.758 1.749 0.797 -2.164 
Constant  -19.563** -34.983*** 8.73 -36.272*** -65.619*** -23.169**  
 -2.103 -3.350 0.678 -2.663 -4.194 -2.367 
n  471 471 471 471 471 471 
Companies  118 118 118 118 118 118 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared  0.524 0.588 0.146 0.440 0.477 0.557 
 131 
 
categories of disclosure, concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  In 2010, 
SHRBASED disclosure is not significantly increased, but this is the only example where disclosure 
has not increased.   The magnitude of the coefficients of each of the year variables increases, with the 
largest increase from 2010 to 2012 in each measure of disclosure, consistent with the univariate 
results.  For example, for TransTOT the 2010 coefficient is 6.097 (p-value <0.01) increasing to 14.573 
in 2012 suggesting that from the base year of 2008 the magnitude of the increase is larger in 2012.     
As expected and consistent with prior literature, the coefficient for Size is positive and significant for 
all types of disclosure indicating that larger firms are likely to have higher levels of remuneration 
disclosure.  In Models (1), (2), (4) and (5), the coefficient for Audit is positive and significant 
suggesting that the use of an auditor from a large audit firm results in higher levels of remuneration 
disclosure.   
In Model (1), DiscTOT variation is additionally correlated with growth, shareholdings and CEO 
change, however contrary to expectations the coefficients for these controls are negative.  The 
coefficient of Grow is -0.679 with a z-statistic of -2.064 (p-value <0.05).  Top20 (-.067, z = -1.70) 
and CEOch (-1.196, z = -1.748) are both negative and weakly significant at p-value <0.1.  The year 
dummy variables coefficients for 2012.year (14.120, z = 16.154) and 2014.year (18.797, z = 19.478) 
are large and significant at the one per cent level.  These coefficients reveal that the extent of 
disclosure in 2012 and 2014 is significantly higher than in 2008.  This is contrast to 2010, where the 
significant, positive coefficient of 4.604 (z = 8.91, p-value <0.01) indicates that while DiscTOT 
disclosure was higher in 2010 than in 2008, the increase was far more modest than the increases 
experienced in 2012 and 2014.     
The other disclosure measure of primary interest in this study is TransREM (Model (5)), as this score 
reflects the items of disclosure the panel of experts attribute to being most useful in enabling users of 
the remuneration report in understanding the economics of the CEO remuneration payment.  
TransREM disclosure scores appear to be largely driven by the engagement of a quality auditor (Audit 
coefficient 11.837, z = 2.716, p-value <0.01) and the year effects.  The coefficients for 2012.year 
(20.456, z = 13.824) and 2014.year (28.930, z = 18.04) are large and significant at the 1% level.  
Consistent with DiscTOT disclosure, the TransREM coefficients reveal that the extent of disclosure 
in 2012 and 2014 is significantly higher than in 2008, and, consistent with the Tukey HSD univariate 
results, there is a distinct difference between 2008/2010 and 2012/2014.   
Other significant results from Table 7.8 are for SHRBASED and BLETTER disclosures.  Unlike 
other types of disclosures, variation in SHRBASED disclosures appear to be driven by the size and 
type of remuneration paid to the CEO.  Model (3) shows that the log of CEO total remuneration 
(CEOrem) has a negative and significant coefficient of -2.195 (z = -2.153, p-value <0.05).  The results 
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also indicate positive significant coefficients for the categorical variables Equity (1.957, z = 1.82, p-
value <0.1) and Term (3.005, z = 1.758, p-value <0.1).  This indicates that when the CEO 
remuneration contained an equity or termination payment, firms increased their share-based payment 
disclosures within the remuneration report.  SHRBASED variations are also influenced by year 
effects differently to the other categories of disclosure.  SHRBASED is the only category that shows 
an insignificant coefficient for 2010.year, indicating that disclosure for share-based payments was 
not significantly different between years 2008 and 2010.  While the coefficients for 2012.year (4.660, 
z = 3.907) and 2014.year (9.765, z = 7.42) are positive and significant, indicating an increase since 
2008, the coefficients are not as large as for other types of disclosure. 
BLETTER disclosures are the items in the remuneration report that experts perceive do not contribute 
to the understanding of the underlying economics of the contract, therefore these disclosures are 
usually statements of fact.  Model (6) indicates that along with Size and Year, the level of CEO 
remuneration (CEOrem 2.149, z = 2.71, p-value <0.01) has a positive and significant influence on 
BLETTER disclosures.  Contrary to predictions, the coefficient on Term is negative and significant 
(-4.012, z =  -2.164, p-value <0.05).  However, this result is not robust to alternative specifications of 
the Model.  In sensitivity testing, when CEOrem is measured based on categories of remuneration 
payments (that is, cash pay, short-term bonus pay and equity pay), Term is no longer significant.   
In summary, the multiple regression results suggest that firm size, auditor choice and year effects are 
significant in explaining the increases in remuneration disclosure levels concurrent with the 
introduction of the two-strikes rule.  All remaining control variables are insignificant at the 10% 
significance level, suggesting that during the period 2008 to 2014 other determinants of variation in 
remuneration disclosure levels are superseded by the introduction of the two-strikes rule.   
7.12 Robustness: Determinants of Disclosure  
To consider the robustness of the results that indicate that Year was a strong driver of variation in 
disclosure from 2008 to 2014, the regression was estimated employing an alternate method of testing 
the year effect.  To investigate the increases in disclosure after the introduction of the two-strikes 
rule, Year dummy variables were replaced with a pre/post dummy variable labelled RULE.  RULE 
is a dummy variable delineating periods before and after the two-strikes rule was introduced.  RULE 
equals one for years 2012 and 2014, and zero otherwise.   
Table 7.9 presents the results for all parsing of disclosure as the primary analysis:  DiscTOT, 
DiscREM, SHRBASED, TransTOT, TransREM and BLETTER.  The R squared results are lower 
than the primary results, ranging from 55.9% (Model (8) DiscREM) to 38.9% (Model (10) 
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TransTOT)).  RULE is positive and significant at the 1% significance level, which supports the 
expectation that disclosure levels have incrementally increased concurrent with the introduction of 
the two-strikes rule.  Size and Audit are still positive significant variables influencing the increase in 
all types of disclosure.  Unlike in the earlier specification of the model, growth (Grow) and a change 
in CEO (CEOch) and the presence of a termination payment are negative and weakly significant in 
Model (7) (Total disclosure).  In explaining the variation in DiscREM disclosure, the CEO 
remuneration level (CEOrem: -2.259, z = -2.144, p-value <0.05) and the presence of a termination 
payment (Term: -6.136, z = -3.716, p-value <0.01) are negative and significant.  The increases in 
DiscREM disclosures appear to be related to increases in BLETTER disclosure and not TransTOT 
disclosure as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients in Model (12) as opposed to Model 
(11).  In Model (10) where TransTOT disclosure is the dependent variable, ROA is -21.859 (z= -
2.646), and significant at the 1% significance level.   
Results presented in Table 7.9 provide support for the results presented in the primary analysis, and 
in turn support the original finding that the levels of disclosure increase concurrent with the years that 
saw the introduction of the two-strikes rule. 
7.13 Conclusion  
In response to RQ1 posed in Chapter 1, the univariate analysis results clearly indicate that there has 
been a significant increase in the mean levels of total and transparent disclosure in the remuneration 
reports of ASX200 firms following the introduction of the accountability mechanism.  Total and 
transparent disclosure scores have increased across the four years of the study.  Increases in disclosure 
are seen across all parsing of the index including industry groups, across remuneration categories and 
in specialised areas of remuneration disclosure such as in relation to consultant use and committee 
behaviour.  Tukey HSD analysis indicates that increases in total and transparent disclosure are 
significant between all year pairs.  The regression analysis supports the expectation that total and 
transparent disclosure have increased across the time period 2008 to 2014 concurrent with the 
introduction of the two-strikes rule.  These changes in disclosure policy have occurred in the absence 
of additional legislated disclosure requirements.  These results indicate that company boards have 
increased the amount of total and transparent disclosure concurrent to the introduction of the two-
strikes rule. 
The following chapter presents the results of the analysis undertaken to investigate the second 
research question that more closely examines the relation between the measured increases in 
disclosure and shareholder voting. 
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Table 7.9  Results:  RQ1 Robustness testing 
DISCtype:i,t = α + β1RULE + β2Sizei,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Growi,t+ β5Auditi,t + β6Top20i,t + β7CEOchi,t  
+ β8 lnCEOremi,t+ β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t +δi + ε 
Variable Pred DiscTOT DiscREM SHRBASED TransTOT TransREM BLETTER 
 Sign (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
RULE + 13.871*** 17.220*** 6.459*** 15.035*** 19.948*** 16.276*** 
  (19.162) (20.533) (7.589) (16.033) (16.55) (18.878) 
Size + 2.108*** 2.394*** 2.271*** 2.552*** 3.212*** 2.058*** 
  (4.033) (4.271) (3.354) (3.687) (4.09) (3.931) 
ROA + -7.107 -7.943 -8.871 -20.859*** -17.29 -3.918 
  (-1.031) (-0.983) (-1.195) (-2.646) (-1.637) (-0.506) 
Grow - -0.744** -0.484 -0.932* -0.687 -0.291 -0.531 
  (-2.196) (-1.019) (-1.894) (-1.463) (-0.546) (-0.891) 
Audit + 5.484* 7.733** 0.074 9.203** 12.539** 5.825** 
  (1.836) (2.259) (0.024) (2.322) (2.520) (2.073) 
Top20 - -0.04 -0.028 -0.005 -0.029 -0.003 -0.042 
  (-0.972) (-0.622) (-0.093) (-0.484) (-0.044) (-1.043) 
CEOch + -1.382* -1.101 -0.404 -1.533 -1.382 -0.801 
  (-1.717) (-1.163) (-0.293) (-1.325) (-0.944) (-0.874) 
CEOrem + 1.105 2.169** -2.259** 1.059 1.837 2.296*** 
  (1.354) (2.344) (-2.144) (0.993) (1.384) (2.687) 
Bonus - 0.225 0.635 1.128 0.432 1.279 0.286 
  -0.215 -0.559 -0.893 -0.368 -0.914 -0.238 
Options - 0.296 0.058 2.354* 1.37 1.143 -0.476 
  (0.344) (0.062) (1.739) (1.099) (0.814) (-0.532) 
Equity - -0.029 -0.18 2.124* 0.974 0.729 -0.542 
  (-0.037) (-0.185) (1.939) (0.897) (0.481) (-0.595) 
Term - -3.258** -6.136*** -0.856 -3.151* -5.198** -5.884*** 
  (-2.207) (-3.716) (-0.530) (-1.936) (-2.561) (-3.331) 
Constant  -15.924 -32.113*** 14.94 -28.779** -59.593*** -21.680** 
  (-1.619) (-2.944) (1.126) (-2.000) (-3.602) (-2.153) 
n  471 471 471 471 471 471 
Companies  118 118 118 118 118 118 
Year FE  No No No No No No 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.488 0.559 0.130 0.389 0.432 0.542 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 8. RQ2 Accountability: Results 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that levels of total and transparent disclosure increased across the period 
2008 to 2014 concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  This Chapter examines the 
relations between board disclosure policy and shareholder voting following the implementation of 
the accountability mechanism.  Section 8.1 introduces the Chapter, while Section 8.2 presents the 
results for RQ2a, Section 8.3 reports the results for RQ2b and Section 8.4 presents the results of 
robustness testing.  Section 8.5 concludes. 
8.1 Introduction  
This analysis examines the relation between the changes in disclosure policy and board 
accountability.  Results to this point indicate that despite no additional legislated disclosure 
requirements, both total and transparent remuneration disclosure of ASX200 firms increased 
following the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Arguably, the increased disclosure may be 
attributed to factors other than the introduction of the rule, for example, increased public pressure on 
boards to disclose.  Therefore, this chapter investigates the effectiveness of the accountability 
mechanism by examining the feedback loop between remuneration disclosures and shareholder 
voting.   This is done in two steps.  First, whether shareholders’ consider the available disclosure 
when casting their vote is examined (RQ2a).  Second, and more importantly for this research, the 
board response to levels of shareholder dissent is examined (RQ2b).  The results of the empirical 
testing is presented in this chapter. 
8.2 Shareholder Dissent and Remuneration Disclosure 
Research examining the implementation of the two-strikes rule (and say on pay legislation in other 
countries) has focused on changes in remuneration arrangements and have not examined the relation 
between shareholder dissent and disclosure policy.  In the first step to exploring this relation, RQ2a 
asks whether shareholder no vote is inversely related to total and transparent remuneration disclosure.  
Table 8.1 presents the regression results for estimating Equation (6.2), Models (1) to (6) where the 
dependent variable is level of dissent: NOVOTE and STRIKE.  NOVOTE is the reported percentage 
of no votes recorded against the remuneration resolution at the firm’s annual general meeting.  
STRIKE is a dummy variable, 1 if the NOVOTE was 25% or above and 0 otherwise.  Equation (6.2) 
is estimated using panel data of 455 firm-year observations for the sample period 2008 to 2014 as 
described in Section 6.3.2.  
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Table 8.1  Results:  RQ2a Shareholder dissent as a function of disclosure policy 
NOVOTEi,t = α + β1DISCtype:i,t + β2RULE + β3NOVOTEi,t-1  + β4Sizei,t + β5ROAi,t + β6Growi,t + β7Auditi,t + β8ShRett + 
β9Top20i,t + β10 CEOchi,t + β11lnCEOremi,t + β12 Bonus + β13Options + β14Equity + β15Term +δi + ε 
(6.2) 
Variables NOVOTE NOVOTE NOVOTE STRIKE STRIKE STRIKE  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DiscTOT -0.000   0.000    
-0.223 0.019 
TransTOT  0.000   0.000   
0.081 0.073 
TransREM   -0.000   0.000  
-0.120 0.201 
RULE -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.114***  
-2.893 -3.392 -3.372 -3.050 -3.111 -3.129 
NOVOTEt-1 0.164** 0.163** 0.164** 0.250 0.248 0.247  
2.223 2.194 2.191 1.408 1.381 1.366 
Size -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043***  
-3.277 -3.535 -3.529 -3.427 -3.677 -3.713 
ROA -0.255** -0.256** -0.256** -0.435 -0.436 -0.436  
-2.321 -2.364 -2.353 -1.542 -1.556 -1.552 
Grow 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***  
3.727 3.714 3.707 3.915 3.854 3.852 
Audit -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.108 -0.109 -0.109  
-0.948 -0.947 -0.949 -1.087 -1.086 -1.090 
ShRet -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031  
-0.859 -0.866 -0.872 -1.050 -1.051 -1.043 
Top20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001  
0.146 0.167 0.167 0.655 0.649 0.649 
CEOch -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.068* -0.068* -0.068*  
-1.087 -1.065 -1.070 -1.861 -1.842 -1.840 
lnCEOrem 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110***  
3.689 3.602 3.643 3.906 3.797 3.775 
Bonus 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.015  
0.683 0.681 0.688 0.356 0.356 0.337 
Options -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.061* -0.061* -0.061*  
-1.198 -1.206 -1.196 -1.702 -1.720 -1.719 
Equity 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.036 0.036 0.036  
0.263 0.257 0.260 0.949 0.957 0.953 
Term -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.932*** -0.931*** -0.929***  
-8.786 -8.933 -8.682 -16.009 -16.676 -15.986 
Constant 0.078 0.083 0.079 0.422 0.426 0.435  
0.652 0.695 0.660 1.537 1.530 1.525 
n 455 455 455 455 455 455 
Companies 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Year FE No No No No No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.140 0.140 0.140 
Robust z-statistics in italics. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The overall R-squared is less than 15% for all models in this analysis, which may suggest that the 
model is missing some important control variables, however low R-squared results are common in 
research attempting to model shareholder dissent (see Bugeja et al., 2016; Ferri & Maber, 2013; 
Monem & Ng, 2013; Alissa, 2015).30 Despite the low R-squared results, the Wald chi-square test is 
                                                 
30 For all estimations, ‘within’, ‘between’ and ‘overall’ R2 are calculated, with only ‘overall’ reported.  Due to the inclusion 
of fixed effects, Adjusted R2 is not calculated.  
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statistically significant at better than 1% significance level, therefore rejecting the null that the model 
has no power.    
The main variable of interest in Equation (6.2) (Table 8.1) is the independent variable DISCtype.  In 
all models, total (DiscTOTi,t) and transparent (TransTOTi,t and TransREMi,t) are insignificant in 
determining the level of shareholder STRIKE and NOVOTE in the current year.  In sensitivity 
analysis (not tabulated), all parsing of total disclosure was estimated, and none are significant for 
shareholder dissent.   
RULE is a dummy variable included in the regression where years 2012 and 2014 is indicated as one 
(1).  Table 8.1 reports that in all models RULE is negative and significant at the 1% significance 
level, however the coefficients are small.  This indicates that there were fewer numbers of firms 
receiving a strike and the level of shareholder dissenting votes were lower in the years after the 
introduction of the rule.   
In Models (1), (2) and (3), NOVOTEt-1 has positive and weakly significant association with 
NOVOTE, suggesting that higher levels of dissent in the previous year are associated with higher 
levels of dissent in the current year.  NOVOTEt-1 is not significant for STRIKE in Models (4), (5) and 
(6). 
The control variables in regression results for estimating Equation (6.2) are drawn from other research 
that has investigated the determinants of shareholder dissent.  Consistent with prior research, CEOrem 
and Grow are positive and significant for STRIKE and NOVOTE at the 1% significance level.  Also 
consistent with prior findings, the presence of a termination payment for the year (Term), Size and 
ROA are negative and significant for STRIKE and NOVOTE at the 5% significance level or better.  
In Models (4), (5) and (6), where STRIKE is the dependent variable, the presence of an equity 
payment (Options) and the turnover of the CEO (CEOch) are both negative and weakly significant. 
In summary, the results of this regression analysis suggest that the level of shareholder dissent is not 
influenced by the level of total or transparent disclosure in the remuneration report. 
8.3 Board Response to Shareholder Dissent 
The main objective of the two-strikes rule was to drive change in board disclosure policy to ultimately 
improve board accountability.  Univariate analysis has indicated that disclosure policy has changed 
over time in that total and transparent disclosure has increased concurrent to the introduction of the 
rule.  This analysis extends the scope of that analysis to ask whether boards acknowledge dissent from 
shareholder and adjust their disclosure policy in response.  If total and transparent disclosure is 
positively associated with the prior year level of shareholder dissent, this may indicate that boards 
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have not only increased disclosure in response to the existence of the two-strikes rule, but that they 
attempt to be more accountable in response to shareholder dissent by changing the disclosure policy 
to provide more total and transparent disclosure.    
Table 8.2 presents the regression results for estimating Equation (6.3), Models (1) to (12) where the 
dependent variable is disclosure.  The primary variable of interest is NOVOTEt-1, which is the no vote 
percentage for each firm, lagged by one year.  The other variables of interest are the year dummy 
variables (Models 1 to 6) and the RULE variable (Models 7 to 12).  Equation (6.3) is estimated using 
panel data of 464 firm-year observations for the sample period 2008 to 2014 as described in Section 
5.3.2.  Consistent with expectations, results presented in Table 8.2 for Models (1) and (2) indicate 
that the level of shareholder dissent from the prior year has a positive and significant association with 
the level of total disclosure, disclosure in the remuneration report, and both measures of transparent 
disclosure.  Of particular interest is transparent disclosure.  The coefficient on NOVOTEt-1 is 7.861 
(z score= 3.116, p<0.01) for TransTOT, and 13.219 (z score = 3.79, p<0.01) for TransREM.  All year 
dummy variables are significant and positively associated with both TransTOT and TransREM, 
indicating that in each year transparent disclosure increased relative to the level of transparent 
disclosure in 2008.  For 2010, the coefficient for TransREM is 7.652 (z score= 8.299, p<0.01), while 
in 2012 the coefficient is 19.839 (z score= 14.006, p<0.01).  The coefficient for the 2014 year dummy 
variable is 28.752 (z score= 18.464, p<0.01) on TransREM.  These increases in coefficients indicate 
that there was a substantial increase in transparent disclosures in the remuneration report between 
2010 and 2012.  These results hold in Models (7) to (12) that include the RULE variable, suggesting 
that disclosure policy was altered in the years following the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  These 
results support the univariate results that indicated mean levels of disclosure were increasing 
significantly across this time period, suggesting that the increases were a board policy response to 
lagged shareholder dissent. 
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Table 8.2  Results:  RQ2b Disclosure as a function of lagged shareholder dissent 
DISCtype:i,t = α + δt + β1NOVOTEi,t-1 + β2Sizei,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Growi,t + β5Auditi,t + β6Top20i,t + β7CEOchi,t + β8lnCEOremi,t  
+ β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t + β12Termi,t +δi + ε 
(6.3)   
VARIABLES DiscTOT DiscREM SHRBASED TransTOT TransREM BLETTER DiscTOT DiscREM SHRBASED TransTOT TransREM BLETTER  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
NOVOTEt-1 6.085** 7.161** -1.539 7.861*** 13.219*** 3.844 6.848*** 8.325*** -2.311 8.579*** 14.704*** 4.916 
 2.575 2.512 -0.489 3.116 3.790 1.218 2.588 2.725 -0.694 2.863 3.990 1.484 
year = 2010 4.126*** 5.026*** 1.574 5.773*** 7.652*** 3.622***       
 8.583 8.857 1.539 8.326 8.299 6.573 
year = 2012 13.645*** 17.521*** 5.007*** 14.146*** 19.839*** 16.764***       
 17.470 18.358 4.170 12.913 14.006 16.790 
year = 2014 18.550*** 22.352*** 10.121*** 22.231*** 28.752*** 19.502***       
 20.774 21.650 7.740 18.879 18.464 18.508 
RULE       13.764*** 17.124*** 6.565*** 14.910*** 19.965*** 16.120*** 
 19.545 20.580 7.583 16.990 17.112 18.299 
Size 2.605*** 2.911*** 2.458*** 3.179*** 3.924*** 2.415*** 2.456*** 2.779*** 2.346*** 2.938*** 3.715*** 2.370*** 
 5.316 5.562 3.706 4.880 5.304 4.970 4.951 5.273 3.528 4.413 4.905 4.867 
ROA 5.354 5.073 -0.518 -3.767 3.809 4.948 -3.675 -4.204 -8.740 -17.670** -12.074 -0.840 
 0.859 0.690 -0.070 -0.558 0.422 0.659 -0.581 -0.572 -1.147 -2.411 -1.320 -0.114 
Grow -0.536* -0.355 -0.770* -0.352 -0.036 -0.459 -0.640** -0.418 -0.988* -0.565 -0.214 -0.468 
 -1.702 -0.724 -1.758 -1.127 -0.082 -0.741 -2.041 -0.885 -1.858 -1.334 -0.419 -0.767 
Audit 5.023* 7.427** -1.018 8.526*** 11.995*** 5.398** 5.668* 7.953** -0.113 9.310** 12.803*** 5.912** 
 1.934 2.381 -0.337 2.689 2.894 1.981 1.958 2.369 0.036 2.431 2.673 2.113 
Top20 -0.045 -0.042 0.001 -0.033 -0.033 -0.049 -0.020 -0.012 0.015 0.001 0.020 -0.029 
 -1.210 -0.954 0.018 -0.625 -0.496 -1.200 -0.514 -0.261 0.296 0.015 0.280 -0.712 
CEOch -1.204* -0.869 -0.617 -1.344 -0.993 -0.658 -1.331* -1.081 -0.464 -1.451 -1.242 -0.845 
 -1.799 -1.071 -0.473 -1.534 -0.848 -0.749 -1.678 -1.146 -0.338 -1.266 -0.853 -0.919 
lnCEOrem 0.445 1.450* -2.150** 0.379 0.837 1.893** 0.638 1.692* -2.180** 0.611 1.153 1.983** 
 0.646 1.826 -2.118 0.429 0.737 2.424 0.821 1.880 -2.086 0.592 0.892 2.356 
Bonus -0.699 -0.395 0.768 -0.674 0.108 -0.631 -0.201 0.173 1.116 0.123 1.086 -0.300 
 -0.809 -0.413 0.621 -0.674 0.086 -0.603 -0.214 0.166 0.881 0.109 0.788 -0.275 
Options 0.296 0.104 1.720 1.157 1.082 -0.479 0.508 0.194 2.138 1.640 1.435 -0.464 
 0.376 0.123 1.348 1.034 0.890 -0.561 0.588 0.213 1.595 1.297 1.049 -0.528 
Equity -0.394 -0.567 1.605 0.470 0.221 -0.842 -0.284 -0.492 1.770* 0.613 0.321 -0.809  
-0.550 -0.660 1.570 0.490 0.168 -0.978 -0.360 -0.514 1.681 0.554 0.211 -0.901 
Term 0.322 -2.630* 3.744** 2.577 0.500 -3.649** -3.601*** -6.548*** 0.052 -3.856** -6.777*** -5.759*** 
 0.229 -1.665 2.206 1.530 0.234 -2.166 -2.668 -4.213 0.032 -2.340 -3.196 -3.606 
Constant -22.564** -38.166*** 4.835 -41.127*** -69.040*** -26.707*** -18.298* -34.817*** 10.660 -32.753** -62.137*** -24.853** 
 -2.536 -3.752 0.382 -3.146 -4.537 -2.805 -1.909 -3.247 0.814 -2.319 -3.818 -2.524 
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
No. of coid 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.528 0.595 0.163 0.449 0.484 0.567    0.492 0.567 0.145 0.395 0.439 0.553 
Robust z-statistics in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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8.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
In examining shareholder voting in the UK, Alissa (2015) identifies three subsamples of shareholder 
voting behaviour: high dissatisfaction = >20%, medium dissatisfaction = 5% to 20%, and low 
dissatisfaction = <5%.  To assess the sensitivity of board response to lagged shareholder dissent, 
following the classifications of Alissa (2015), the estimations for Equation (6.3) are repeated at three 
levels of dissent (lagged): above 20% (NOVOTE>20t-1), between 5% and 20% (NOVOTE_5_20t-1), 
and less than 5% no vote (NOVOTE<5t-1).  Given the focus of the PC Inquiry was to improve 
transparency, the dependent variables tested are TransTOT and TransREM.  Table 8.3 presents the 
results.  Model (1) and (2) indicate a positive and significant association between lagged no vote levels 
above 20% and increased levels of transparent disclosure.  NOVOTE>20t-1 has a positive and 
significant coefficient of 2.840 (z score= 3.078, p<0.01) for TransTOT, and a positive and significant 
coefficient of 3.831 (z score= 2.986, p<0.01) for TransREM.  This result indicates that a dissenting 
vote of more than 20% is associated with increased levels of transparent disclosure in the following 
year.  This finding is consistent with expectations. 
Models (3) and (4) indicate that levels of dissent above 5% but below 20% are not significantly 
associated with levels of transparent disclosure in the following year’s remuneration report.  As with 
prior estimations of the disclosure model, year effects, firm size and choice of audit are positive and 
significantly associated with disclosure in these models. 
Models (5) and (6) test the association between firms receiving a dissenting vote of less than 5% and 
the level of transparent disclosure in the following year.  In Model (7) the coefficient on NOVOTE<5t-
1 is insignificant, but in Model (8), where the dependent variable is TransREM, the NOVOTE<5t-1 
coefficient is highly significant and negative (-2.879, z score = -2.821).  This indicates that when 
firms have a no vote of less than 5%, they decrease their transparent remuneration disclosure in the 
following year.  All other coefficients are consistent with prior estimations of the model. 
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Table 8.3  Results:  RQ2b Sensitivity analysis - Transparent disclosure and levels of lagged dissent 
DISCtype:i,t = α + δt + β1NOVOTEi,t-1 + β2Sizei,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Growi,t + β5Auditi,t + β6Top20i,t + β7CEOchi,t + 
β8lnCEOremi,t + β9Bonusi,t + β10Optionsi,t + β11Equityi,t + β12Termi,t +δi + ε 
(6.3) 
Variables TransTOT TransREM TransTOT TransREM TransTOT TransREM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NOVOTE>20t-1 2.840*** 3.831***      
(3.078) (2.986)   
NOVOTE_5_20t-1   -0.040 1.253    
(-0.051) (1.229)   
NOVOTE<5t-1     -1.183 -2.879*** 
     (-1.479) (-2.821) 
year = 2010 5.833*** 8.074*** 6.099*** 8.344*** 5.908*** 7.969***  
(8.420) (9.034) (8.680) (9.312) (8.264) (8.789) 
year = 2012 14.546*** 20.423*** 14.577*** 20.306*** 14.423*** 20.088***  
(12.403) (14.021) (12.196) (13.735) (12.229) (13.833) 
year = 2014 22.483*** 29.044*** 22.398*** 28.970*** 22.477*** 29.113***  
(18.091) (18.501) (17.756) (17.905) (17.681) (18.099) 
Size 2.907*** 3.599*** 2.775*** 3.461*** 2.859*** 3.632***  
(4.314) (4.719) (4.098) (4.510) (4.223) (4.735) 
ROA -6.404 -0.506 -7.120 -0.888 -6.234 0.550  
(-0.880) (-0.049) (-0.975) (-0.086) (-0.866) (0.054) 
Grow -0.550 -0.223 -0.516 -0.165 -0.517 -0.183  
(-1.463) (-0.491) (-1.382) (-0.353) (-1.392) (-0.402) 
Audit 8.424*** 11.804*** 8.488** 11.653*** 8.204** 11.318***  
(2.588) (2.798) (2.508) (2.677) (2.454) (2.675) 
Top20 -0.060 -0.051 -0.067 -0.056 -0.061 -0.047  
(-1.083) (-0.745) (-1.163) (-0.795) (-1.067) (-0.667) 
CEOch -1.326 -0.941 -1.387 -1.075 -1.406 -1.070  
(-1.501) (-0.801) (-1.545) (-0.906) (-1.567) (-0.916) 
CEOrem 0.595 1.153 0.814 1.474 0.754 1.280  
(0.661) (1.001) (0.874) (1.236) (0.823) (1.107) 
Bonus -0.292 0.399 -0.429 0.105 -0.475 0.105  
(-0.285) (0.320) (-0.419) (0.085) (-0.459) (0.084) 
Options 1.193 1.239 0.952 0.937 1.082 1.224  
(1.063) (0.984) (0.855) (0.739) (0.954) (0.961) 
Equity 0.779 0.562 0.840 0.634 0.812 0.571  
(0.827) (0.436) (0.880) (0.486) (0.853) (0.442) 
Term 1.470 -0.354 2.970 2.689 3.316* 2.499  
(0.858) (-0.163) (1.644) (1.221) (1.900) (1.199) 
Constant -35.279*** -64.111*** -36.200*** -68.008*** -36.985*** -67.161***  
(-2.588) (-4.087) (-2.663) (-4.356) (-2.722) (-4.349) 
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 
Number of coid 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.440 0.476 0.440 0.478 0.440 0.478 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.4 Robustness 
To test the robustness of the results found in Section 8.2 further analysis is conducted using alternate 
specifications of the control variables (not reported).  Due to the disparity of measures used to 
measure CEO remuneration in the remuneration disclosure and say on pay literature, all models are 
estimated with alternate measures of CEO remuneration.  Specifically, the models are estimated with 
remuneration measured as: the cash salary as a percentage of total reported pay following Core et al. 
(1999) and Bugeja et al. (2016); total reported CEO remuneration scaled by total assets following 
Core et al. (1999); and the reported categorised elements of remuneration (cash, short-term incentive 
payment and long-term incentive payment) following Clarkson et al. (2011) and Kimbro and Xu 
(2015).  An alternate measure for performance, ROE, is estimated following Clarkson et al. (1999; 
2006); and firm size is measured using book value of equity and the natural log of market 
capitalisation (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Clarkson et al., 2013; Etimur et al., 2013).  All regressions 
are estimated using dummy variables for industry membership.  The results from estimating all 
models are consistent with the primary results with no impact on the dependent variables or variables 
of interest.   
8.5 Conclusion 
The results presented in Chapter 8 are in response to the second research question.  The introduction 
of the two-strikes rule was intended to illicit more board accountability in the form of higher levels 
of transparent disclosure from ASX listed companies through the introduction of a shareholder voting 
mechanism that was supported by an enforcement mechanism (a potential board spill).  It is proposed 
in Section 5.2.2 that the voting mechanism acts as a feedback channel from shareholders to firms, and 
a positive association is expected between shareholder dissent and transparent disclosure in the 
remuneration report in the following year.   
To examine the use of the voting mechanism by shareholders, the association between disclosure and 
shareholder dissent in the current year is tested.  The results indicate that shareholder dissent is not 
associated with levels of disclosure in the current year’s remuneration report.  Consistent with the 
literature, the results indicate that shareholder dissent is correlated with reported CEO remuneration, 
firm growth, firm size, profitability and termination payments. 
Section 8.3 then examines the association between lagged shareholder dissent and transparent 
disclosure remuneration.  The regression results suggest that higher dissent levels are associated with 
higher levels of transparent disclosure.  Sensitivity analysis reveals that this relation is strongest when 
shareholder dissent is above 20%.  Interestingly, when shareholder dissent is below 5%, transparent 
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remuneration disclosure is lower in the following year.  These results are consistent with the 
proposition that boards manage disclosure policy by adjusting transparent disclosure in the 
remuneration report in response to feedback from shareholders. 
The following chapter presents the qualitative study of the subset of Australian listed firms that 
lobbied the PC Inquiry.  
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Chapter 9. Accountability:  Real Effects & Lobbying Strategy  
This chapter presents the third stage of the thesis that comprises a qualitative study of the disclosure 
policy of twenty ASX200 firms that were involved in the standard setting process that ultimately 
resulted in the accountability mechanism, colloquially known as the two-strikes rule.  The purpose of 
this study is two-fold.  First, prior research suggests that qualitative research is necessary in order to 
fully appreciate the real effects of regulatory change in achieving accountability.  Second, listed firms 
that lobbied the PC Inquiry are found (in Stage 1 of the thesis) to employ lobbying strategies, and 
strongly oppose the introduction of the accountability mechanism.  By examining lobbying behaviour 
and resulting changes in disclosure practices over time, it may be possible to understand the 
motivations of the lobbyists and extrapolate how specific disclosure practices are used by company 
boards to achieve (or avoid) accountability. 
Section 9.1 introduces the study, while Section 9.2 outlines the method adopted.  Section 9.3 outlines 
the sample used in the study, while Section 9.4 presents relevant quantitative analysis of the lobbying 
firms’ disclosure policy while Section 9.5 presents the qualitative analysis.  Section 9.6 juxtaposes 
the lobbying firms’ disclosure policy against their lobbying behaviour and 9.7 concludes.   
9.1 Introduction 
Leuz and Wysoki (2016) emphasise the importance of examining the costs and benefits of regulatory 
change from a qualitative perspective to properly identify the effects of particular changes in 
regulation.  To this end, to gain a deeper, richer perspective of how remuneration reporting has 
evolved following the introduction of the two-strikes rule, the 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports 
of the twenty ASX200 firms that lobbying the PC Inquiry are analysed using a qualitative, content 
analysis approach.   
The remuneration reports of the lobbying firms are utilised for the qualitative analysis in this stage of 
the thesis to allow two streams of investigation of the costs and benefits of the regulatory change.  
First, a qualitative analysis of disclosure behaviour is expected to provide greater insights into how 
disclosure behaviour has changed concurrent with the conduct of the PC Inquiry.  Second, the 
qualitative analysis of remuneration reports of lobbying firms will provide an opportunity to examine 
the response of firms involved in the political process of regulation settings.  These two streams of 
investigation are discussed in more depth in Section 9.1.1 and 9.1.2.   
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9.1.1 Qualitative Perspective of Changes in Disclosure Behaviour  
Results in Stage 2 of this thesis indicate that concurrent with the conduct of the PC Inquiry, total 
disclosure in remuneration reports increased, and transparency of reports improved.  However, the 
quantitative results indicate that boards do not provide disclosure that meets 100% of the legislated 
disclosure requirements, and remuneration reports are not fully transparent.  Therefore, this stage of 
the thesis aims to provide a more detailed examination of the disclosure policy of boards allowing an 
understanding of the nuances evident in disclosure practices.  This aim is consistent with Firestone 
(1987:16) who suggests that quantitative studies can be enhanced by qualitative analysis that provide 
‘persuasive, rich descriptions that give the reader enough detail to make sense’ of the quantitative 
results.  In Section 9.3, the subsample of lobbying firms is shown to be a representative sample of the 
total ASX200 firms, and therefore the disclosure behaviour of these firms is believed to be 
representative of Australian listed firms. 
9.1.2 Disclosure Behaviour of Lobbying Firms 
The second reason for examining the remuneration reports of the twenty firms that lobbied the PC 
Inquiry is to enable a longitudinal examination of the behaviour and motivation of firms involved in 
the political process that resulted in the change in regulation.  Financial transparency is related to 
political economy, which is the relation between government and the economy (Bushman et al., 
2004).  Financial transparency is one small component of the accounting and disclosure infrastructure 
of an economy, which has evolved as a complementary component of the economic, legal and 
political structures (Ball, 2001).  These structures are informed by lobbyists who act as a link between 
the political process and the stakeholders.  Research into lobbying behaviour adds credibility to the 
entire political process of standard setting, as it provides insights into the quality of outcomes 
produced via consultation.  The tension exists in that such research may highlight that inclusive, 
balanced outcomes are produced or the research may expose situations where regulators appear to be 
too influenced by one player (lobbyist) in the process.  Therefore it follows that firms that participated 
in lobbying behaviour are of particular interest to the study of remuneration disclosure because their 
attitudes towards the executive remuneration framework, and in particular towards disclosure, may 
be revealed through their lobbying and reflected in their disclosure policy choices. 
Prior research suggests that firms participate in lobbying to influence the process with a particular 
outcome in mind (Puro, 1984; Zeff, 2002) namely to benefit the firm (Sikka, 2001).  Schipper (2010) 
suggests that researching stated preferences versus real preferences of lobbyists may be a useful 
technique to gather data on the costs of implementing accounting standards.  The examination of the 
lobbying behaviour and outcomes of the PC Inquiry (Chapter 4) would suggest that lobbying firms 
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had very little influence on the outcome of the inquiry with their stated preferences being largely 
ignored by the regulator. 
The stated preferences of lobbying firms are reported in Chapter 4.  To summarise, firms stated 
preferences for no additional legislated disclosure requirements, and no change to the non-binding 
shareholder vote on audited remuneration reports.  Lobbying firms cited the risk of unintended 
consequences as being the reason for these preferences.  However, research would suggest that these 
reasons may not be the ‘real’ reasons firms opposed changes to the remuneration reporting 
framework.   
There is an extensive literature that paints a grim view of firms that participate in lobbying activities.  
The theory behind why firms lobby suggests that management lobby to protect their self-interest, and 
not the interests of shareholders (Cortese et al., 2010; Watts, 1977; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Zeff, 
2002).  There is research that suggests that lobbying firms are more likely to commit fraud (Yu & 
Yu, 2011), manage earnings (Jones, 1991) and be political ‘players’ (Drutman, 2010).  As described 
in Chapter 2, incentives exist for management to minimise disclosure of executive remuneration 
contracts, such as the desire to hide the existence of suboptimal contracts (Jensen et al., 2004) or to 
mask the excessive managerial influence over the board (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  In combination, 
these theories suggest that firms may have participated in lobbying the PC Inquiry in an attempt to 
maintain a situation where their remuneration practices were not revealed to shareholders. 
In addition to these theories that suggest lobbyists may have had a preference to maintain poor 
disclosure practices, Posner (1974) proposed that regulators tend to become captured by those they 
regulate, while Howieson (2011) demonstrates that standard setters are subject to extensive political 
pressures applied to in the face of public anxiety.  The combination of the poor reputation of lobbying 
firms, and prior research that suggests firms have captured regulators in the past, provides the 
motivation for research that examines the behaviour of lobbyists as it relates to the change in 
regulation.  The disclosure behaviour is particularly interesting in this setting, because the stated 
preferences of firms that lobbied the Inquiry appear to have been largely ignored by the regulator.    
This stage of the research therefore investigates the disclosure policy of lobbying firms before and 
after the PC Inquiry in an attempt to understand what the real preferences of lobbying firms where, 
and whether the disclosure policy of these firms changed in line with introduction of the 
accountability mechanism.   
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9.2 Method 
Prior to conducting a qualitative analysis of the remuneration reports, the descriptive statistics of the 
firm characteristics of the lobbying firm sample are tabulated, and comparisons to the ASX200 
sample are made.  The quantitative disclosure scores, including total and transparent disclosure, for 
the lobbying firm sample are then calculated and presented.  These are then compared to the ASX200 
sample to gain insights as to how comparable the lobbying group of firms are to the larger sample. 
The qualitative examination of the 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports is conducted by content 
analysis following the integrative model outlined by Nuendorf (2002).  This involves developing the 
theory of what will be analysed, developing a coding scheme, coding, testing reliability, and then 
reporting (Nuendorf, 2002:51).  The coding scheme is developed based on each item of transparent 
disclosure (as determined by TransREM, see Section 6.2.6).  Using a predictive approach, a content 
index was created to allow ‘pattern coding’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  The content index was based 
on the qualitative analysis reported in Chapter 4, and included three rankings: ‘boilerplate’ level, mid-
range or ‘transparent’.  This coding produced a case-ordered meta-matrix that allowed ‘repeatable 
regularities’ to be identified (Miles & Huberman, 1994:189).  Remuneration reports from the years 
2008 and 2014 were read and human coded.  Each item on the coding scheme was coded based on 
the content index, and extracts or quotes were collated for each company.  Due to the level of 
subjectivity in the indexing and data collection, an independent researcher reviewed the data 
collection process and results to ensure reliability of the results.  The final data set was then analysed 
using ‘drawing conclusions from matrix data’ method described by Miles and Huberman (1994:242).   
9.3 Background: Lobbying Firm Sample 
To more closely examine the disclosure policy choice of firms intimately involved in the development 
of the remuneration framework, the industry respondents who participated in lobbying the PC Inquiry 
are examined.  The PC Inquiry received input from 40 separate firms, which made a total of 57 points 
of contact with the Inquiry.  Of the 40 industry respondents identified in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 10 
firms were listed overseas, 5 firms were private, 3 firms were managed funds and 2 firms were 
delisted before 2014.31 To enable an analysis of the longitudinal behaviour of the firms that 
participated in the PC Inquiry, the audited remuneration reports of twenty lobbying firms that were 
listed in 2008 and 2014, and participated in lobbying the PC Inquiry in 2009 are analysed in this 
                                                 
31 David Jones was delisted in 2014 after its sale to a South African company, and Australian Unity is a mutual company 
and therefore not required to publish and audited remuneration report.  
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stage.  The details of the lobbying activity of these 20 firms and their ASX codes are shown in Table 
9.1.  All lobbying firms except one, Sirtex Medical, were members of the ASX200 in 2014.   
The lobbying firms made a total of 33 points of contact with the PC Inquiry, which represents 58% 
of the total contact made by industry respondents to the Inquiry.32  Twelve firms made at least one 
written submission, while eight companies communicated with the Inquiry solely in person, either by 
attending a roundtable or an industry visit.33  Of the twenty firms that lobbied the PC Inquiry, 8 firms 
had non-written contact, therefore 12 made at least one written submission to the Inquiry, and five 
firms made written submissions in both phases of the Inquiry.34  
Table 9.1  Lobbying firms and their lobbying contacts with the PC Inquiry 
Company Name 
 
ASX 
code 
Phase 1 - 
Written 
Submission 
Phase 2 - 
Written 
Submission 
Roundtable 
participant 
Commission 
Visit 
Alumina Limited AWC   1  
Amcor Limited AMC   1  
AMP Capital Investors Limited AMP    1 
ASX Limited ASX 1 1  2 
BHP Billiton Limited BHP 1 1   
BlueScope Steel Limited BSL 1 1   
Boral Limited BLD  1 1  
Commonwealth Bank of Australia CBA   1  
CSR Limited CSR   1  
Downer EDI Limited DOW   1  
Macquarie Group Limited MQG 1 1 1  
National Australia Bank  NAB  1   
Origin Energy Limited ORG 1 1 2  
Perpetual Limited PPT  1 1  
Qantas Airways Limited QAN   1  
Sirtex Medical Limited SRX  1   
Suncorp Group Limited SUN   1  
Wesfarmers Limited WES 1    
Westpac Banking Corporation WBC  1  1 
Woolworths Limited WOW 1    
Total 20 7 10 12 4 
Table 9.1 presents a summary of the type and number of contacts firms had with the PC Inquiry. 
9.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics of the lobbying firms are outlined in Table 9.2.  
As discussed above, the lobbying firm sample includes Sirtex Medical Pty Ltd (SRX) that became a 
member of the ASX200 in 2013.  The lobbying firm sample also includes the largest firm of the 
ASX200 sample used for Stage 2.  The top of the range for many descriptive statistics in the lobbying 
firms subsample is therefore the same as the ASX200 sample, because MQG is the largest  
                                                 
32  A full analysis of the behaviour of all Industry respondents is detailed in Chapter 4. 
33 While there are no transcripts outlining the content of roundtable discussions or visits to industry, for the purposes of 
this stage of the analysis, the participation in a lobbying activity is of interest as it is a point of difference between these 
firms and other firms that did not lobby.   
34 Detailed information on ‘Phase 1’ and ‘Phase 2’ of the PC Inquiry is provided in Section 4.3. 
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Table 9.2  Descriptive statistics:  Lobbying firm characteristics 
Panel A Continuous Variable 2008 2010 2102 2014 
Assets (natural log)     
Mean 23.64 23.76 23.80 23.84 
Median 23.36  13.68 23.79 23.74 
Std. Dev. 2.34 2.28 2.33 2.34 
Minimum 17.16 18.02 18.39 18.82 
Maximum 27.21 27.25 27.36 27.51 
ROA     
Mean 0.51 0.05 0.92 0.85 
Median 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Std. Dev. 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Minimum 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Maximum 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.16 
Growth     
Mean 0.57 0.69 1.03 0.62 
Median 0.51 0.64 0.80 0.56 
Std. Dev. 0.33 0.38 0.85 0.33 
Minimum 0.14 0.21 0.19 0.11 
Maximum 1.38 1.50 3.76 1.47 
Top20 Shareholders %     
Mean 58.26 60.79 63.88 65.39 
Median 55.87 58.05 62.13 63.59 
Std. Dev. 15.11 13.54 13.50 13.45 
Minimum 32.66 34.89 38.64 44.81 
Maximum 88.15 83.49 85.79 87.21 
No Vote %     
Mean 14.10 8.33 6.65 4.60 
Median 5.02 4.89 4.00 2.87 
Std. Dev. 18.02 11.97 5.91 4.27 
Minimum 1.16 0.77 1.24 0.81 
Maximum 56.14 46.05 24.99 18.83 
Panel B Binary Variables     
 CEO Change during year 5 3 4 0 
 Audit (top 4 firm) 19 19 19 19 
Table 9.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for the lobbying firm sample. Variables are defined 
as described in Section 5.2. 
firm in both samples.  The mean and minimum values in the lobbying sample are heavily influenced 
by the presence of Sirtex Medical in the sample, which is to be expected, as it falls outside of the 
ASX200 before 2013.  As these statistics demonstrate, the subset of lobbying firms is, on average, 
slightly smaller than those in the total sample due to the influence of SRX.  For example, the total 
average assets of lobbying firms is $23.64m in 2008 increasing to $23.84m in 2014 compared to the 
total sample that increases from $27.7m in 2008 to $39.8m in 2014.    
In comparison, the profitability of the lobbying firms appears to be slightly higher than the total 
sample.  By 2014 mean ROA is 0.85 for lobbying firms and 0.047 for the ASX200 sample.  Growth 
as measured by the market to book ratio is lower than the full sample in each year but follows the 
same trend each year.  Top 20 shareholdings is similar across both samples.  In 2014, the lobbying 
firms had 65.39% of shares held by the top twenty shareholders, while the ASX200 sample had 
71.37%.  The shareholder dissent trends were similar for both samples, and the levels of no votes are 
similar.  By 2014 the lobbying firms had lower mean no votes at 4.6% while the ASX200 firms were 
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at 7.11%.  Apart from SRX, all lobbying firms used a big 4 auditor every year of the study.  As 
expected, the overall picture of the lobbying firms is comparable to the full sample.  This suggests 
that the disclosure policy adopted by the lobbying firms is not likely to be driven by these factors any 
more or less than the ASX200 firms.     
Table 9.3 indicates that the industry classification of lobbying firms is concentrated into two main 
GICS Sectors, Financial (40%) and Materials (30%).  Six of the eleven GICS Sectors are represented, 
as opposed to the total sample where all Sectors are represented.  The lobbying firms mirror the spread 
of the total sample across the main sectors represented, with 74.57% of the total sample of firms being 
represented in the same six sectors (consumer staples, energy, financials, health care, industrials and 
materials) as 100% of the lobbying firms. 
Table 9.3  Lobbying firms:  Industry representation 
GICS Sector No. % GICS Industry Group No. % 
Financials 8 (40.00) Banks 3 (15.00)  
 
 
Diversified Financials 4 (20.00)  
 
 
Insurance 1 (5.00) 
Industrials 2 (10.00) Commercial & Professional Services 1 (5.00)  
  Transportation 1 (5.00) 
Health Care 1 (5.00) Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 1 (5.00) 
Consumer Staples 2 (10.00) Food & Staples Retailing 2 (10.00) 
Energy 1 (5.00) 
 
  
Materials 6 (30.00) 
 
  
Table 9.3 presents the breakdown of the lobbying firms by GICS sector and GICS industry group. 
Table 9.4 presents the descriptive statistics of CEO remuneration in the lobbying firms.  Consistent 
with the total sample, the structure of remuneration for a lobbying firm CEO includes a cash salary, 
short-term bonus and a long-term incentive payment.  The average reported total CEO remuneration 
was $5,973.6 in 2014, ranging from a minimum of $1,427,2m to a maximum of $13.1m.   
As an aside, the lobbying firms appear to change either the reporting classification or the actual 
structure of their remuneration payments to CEO’s.  While the CEO of almost all lobbying firms 
reportedly received some form of long-term incentive payment in each year across the study, the 
payment appears to be more likely to be classified as shares or options in 2012/2014 than the generic 
‘long-term incentive payment’.  This is evidenced by the number of firms reporting a ‘generic’ LTIP 
dropping from 10 firms in 2008 to 4 firms in 2014.  This may indicate that concurrent with the 
introduction of the two-strikes rule lobbying firms provided more specific disclosure regarding the 
long-term incentive payment made to the CEO.  Alternately, it may indicate that firms have changed 
the type of payment from a cash based LTIP to a share or option based payment.  This presents an 
interesting area for future research.        
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Table 9.4  Descriptive statistics:  Lobbying firms CEO remuneration 
Variable 2008 2010 2102 2014 
CEO total remuneration (reported) $    
Mean 8,181,544 6,006,647 6,086,766 5,973,577 
Median 5,499,589 5,745,303 6,556,043 5,463,432 
Std. Dev. 10,759,667 3,807,624 2,996,338 3,081,370 
Minimum 429,759 520,000 783,858 1,427,230 
Maximum 51,507,342 16,157,746 9,903,107 13,080,432 
Cash Salary $     
Mean 1,885,867 1,810,191  1,928,960  1,896,101  
Median 1,871,770 1,838,219 2,016,707 1,947,974 
Std. Dev. 673,924 751,963 794,747 714,297 
Minimum 381,002 401,539 483,202 719,465 
Maximum 3,122,450 3,128,875 3,346,091 3,349,587 
Short-term incentive bonus $     
     Observations 18 18 16 18 
Mean 4,360,281 1,769,765 1,795,392 1,699,377 
Median 1,800,000 1,834,322 2,062,396 1,522,500 
Std. Dev. 10,752,060 954,812 953,978 1,006,380 
Minimum 300,000 724,200 550,000 300,000 
Maximum 45,950,719 4,681,736 4,163,000 4,354,688 
Total long-term incentive payment $    
     Observations 19 19 20 20 
Mean 2,269,722 2,258,278 2,178,521 2,180,588 
Median 1,606,519 1,922,774 1,918,500 1,748,441 
Std. Dev. 2,235,496 2,307,586 1,899,349 1,721,848 
Minimum -611,248 -430,413 141,608 247,462 
Maximum 9,306,769 9,273,430 6,630,607 6,508,926 
Table 9.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the reported values of total and categories of CEO remuneration as  
reported on the Thomson Reuters Connect 4 Boardroom database.  
9.4 Quantitative Disclosure scores 
The disclosure index developed in Chapter 6 is applied to the lobbying firms to quantify the amount 
of total and transparent disclosures made in the remuneration report.  The total disclosure index 
consists of 117 disclosure items in total (DiscTOT), with 79 items in RemRep that are items that are 
mandated components of the remuneration report (DiscREM), and 38 in SHRBASED (SHRBASED) 
that are disclosed related to share-based payments.  The results are summarised in Table 9.5 below. 
As the results indicate, remuneration disclosure of lobbying firms has increased over time from 2008 
to 2014.  In 2008, the mean DiscTOT score was 49.68%, increasing to 64.68% in 2014.  No lobbying 
firms adopted a full disclosure policy, with the maximum total disclosure score being 91.07% by BHP 
Billiton (BHP) in 2014.  This is a stark contrast to the lowest disclosure score of 19.3% by SRX in 
2008.  SRX was a significantly smaller company than the other lobbying firms, however examination 
of other larger lobbying firms reveal low DiscTOT scores in 2008 such as Qantas (QAN) at 37.5% 
and Downer EDI (DOW) at 38.9%.  This improvement across time and variation in level of disclosure 
is consistent with earlier research that finds that boards consciously choose and modify the company 
disclosure policy (Verrecchia, 1983, Clarkson, et al., 1999, Beatty, et al., 1995).   
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As described in Chapter 6, the disclosure index is divided into DiscREM and SHRBASED.  DiscREM 
is comprised of general disclosure requirements that are mandated either by the Corporations Act, or 
required by the ASX Corporate Governance Principles.  By choosing not to disclose these elements, 
companies would be exposing themselves to the risk of litigation or delisting.  In contrast, the 
disclosure elements of SHRBASED can be disclosed in the remuneration report or the notes to the 
financial statements, due to a grey area in the legislation that suggests that companies do not have to 
‘double up’ on disclosures.  Based on the associated legal requirements, in theory, DiscREM 
disclosures should have 100% compliance, and the variation in total disclosure would be due to 
SHRBASED disclosures.   
Table 9.5  Descriptive statistics:  Lobbying firms disclosure scores 
Variable 2008 2010 2012 2014 
DiscTOT     
Mean 49.68 54.70 62.90 64.68 
Median 52.02 56.06 62.50 64.86 
Std. Dev. 9.89 9.77 8.72 9.21 
Minimum 19.30 21.93 43.36 42.45 
Maximum 65.49 71.68 85.84 91.07 
DiscREM     
Mean 56.25 63.64 73.31 74.81 
Median 57.33 64.64 74.32 74.00 
Std. Dev. 9.85 9.74 7.80 8.03 
Minimum 25.00 32.89 56.58 57.35 
Maximum 69.33 79.10 88.00 94.59 
SHRBASED     
Mean 36.80 37.32 42.49 45.09 
Median 42.11 40.79 44.74 44.74 
Std. Dev. 13.65 14.16 16.48 15.05 
Minimum 7.89 0.00 13.16 15.79 
Maximum 57.89 57.89 81.58 84.21 
TransTOT     
Mean 52.73 57.66 64.42 68.89 
Median 53.13 58.95 64.58 68.75 
Std. Dev. 14.55 15.52 12.44 11.89 
Minimum 7.69 4.62 31.25 39.58 
Maximum 72.92 79.17 91.67 95.83 
TransREM     
Mean 51.46 60.12 67.69 73.98 
Median 51.85 62.96 70.37 72.22 
Std. Dev. 16.62 16.93 14.03 12.95 
Minimum 7.41 11.11 33.33 48.15 
Maximum 88.89 85.19 88.89 96.30 
Number of pages     
Mean 16 20 22 22 
Minimum 4 4 8 12 
Maximum 50 55 46 35 
Remuneration Committee     
No committee established 1 0 0 0 
Committee disclosed 19 20 20 20 
Remuneration Consultant     
No consultant disclosed 8 2 0 0 
Consultant used 12 18 20 20 
Table 9.5 presents the disclosure scores gained by applying the index developed in Section 6.2 to the lobbying firm sample.  
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As with the ASX200 firms, despite the legal requirements, there is a range of compliance in DiscREM 
scores.  In 2014 the mean disclosure for DiscREM requirements was 74.81%, with QAN disclosing 
the lowest of any lobbying company with a DiscREM score of 57.35%.  The mean disclosure had 
increased by more than 15%, up from an average of 56.25% in 2008.  The maximum disclosure in 
2014 is 94.59% (BHP).  These results indicate that, as with the ASX200 sample, there has been 
change in the disclosure policy choice of lobbying firms across the time period of 2008 to 2014.      
SHRBASED disclosures relate to share-based remuneration payments (for example, options).  As 
previously discussed, whether the SHRBASED items should be disclosed in the remuneration report 
falls into a grey area.  Despite the choice, it is expected that companies wanting to be transparent and 
make all remuneration disclosure easy for shareholders to find would chose to disclose all elements 
of remuneration payments in the remuneration report.   
As with DiscREM, these expectations do not hold in SHRBASED disclosures as demonstrated by the 
scores shown in Table 9.5.  In 2008, the average disclosure of SHRBASED items was 36.8%.  While 
there was an increase, in 2014 the average disclosure was still below 50%.  As with DiscREM 
disclosures, there was a broad spread of disclosure across the time period ranging from a minimum 
of 7.89% in 2008 to a maximum of 84.21% in 2014.  These results are unable to be interpreted with 
any real meaning as to the board’s intention.  In the interests of reducing the size of the overall annual 
report, boards may not wish to duplicate the information.  Alternatively, boards may be deliberately 
‘hiding’ the detail pertaining to share-based remuneration.  This question presents an opportunity for 
further research in a future study.  In spite of the fact that the disclosure scores for SHRBASED are 
low, over the time period of the study, the SHRBASED scores have increased by 13%, providing 
further evidence of a change in disclosure policy that coincides with the conduct of the PC Inquiry.    
9.4.1 Transparency Scores 
‘Transparent’ disclosure, not ‘simply more’ disclosure, was the intended goal of the two-strikes rule.  
The intention was to improve the quality of disclosure by making the economics of the remuneration 
contract visible to shareholders.  To examine the change in transparent disclosure over time, 
TransTOT and TransREM scores are also presented in Table 9.5.35  
As the results indicate, there was a steady increase in the average TransREM from 51.46% to 73.98% 
over the period 2008 - 2014.  Amcor Limited (AMC) scored 96.3% for TransREM disclosures.  The 
disclosure choice of lobbying firms at the minimum end of the transparency spectrum improves 
                                                 
35 As discussed in Chapter 5, the disclosures in SHRBASED were not required to be disclosed as part of the remuneration 
report over the time period 2008 - 2014.  Also, given all of the items were considered critical, there is no distinction 
between ‘black letter’ and transparent disclosures in SHRBASED, therefore further analysis will not provide deeper 
insights. 
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substantially over the course of the study.  The lowest TransREM score in 2008 was just 7.41%, 
increasing to 48.15% in 2014.  The standard deviation of TransREM only varied by 4% over the 
period of the study, starting at 16.62% in 2008 and decreasing to 12.95% in 2014.  This suggests that 
while all firms increased the number of transparent disclosures they issued, across all lobbying firms 
the range of transparent disclosure is similar in 2014 as it was in 2008.   
Taken together, these results demonstrate that while total disclosure and transparency have improved, 
most lobbying companies still chose to withhold some information from the remuneration report, and 
are therefore not fully transparent.   
9.4.2 Page Number Analysis 
The data pertaining to number of pages in the remuneration reports indicates that between 2008 and 
2014 the average length of the audited remuneration report for lobbying firms rose from 16 pages to 
22 pages, a 37.5% increase (see Table 9.5).  This is a smaller increase than the reports of the total 
group of ASX200 firms, where the average number of pages increased 50% from 12 pages in 2008 
to 18 pages in 2014.  In 2008, the average length of reports for lobbying firms was 4 pages longer 
than the 12 page average for ASX200 firms.  This may suggest that lobbying firms on average were 
disclosing more information in 2008 than ASX200 firms that predominantly did not lobby.  At the 
end of the study period, lobbying firms produced remuneration reports that were on average 22 pages 
long compared with the ASX200 18 page reports, suggesting that lobbying firms increased the 
amount of disclosure produced following the PC Inquiry and the subsequent changes.  The longest 
remuneration report throughout the duration of the study was in 2010, which was 55 pages produced 
by MQG, and the shortest was 4 pages published by SRX in 2008 and 2010.  Going against the trend 
of the other 19 lobbying firms, the MQG remuneration report was shorter in 2014 than in previous 
years.    
Overall, the increase in the average number of pages anecdotally suggests that the amount of 
remuneration disclosure increased in the years following the Inquiry.  This increase, however, does 
not necessarily indicate an improvement in quality or transparency of the disclosure, it may represent 
‘simply more’ disclosure that is not incrementally more informative. 
9.4.3 Remuneration Committee 
As described in Section 7.6, the establishment of a remuneration committee is required under the 
ASX CGPR.  In 2008, one company (AMC) did not disclose whether they had established a 
remuneration committee in their remuneration report (see Table 9.5).  By 2014, all lobbying firms 
disclosed in their remuneration report that they had established a remuneration committee.  Even 
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though all firms had established a remuneration committee by 2014, 40% of companies did not 
disclose details of the committee in the remuneration report, preferring to disclose some of the 
information in the governance section of the annual report.  Some companies do not appear to disclose 
specific details as recommended by Principle 8, in spite of the requirement of the ASX to disclose, or 
if they don’t disclose, to explain why not.  For example, 6 of the 20 companies are missing some 
elements of the suggested disclosures.  These findings are consistent with the results of the ASX200 
sample, where by 2014 all companies disclosed that they had established a committee, however 33% 
of the sample did not disclose all relevant details of the committee. 
While the disclosure of the details of the remuneration committee could be classified as voluntary 
disclosure in that it is only mandated by quasi-legislation, the gaps in disclosure give an indication 
that in 2014 some companies are choosing a disclosure policy that is short of ‘full’ disclosure. 
9.4.4 Remuneration Consultant 
Over the period 2008 to 2014, disclosure pertaining to the use of remuneration consultants increased 
to 100%, with only 12 companies disclosing whether a remuneration consultant was engaged in 2008 
(see Table 9.5).  In 2014, all but one company engaged a remuneration consultant, with 57% of 
companies stating they relied on a recommendation from the remuneration consultant.  In one case it 
was unclear whether a recommendation was made or not.  While companies were meeting the 
requirement to disclose the use of a consultant, some companies did not disclose all of the information 
required.  Section 300A(h)(iv) & (i) required that the amount and nature of consideration payable for 
any advice is to be disclosed, however of the 19 companies that indicated a consultant was engaged, 
63% of companies did not disclose the fees paid to the consultant.  This is higher than the findings of 
Ownership Matters (2013) who found in the 2012 reporting period just over 30% of companies in the 
ASX200 disclosed the identity of their consultant but did not disclose the fees paid.   
9.4.5 Comparisons to ASX200 Sample 
To examine the significance of the increases in mean disclosure and the compare these levels of 
disclosure with the ASX sample, further analysis is conducted.  First, as with the full sample reported 
in Chapter 6, ANOVA followed by post-hoc testing was conducted to examine DiscTOT, TransTOT 
and TransREM.  The results reported in Table 9.6 indicate that at least one of the mean disclosure 
scores is different in the four years for each category.  These results indicate that as with the ASX200 
sample, levels of total and transparent disclosure increased concurrent with the conduct of the PC 
Inquiry.  Tukey HSD testing suggests that while there is a significant difference between some of the 
means, most years are not significantly different in each year.  For that reason, the results are reported 
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for the years that are not homogenous (that is, the years that are significantly different from each other 
are reported).  These results indicate that total disclosure has increased significantly from 2008 to 
2012 and 2014, and from 2010 to 2014, but unlike the ASX200 sample there is not a significant 
difference between the years 2010 and 2012.  The results indicate that the mean level of total 
transparent disclosure was significantly different in 2014 from 2008, while TransREM disclosure 
increased significantly from 2008 to 2012 and 2014.     
Table 9.6  ANOVA on mean year disclosure score for lobbying firms 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares DF 
Mean 
Square 
F 
(p-value) 
Tukey HSD  
Heterogeneous sub groups 
DiscTOT      
Between 2977.10 3 992.37 11.210 {08,14}{08,12}{10,14} 
Within 6729.86 76 88.55 (<0.001)  
Total 9706.96 79 122.87   
TransTOT      
Between 35577.06 3 11859.02 68.920 {08,14} 
Within 67446.85 392 172.06 (<0.001)  
Total 103023.91 395 260.82   
TransREM      
Between 5672.23 3 1890.74 8.150 {08,12}{08,14} 
Within 17622.70 76 231.88 (<0.001)  
Total 23294.94 79 294.87   
Table 9.6 presents results based on the measure of the extent of total and transparent remuneration disclosure in the remuneration 
reports of the ASX200 sample.  Measures of disclosure are based on the scoring index described in Section 6.2, and variable 
definitions are as defined in Section 6.3. 
As a final comparison of the lobbying firms to the ASX200 sample, t-testing was conducted on the 
means of DiscTOT and TransREM disclosure scores.  The results are presented in Table 9.7.  The 
results of t-tests indicate that in each year lobbying firms had higher mean DiscTOT and TransREM 
scores.  For DiscTOT scores, this analysis indicates that in 2008, 2010 and 2012 the null hypothesis 
that lobbying and ASX200 scores were equal is rejected at the 1% confidence level.  In 2014, the null 
cannot be rejected, indicating that by 2014, while the lobbying firm’s mean disclosure was still higher, 
on average, than ASX200 firms, the difference was no longer significantly different.   
T-testing also suggests that in 2008, 2010 and 2012 the mean total disclosure scores of the lobbying 
firms was higher than for the ASX200 sample.   
Similar results are indicated for TransREM disclosures.  In 2008 and 2010, the null hypothesis that 
difference between mean scores is zero is rejected.  By 2012, the null is still rejected, but at the 10% 
significance level.  By 2014, the null is rejected, indicated that the difference between lobbying firms 
and the ASX200 sample is no longer significant.   
Taken together, the results indicate that, as was the case with the ASX200 sample, the lobbying firms 
increased their levels of disclosure across the period of the study, concurrent with the introduction of 
the two-strikes rule.  There has been a significant improvement in DiscTOT, TransTOT and 
TransRem  
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Table 9.7 Comparison of lobby firms and ASX200 mean disclosure 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
DiscTOT     
ASX200 41.147 45.804 55.920 61.228 
Lobbying 49.679 54.698 62.903 64.684 
Difference -8.533 -8.894 -6.983 -3.457 
t-statistic -3.559 -4.002 -2.924 -1.379 
H= 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.171 
H>0 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.915 
H<0 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.085 
TransREM     
ASX200 38.132 46.855 60.471 69.798 
Lobbying 51.460 60.121 67.685 73.981 
Difference -13.328 -13.266 -7.214 -4.184 
t-statistic -3.298 -3.387 -1.818 -1.072 
H= 0 0.001 0.001 0.072 0.286 
H>0 0.999 1.000 0.964 0.857 
H<0 0.001 0.001 0.036 0.143 
Table 9.7 presents the results of t-testing, where H0=0, H0<1 and H0>0. p-values are in italics, 
significant p-values are in bold. 
TransREM between 2008 and 2014.  It is also indicated that in 2008, lobbying firms had higher mean 
levels of disclosure than the ASX200 sample.  By 2014, the lobbying firms still had slightly higher 
mean levels of disclosure, but the difference between the two samples was no longer significant.  
Given that the lobbying firms levels of disclosure were not significantly different in each year, but 
the ASX200 firms were (refer to Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for comparisons), this would suggest that the 
lobbying firms did not improve their levels of disclosure as much as the ASX200 sample, but this 
may be because their disclosure was already at a higher level to begin with.   
Overall, these results indicate that the 2014 remuneration reports of the lobbying firms are comparable 
to the ASX200 sample, and a qualitative analysis of the lobbying firm’s reports should yield results 
that are comparable to the larger sample. 
9.5 Qualitative Content Analysis of Remuneration Reports 
To foster a deeper understanding of the type and nature of disclosure revealed in the quantitative 
analysis, the remuneration reports from 2008 and 2014 were analysed using a qualitative, integrative 
content analysis approach.  The reports for each company for the two years, 2008 and 2014, were 
read, pattern coded and analysed.  Illustrative examples of text were collated to highlight certain 
elements of disclosure policy or behaviour.  Based on the Miles and Huberman (1994) method for 
drawing conclusions, several themes were identified, and are summarised here.  Each theme is then 
discussed and supported with examples in the following sections. 
The qualitative analysis of the 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports support the quantitative results 
that suggest that transparent disclosure has improved across the period.  One prevailing theme to 
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emerge from the analysis is an overall shift from reports containing statements of policy, to obvious 
attempts by the board to explain remuneration policy.   
In spite of a statistically significant improvement in transparent disclosure, quantitative results also 
indicate that boards do not adhere to full compliance with legislated disclosure requirements, with no 
ASX200 or lobbying firms achieving a 100% disclosure score.  The qualitative analysis identifies 
several themes that indicate deficiencies in remuneration disclosure.  These areas are summarised as 
follows:  
• Boilerplate Disclosure:  across the lobbying firms, there is extensive evidence of ‘boiler-
plating’.  While seemingly less prevalent than in 2008, there are examples of boiler-plating in 
2014. 
• Sticky Disclosure:  between 2008 and 2014, there is extensive evidence of stickiness in 
disclosure, that is, the structure and disclosure is presented with only cosmetic changes. 
• Levels of remuneration:  the explanation of the reason for the amount (level) of remuneration 
generally has not changed, and is still not transparent in 2014. 
• Repetitive Disclosure:  in 2014, many reports appear to contain evidence of repetition of 
points or entire paragraphs of text, which may partly explain the overall increase in number 
of pages in remuneration reports. 
• Short-term incentives:  generally, specific hurdles for short-term incentive payments such as 
cash bonuses are not disclosed in 2008, with minimal improvement in 2014. 
• Sensitive information:  some firms make a statement that they are not making a disclosure due 
to fear of revealing ‘sensitive information’, however this is not an allowable exclusion under 
current legislation.   
To illustrate these themes, the following sections present a series of quotes, examples and 
observations from the remuneration reports of the lobbying firms.  All quotes are taken from the 
audited remuneration report contained in the Annual Report of the company. 
9.5.1 Improvement: From ‘Statement’ to ‘Explanation’ 
Throughout the qualitative analysis of the remuneration reports, examples of all themes identified 
above were found in many areas of the reports.  However one section of the legislated disclosure 
requirements, s300A(1) of the Corporations Act, was found to be more prone to poor disclosure 
practices in 2008.  It is therefore not surprising that this area of disclosure also showed great 
improvement in 2014.  For that reason, s300A(1) is used to illustrate many of the themes identified 
in this section.  To provide context for the reader an extract of s300A(1) follows (emphasis added): 
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a. discussion of board policy for determining, or in relation to, the nature and amount 
(or value, as appropriate) of remuneration of the key management personnel for: 
i. the company, … 
b. discussion of the relationship between such policy and the company’s performance. 
In 2014, the disclosure of s300A(1)(b) that requires a discussion of the board policy for determining 
remuneration shows considerable improvement across all of the lobbying firms.  While most 
companies still use many standard terms (as described in Section 9.6.2 below), there generally appears 
to be more information available to shareholders.   
An example of the shift by many firms from a boilerplate statement in 2008 to a more informative, 
but not fully transparent discussion of remuneration policy is evident in the disclosure of Downer 
EDI (DOW).  In 2008, the policy of the board of DOW in relation to the policy for determining 
remuneration was summarised in a brief paragraph and five dot points, each of that is a boilerplate 
statement that provides the shareholder with no insight into how remuneration is determined for the 
CEO.  An exert of the statement is presented here (DOW, 2008:9): 
2. Remuneration policy 
The board recognises that Downer EDI’s performance is dependent on the quality of its people. 
In order to achieve its financial and operating objectives, Downer EDI must be able to attract, 
retain and motivate highly skilled executives, in an employment environment of significant 
competition for such people. 
Downer EDI’s remuneration policy is based on the following principles: 
• variable remuneration should form a significant part of an executive’s total 
remuneration; 
• variable remuneration should be linked to shareholder wealth creation and should be at 
risk; 
• variable remuneration should consist of short-term incentives as well as long-term 
incentives 
In 2014, this statement has been expanded to a full page table that outlines six policies with 
explanations that explain how practice is aligned with policy.  An exert of DOW’s policy is provided 
here (DOW, 2014:18): 
Downer’s executive remuneration policy and practices are summarised in the table below. 
Policy   Practices aligned with policy 
Retain experienced, 
proven performers, 
and those considered 
to have high potential 
for succession 
 
• Provide remuneration that is internally fair; 
• Ensure remuneration is competitive with the external market; 
and 
• Defer a substantial part of pay contingent on continuing 
service and sustained performance. 
As this extract from the 2014 remuneration report illustrates, more information is provided by the 
board in explaining the remuneration policy.  However, the statements contained in the disclosure fall 
short of allowing the shareholder to determine how the underlying economics actually function, 
therefore the disclosure is not transparent.  For example, the explanations “provide remuneration that 
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is internally fair” and “ensure remuneration is competitive with the external market” provide 
shareholders an overview of the intent of the policy, but does not actually explain how ‘internally 
fair’ and ‘competitive with the external market’ is determined.  Therefore this disclosure falls short 
of 100% transparency.   
In other areas of disclosure, such as the discussion of the relation between remuneration policy and 
the company’s performance, some remuneration reports have moved away from boilerplate 
disclosure towards transparent disclosure.  A small number of boards, such as MQG (2014:47), make 
transparent disclosures:  
“To demonstrate the link between pay and performance, a comparison of performance measures 
and executive remuneration outcomes allows shareholders to see how the remuneration for 
Executive KMP is aligned with performance.” 
Figure 9.1  Extract from the remuneration report of Macquarie Group Ltd (2014:47) 
 
 
As illustrated by Figure 9.1, MQG provide detailed information to the shareholder to give an 
indication of the underlying economics of the calculation of the CEO remuneration and how the level 
and percentage of remuneration is linked to company performance.  The appropriateness and validity 
of the relation between company performance and remuneration is not in question in this research, 
only whether transparent information is provided to shareholders.  In this case, as for most lobbying 
firms, the transparency of these disclosures have improved from 2008 to 2014. 
9.5.2 Boilerplate Disclosure 
While the general discussion of the board policy used to determine remuneration levels and structure 
has improved, disclosures are not 100% transparent, and there are many examples of poor disclosure 
behaviour in the remuneration reports in 2014.  Evidence of boiler-plating is found for all 
requirements of s300A of the Corporations Act, however the requirements of s300A(1) appear to be 
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particularly susceptible to the use of standard terms to describe remuneration arrangements.  In the 
final report, the PC Inquiry described the disclosure used by many companies as being “legalistic 
‘boiler-plating’”, that is, ‘they attempt to shield themselves by using standard terms to describe 
arrangements’ (PC, 2010:247).  They go on to say that ‘such terminology is not particularly 
illuminating for investors’.  A reading of the 2008 remuneration reports reveals extensive use of what 
the PC Inquiry describes as ‘boiler-plating’. 
A large number of firms respond to the requirement to discuss the relation between remuneration 
policy and the company’s performance with a boilerplate response that makes a general reference to 
a relationship that ‘aligns’ pay with performance, but does not outline how this is achieved.  An 
example is provided from the annual report of AMP Ltd (2008:12): 
“The AMP Board’s approach to executive remuneration is to align remuneration with the 
creation of value for AMP shareholders.  AMP’s remuneration is market competitive and aims 
to attract, retain and motivate high calibre employees who contribute to the success of AMP’s 
business.  AMP pays for performance.  All executives have a significant component of their 
remuneration at risk.  Specific details about these components are listed below.” 
In 2008, all lobbying firms use a variation of the phrase that the board’s policy is to ‘align 
remuneration with firm performance’.  For example: 
NAB: “The Group’s philosophy is to manage a Total Reward framework designed to link 
employee rewards to creating sustainable value for shareholders” (2008:13).   
QAN: “Qantas’ philosophy for the remuneration of its Executives continues to align the earnings 
of its Executives with their duties and responsibilities and to pay for performance” (2008:60). 
CSR: “Remuneration should reward executives for achieving or exceeding the business plan and 
increasing shareholder value” (2008:9). 
As is evidenced by these 2008 disclosures, the firms are attempting to meet the requirement of the 
legislation by providing a statement about the board policy regarding remuneration.  However, the 
disclosure does not discuss or explain the policy in such a way that allows the reader to understand 
the underlying economics of the CEO remuneration contract, and is therefore not transparent.  As 
indicated in Section 9.6.1, the existence of boilerplate disclosure is not as prevalent in the 2014 
remuneration reports, however has not completely disappeared.  Boilerplate statements pertaining to 
aligning remuneration with firm performance are usually supported by brief discussions in the 2014 
reports.  The following CSR disclosure is typical of how disclosures in this area have evolved 
(2014:25):  
C2 – Ensuring executive remuneration is performance driven 
The variable components of remuneration (both short-term and long-term) are driven by 
challenging targets focused on both external and internal measures of financial and non-
financial performance.  Details of the performance measures used are set out in sections D2 – 
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STI plan and D3 – LTI plans.  Further detail on the link between performance and remuneration 
is set out in section E. 
A significant proportion of executive remuneration is ‘at risk’.  The following target 
remuneration mix chart sets out the remuneration mix as fixed remuneration, on-target STI and 
half of the LTI expense (representing target LTI) for the chief financial officer and the managing 
director. 
While a greater quantity of disclosure provided in the 2014 report, it does not appear that the board 
of CSR have intended to provide transparent disclosure.  The disclosure in the 2014 report still appear 
to be statements containing standard terms that provide minimal insight to the shareholders as to how 
remuneration is determined.   
9.5.3 Sticky Disclosure 
The requirement in s300A(1) for a discussion of the board policy for determining the nature and 
amount of remuneration (as discussed above) is also an area of disclosure where extensive ‘stickiness’ 
is evident.  Lang and Lunholm found that firm disclosure tends to be ‘sticky’, meaning that the general 
content of reports remains relatively constant over time (1993:267).  While many lobbying firms use 
similar statements from one year to the next (as illustrated in 9.6.2), some companies maintain 
identical disclosures for many years.  An example is provided from the remuneration reports of 
Woolworths (WOW) in 2008 and 2014: 
WOW 2008 Explanation of the purpose of the LTIP: 
"The other variable remuneration component is the Long-term Incentive Plan that is designed 
to: 
• Attract, retain and motivate all executives; 
• Align executive rewards to shareholder value creation; and 
• Provide rewards that are linked to the Company’s strategic, financial and human 
resources objectives" (2008:32). 
WOW 2014 Explanation of the purpose of the LTIP: 
"Woolworths’ long-term incentive plans have been in place, in various forms, since 1993 and 
are designed to: 
1. Attract, motivate and retain key talent; 
2. Align executive rewards to shareholder value creation; and 
3. Provide rewards that are linked to the Company’s strategic and financial objectives" 
(2014:53).  
As illustrated, the content of the WOW remuneration report has not changed in six years, only the 
presentation, that is, moving from dot points to numbered paragraphs.  Evidence of sticky disclosure 
exists in all of the remuneration reports to some degree, which is consistent with expectations in the 
literature.  In many cases, as demonstrated by the WOW example, the ‘stickiness’ is in areas that 
require ‘discussion’.  This is contrary to the intent of the introduction of the two-strikes rule that was 
aimed at improving transparency in these particular areas.    
 164 
 
9.5.4 Levels of Remuneration 
One area of remuneration disclosure that appears to be subject to extensive boiler-plating and 
stickiness, is the specific element of s300A(1) that requires a discussion of the ‘amount’ of 
remuneration.  Most firms include a brief disclosure that states that the level of pay that is ‘competitive 
to attract, retain and motivate’ management, with no explanation of the details of the process.  For 
example: 
DOW: "Provide a total remuneration opportunity sufficient to attract proven and experienced 
executives from secure positions in other companies and retain existing executives" (2014:18). 
BHP: “Provide competitive rewards to attract, motivate and retain highly-skilled executives 
willing to work around the world.” (2008:139). 
WOW: “Remuneration is market competitive and designed to attract, motivate and retain key 
executives” (2008:30). 
These disclosures do not reveal any information about the underlying economics of this particular 
firms’ contract with their individual CEO.  There is no discussion of what constitutes a ‘competitive’ 
level of pay, or how the appropriate level required to ‘motivate’ the CEO is determined.  These 
disclosures are therefore far from transparent. 
There was one exception to the boilerplate disclosure that was common in 2008 with regards to level 
of remuneration.  Origin Energy (ORG) disclose that: 
“Origin Energy’s remuneration is competitively benchmarked to ensure that valued employees 
are attracted and retained. 
• Remuneration is benchmarked against 20 large energy and utility companies and an ‘all 
industries’ group of over 300 companies.  Using these comparison companies as a fair 
representation of the market, the median level is applied as the benchmark for fixed pay, while 
the top quartile level is the benchmark for aggregate remuneration (i.e. fixed plus at risk 
remuneration) for better-than-targeted performance. 
• In a tight labour market which has known skills shortages or ‘hotspots’ in business critical 
areas of the Company, benchmarks which specifically compare Origin Energy to those ‘hotspot’ 
markets (rather than the general market) are used to ensure that remuneration remains 
competitive” (2008:29). 
While Origin’s disclosure is not boilerplate, it is also not fully transparent.  This disclosure meets the 
requirement of the Corporations Act in that it provides a ‘discussion’ of the board’s policy to 
determine level of pay, however it is not transparent in that it does not allow the shareholder to 
ascertain exactly how the level of pay was determined, that is, the shareholder would not be able to 
apply the policy in order to reach the same outcome as the board. 
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Remuneration reports in 2014 do appear to contain statements that are more informative, however 
still appear to be boilerplate in nature and similar to 2008 when meeting the requirements of s300A(1).  
Typical of a 2014 response is the National Australia Bank (NAB), who state:  
"The LTI opportunity granted in respect of 2014 was increased for senior executives - 
rebalancing the target reward mix so that the Group Chief executive officer (Group CEO) has 
approximately 40% of target reward based on LTI outcomes.  The new policy increases the 
weighting of LTI and reduces the emphasis on STI to increase alignment with shareholders over 
the long-term (see Figure 3 in Section 3.4.)" (2014:33).   
With respect to the discussion of the level of remuneration, in 2014, most lobbing firms move on 
from a one-line statement to a paragraph in that they state that CEO remuneration is set at a 
‘competitive’ level, at the median of the ‘relevant’ market, which they claim is necessary to ‘attract 
and retain’ appropriate talent.  Almost all firms using similar disclosure language, for example: 
BHP: "The Committee determines the appropriate remuneration for the CEO, taking into account 
his responsibilities, location, skills, experience and performance within the Group.  In doing 
so, the Committee recognises that levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, 
motivate and retain a highly skilled CEO, but also that the Group should avoid paying more 
than is necessary for this purpose" (2014:179). 
NAB: “The remuneration policy is designed to: 
• Attract, recognise, motivate and retain high performers; 
• Provide competitive, fair and consistent rewards, benefits and conditions; 
• Reward achievement of short and long-term individual objectives and business strategy; 
and 
• Align the interests of senior executives and shareholders through ownership of Company 
securities.  (2014:38) 
In one extreme case, Woolworths, the disclosure pertaining to the level of CEO pay is boilerplate and 
sticky:  
WOW 2008 Discussion of level of CEO pay: 
‘To ensure alignment between Company performance and individual performance, Woolworths 
aims to position all senior executives’ remuneration at: 
• The median of the relevant market for fixed remuneration; and 
• The third quartile of the relevant market for total remuneration for outstanding 
performance.’ (2008:31). 
WOW 2014 Discussion of level of CEO pay: 
 ‘To ensure alignment, Woolworths aims to position all KMP remuneration at the: 
2. Median of the relevant market for TFR; and 
3. Stretch targets for variable components are set around the 75th percentile of the relevant 
remuneration market data to drive upper quartile business performance.’ (2014:47) 
In 2014, only one lobbying firm, Alumina (AWU), fully disclose details of how the ‘value’ (or level) 
of the CEOs fixed remuneration was determined.  AWU (2014:61) discloses details of the comparator 
group, how the ‘market range’ was determined, the median of the comparator group and how their 
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CEO compares to other companies and therefore provides a clear understanding of how the level of 
pay was determined: 
“CEO Remuneration Market Comparable Alumina’s CEO fixed remuneration (inclusive of his 
equity exposed component) lies at the 40th percentile of the ASX 100 companies within 50 to 
200% of Alumina’s market capitalisation, excluding financial sector companies (ASX 100 
Market Cap) comparator group but in the bottom quartile at approximately the 8th percentile 
for his total target remuneration (TTR).  The Board believes positioning his fixed remuneration 
slightly below the median is appropriate.  On the one hand, the bauxite, alumina and aluminium 
markets and industries are complex and dynamic, and the CEO’s role in influencing the joint 
venture and equity partner across many jurisdictions is demanding, tactically and strategically.  
On the other hand, Alumina is a non-operating company and the CEO is new to the role.  The 
modest level of TTR is a direct reflection of the positioning of his fixed remuneration coupled 
with an incentive scheme that is designed to be attractive but moderated.”  
 
Figure 9.2  Extract from the remuneration report of Alumina (2014:61) 
 
 
9.5.5 Repetition  
Many remuneration reports repeat the same information within the report.  The QAN remuneration 
report increased from 12 pages in 2008 to 20 pages in 2014, however some of this may be attributed 
to repetition.  For example, the phrase ‘the CEO elected to forego five per cent of his base pay’ 
appears six times in the 2014 report.  Also, large sections of text can be easily identified as duplicated 
within the report, for example:  
QAN: "…reference to external market data including comparable roles in other listed Australian 
companies and in international airlines.  The primary benchmark is a revenue based peer group 
of other S&P/ASX companies.  The Board believes this is the appropriate benchmark, as it is the 
comparator group whose roles best mirror the complexity and challenges in managing Qantas’ 
businesses and is also the peer group with whom Qantas competes for Executive talent." 
(2014:48) 
QAN: "…reference to external market data including comparable roles in other listed 
Australian companies and international airlines.  The primary benchmark is a revenue based 
peer group of other S&P/ASX companies.  The Board believes this is the appropriate benchmark, 
as it is the comparator group whose roles best mirror the size, complexity and challenges in 
managing Qantas’ businesses and is also the peer group with whom Qantas competes for 
Executive talent." (2014:51) 
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Other reports also have repetition that is so extensive the reader easily identifies it.  For example, in 
the 2014 MQG remuneration report, there are 29 uses of variations of the phrase ‘to align the interests 
of staff and shareholders’.   
This repetition within remuneration reports may be contributing to the length, and possibly 
complexity, of remuneration reports.  Such repetition is not necessarily attributable to the complexity 
of the underlying remuneration contract, but instead may provide support for the claim by some 
respondents to the PC Inquiry that some companies are producing impenetrable reports that are 
potentially misleading to some readers (PC, 2010:373).  Academic literature is divided on the role of 
repetitive disclosures.  Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007:145) summarise the academic literature 
suggesting that repetitive disclosure may enhance the understandability of information or can add 
noise to reports, but in both cases, repetition is generally used by firms for the purposes of ‘impression 
management’.  It would appear that lobbying firms may use repetition for varying reasons.  In the 
examples provided here, Qantas could be accused of repetition to add noise, while Macquarie would 
appear to be using repletion for impression management, the impression being that executive 
contracts are strongly aligned with appropriate outcomes.     
9.5.1 Short-term Incentive Performance (STIP) Disclosure 
Short-term incentive payments (STIP) are a problematic area of disclosure in the remuneration report 
of all lobbying firms, both in 2008 and 2014.  STIPs most commonly take the form of a cash bonus, 
though can be an award of an equity instrument, and are paid annually.  Murphy (1999) states that 
‘virtually every for-profit company’ makes STIPs, and ‘typically’ those bonus payments are based 
on a single year’s performance (1999:2498).  While it is generally accepted in the literature that most 
companies use two or more performance measures, one of that is typically some measure of 
accounting profit, specific detail on how STIPs are structured, assessed and calculated is generally 
unavailable (Murphy, 1999).  This view is supported by the PC Inquiry final report that states that 
STIPs are complex and difficult to assess due to a lack of disclosure (2010:72).  While researchers 
and policy makers are in agreement that disclosure regarding STIPs is limited, the Corporations Act 
have detailed requirements for disclosure of remuneration that is dependent on a performance 
condition, that is, an incentive (or ‘bonus’ payment).  Specifically, the Corporations Act s300A(ba) 
requires that: 
(ba) if an element of the remuneration of a member of the key management personnel for the 
company, or if consolidated financial statements are required, for the consolidated entity is 
dependent on the satisfaction of a performance condition: 
(i) a detailed summary of the performance condition; and 
(ii) an explanation of why the performance condition was chosen; and 
(iii) a summary of the methods used in assessing whether the performance condition 
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is satisfied and an explanation of why those methods were chosen… 
This requirement is elaborated on in the Corporations Regulations 2001 2M.3.03(1) Item12 that 
states: 
For each grant of a cash bonus, performance-related bonus or share-based payment 
compensation benefit made to a person, whether part of a specific contract for services or not: 
The terms and conditions of each grant affecting compensation in the reporting period or a 
future reporting period, including the following: 
 (c) the service and performance criteria used to determine the amount of compensation 
Followed by Item 13 that futher emphasises the need for transparcy by stating: 
Any further explanation that is necessary in addition to those prescribed in paragraph 
300A(1)(ba) of the Act and item 12 to provide an understanding of: 
(a) how the amount of compensation in the current reporting period was determined; and 
(b) how the terms of the contract affect compensation in future periods.   
In spite of this seemingly clear requirement to disclose transparent information about performance 
conditions, none of the 20 lobbying firms met all of these requirements.  In particular, the requirement 
to disclose ‘the service and performance criteria’ to enable an understanding of ‘how the amount of 
compensation was determined, is not disclosed by any of the lobbying firms.   
In 2008, all disclosures in relation to STIPs could be described as boilerplate, as shown by these 
examples:  
AWC: “Performance of senior executives is measured against a scorecard of agreed objectives 
and targets.  Individual performance against the measures was assessed for each senior 
executive for 2008.” (2008:20). 
SRX: "The KPIs are specifically tailored to the accountabilities of each director/executive.  They 
target areas the Board believes hold greater potential for group expansion and profit, covering 
both short- and long-term goals.  The level set for each KPI is based on budgeted figures for the 
group and respective industry standards." (2008:30). 
QAN: “Differentiation of payments among Executives based on individual performance is an 
important part of the approach to performance management at Qantas.  The performance of 
each individual is assessed against their Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the year, and 
an Individual Performance Factor (IPF) assigned at year end.  At the beginning of each year, 
performance objectives are set in the areas of customer service, operational performance, people 
achievements and financial performance.  At the end of the year, each Executive’s contribution 
is assessed against these criteria.  Their contribution is also considered relative to other 
Executives in determining their IPF” (2008:62). 
In 2014, there were noticable improvements in some of the lobbying firms disclosure with regards to 
STIPs, with only six companies using boilerplate disclosures.  In place of ‘boilerplate’ disclosure, in 
2014 50% of lobbying firms provided what can be classified as ‘mid-range’ disclosures, whereby 
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they did not make boilerplate statements, but they were not transparent.  One example of a company 
report in that disclosure has improved is SRX: 
SRX: "KPIs and other influencing factors reflect the nature of specific roles, while creating 
shared objectives where appropriate.  A shared KPI for FY14 was Company earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, excluding exchange rate fluctuations, clinical 
studies, and Research & Development expenditure (normalised EBITDA).  Role-specific 
influencing indicators included such factors as dose sales, expense control, delivery 
performance, cost-of-goods sold, audit compliance and to cover project-style work, progress 
against milestones" (2014:34).   
As this example demonstrates, SRX have provided more information, but the underlying economics 
of the contract are still not clear.  Of the companies in this ‘mid-range’ category, many used a ‘score-
card’ approach to assessing executive compensation performance.  Generally, the items on the score 
card were well described, however the actual hurdle, that is, the required performance, was not 
disclosed, and therefore how the executive met the target could not be transparently disclosed.  The 
disclosure of QAN is typical of many firms that adopt a scorecard approach: 
QAN: “In determining outcomes under the STIP, the Board assesses performance against 
financial, safety and other key business measures as part of a balanced scorecard, as outlined 
on pages 52 to 54.  While the Board sees this balanced scorecard approach as an important 
design element of the STIP, it also recognises that the overall STIP outcome must be considered 
in the context of the Group’s financial performance.” (2014:51)  
Figure 9.3  Extract from the remuneration report of Qantas Ltd (2014:52) 
 
In reading the 2014 remuneration reports it can be seen that the discussion regarding the board policy 
on STIPs appears to be longer, however not necessarily more informative than in 2008.  These 
disclosures do not provide information necessary to ascertain how the compensation in the current 
period was determined, and are still largely boilerplate in nature.  As a specific example, Qantas state 
that ‘underlying PBT’ is the performance measure, however there is no explanation of how underlying 
PBT is calculated or what action the executive is required to take with regard to this measure – is 
underlying PBT required to decrease, stay the same or increase in order for the STIP to be awarded?  
In 14 lobbying firms (70%), the disclosure in 2014 is ‘longer’ but not necessarily more informative, 
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that suggests that the changes to the remuneration framework has led to ‘simply more’ disclosure as 
opposed to ‘better’ disclosure in these firms. 
From the qualitative analysis, four firms are classified as providing ‘transparent’ disclosure.  Alumina 
(AWC) is an example of a transparent disclosure in the area of STIPs.  Alumina provide an extensive 
overview of their scorecard approach, including discussion of minimum performance thresholds, 
potential awards, objectives and an commentary on how targets were met or exceeded.  Figure 9.4 is 
an extract of Table 4 that extends over two pages of Alumina’s 2014 remuneration report.  
Figure 9.4  Extract of the remuneration report of Alumina Pty Ltd (2014:67). 
 
While this disclosure does not allow the reader to precisely calculate the remuneration amount paid 
to the executive, it does meet the requirements of s300A in that detailed information about the 
performance conditions are disclosed.  Unlike ‘mid-range’ disclosure, this disclosure identifies the 
specific performance measure (cash flow distribution), the hurdle ($85million), and the performance 
($119 million).  This enables an ‘understanding’ of how the bonus was determined.  To that end, the 
disclosure does not meet the definition of ‘full transparency’, but on a continuum of transparency, 
this disclosure the most ‘transparent’ of all the lobbying firms in the area of STIP disclosure. 
9.5.2 Sensitive Information 
In 2010, the CAMAC inquiry recommended that no major changes be made to s300A of the 
Corporations Act, as the commission expected that the two-strikes rule would result in remuneration 
practices evolving or changing significantly over the ‘next few years’ (2010:8).  Instead of significant 
changes to s300A, the CAMAC recommended ‘some well-developed simplification proposals’, one 
of that was that s200A should be amended to allow companies to exclude ‘commercially sensitive 
information concerning a performance condition’ and that the company should be permitted to 
disclose a general description of the omitted information and a statement that the omission had been 
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made deliberately (2010:9).  This recommendation was not supported by the government at the time, 
and s300A was therefore never amended to include a ‘sensitive information’ provision.  In spite of 
this, in 2014 many firms did not disclose specific performance hurdles.  In spite of not being an 
allowable course of action under s300A, at least three firms (BHP, CBA and DOW) made a statement 
in their remuneration report that they were deliberately not disclosing performance hurdles because 
the company did not wish to disclose commercially sensitive information.  For example, Downer EDI 
make the following disclosure in their 2014 remuneration report: 
DOW: ‘Specific STI financial and commercial targets at division and corporate levels remain 
commercially sensitive and so have not been reported.  In order for an STI to be paid, a minimum 
of 90 per cent of the budgeted profit target must be met.  For corporate executives, the hurdle is 
90 per cent of the Group budgeted profit target.  Profit for this purpose is defined as NPAT.  For 
divisional executives, the hurdle is 90 per cent of the division budgeted profit target.  Profit for 
this purpose is defined as EBIT.’ (2014:35) 
ASX continuous disclosure requirements provide an exception that some commercially sensitive 
information is not required to be disclosed to the market.36 A recommendation of the CAMAC inquiry 
was that companies should be permitted to exclude commercially sensitive information from their 
discussion of performance conditions in the remuneration report, however this was not supported by 
government, and therefore the Corporations Act was not amended to allow this exclusion.  It may be 
that firms that use the ‘commercially sensitive information’ argument to exclude certain information 
are unclear of the difference between ASX Listing rules and the Corporations Act, however this seems 
unlikely for a large ASX200 company.  It would appear more likely that this is a strategy similar to 
boiler-plating where the company attempts to appear to be meeting the disclosure requirements, but 
in fact, they are not providing shareholders with the information necessary to understand the 
underlying economics of the remuneration contract.  This is a question that could be investigated as 
part of a larger study into the use of boiler-plating as a disclosure policy choice in listed firms.   
9.5.3 Summary  
The analysis of the 2008 and 2014 remuneration reports of the 20 companies that participated in 
lobbying the PC Inquiry provides clear examples of improvements in transparent disclosure in the 
form of clearer, more detailed discussions of remuneration contracts.  While overall improvement in 
transparency is evident, 2014 remuneration reports also contain evidence of disclosure practices that 
are unhelpful to shareholders such as boiler plating, stickiness and repetition.  The legislated 
requirements pertaining to levels of remuneration and short-term incentive payments appear to be 
most likely subject to these disclosure practices.  This section has looked at several examples from a 
                                                 
36 See ASX Listing Rules 3.1A and ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 8 for detailed information regarding continuous 
disclosure and commercially sensitive information. 
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broad range of remuneration reports.  In the following section, the relation between the disclosure 
behaviour and lobbying participation of these firms is examined to gain insights into the motivation 
for participating in the standard setting process.    
9.6 Lobbying Behaviour and Disclosure Policy 
Results in Chapter 4 demonstrate that firms were strongly opposed to the introduction of the two-
strikes rule.  The question of interest in this section is whether firms appear to participate in the 
standard setting process in an attempt to influence regulatory outcomes to facilitate continued poor 
disclosure practices.  To examine this question, Section 9.7.1 analyses the disclosure behaviour of the 
lobbying firms, while Section 9.7.2 focuses on shareholder dissent, which may be a reflection of 
remuneration issues that firms were attempting to manage by influencing regulatory outcomes.  
Section 9.7.3 reports on other issues that may have influenced lobbying behaviour and focuses on 
firms that participated in the PC Inquiry in both phases. 
9.6.1 Lobbying Firm Disclosure and Lobbying Behaviour 
If firms were motivated to participate in the standard setting process because they were attempting to 
influence regulatory outcomes to conceal poor disclosure practices, it could be anticipated that 
lobbying firms would have low total and transparent disclosure scores.  The analysis of the 
quantitative disclosure scores of lobbying firms compared to ASX200 firms presented in Section 9.5 
clearly demonstrate that the remuneration reports of lobbying firms contained more total and 
transparent disclosure than the ASX200 firm reports for the whole period of the study.  In particular, 
t-test results (reported in full in Section 9.5.5) show that in 2008, total disclosure for lobbying firms 
was significantly higher than ASX200 firms.  Transparent disclosure scores were 51.46% for 
lobbying firms compared to 38.13% for ASX200 firms, which are also significantly higher at the 1% 
level of significance.  The quantitative results also indicate that lobbying firms improved total and 
transparent disclosure in the years following the PC Inquiry.   
The quantitative results do not support the theory that firms were motivated to lobby the PC Inquiry 
because they were attempting to ensure that legislation did not change so they could, in effect, 
maintain poor disclosure practices. 
9.6.2 No Vote Percentages and Strikes against the Remuneration Report 
The key purpose of the two-strikes rule was to strengthen the accountability framework around 
executive remuneration. In theory, the voting mechanism allows shareholders to signal dissatisfaction 
to the board with regards to the remuneration policy of the company.  While the quantitative results 
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suggest lobbying firms had superior disclosure practices compared to the ASX200 mean, shareholder 
voting may indicate that shareholders had issues with these firms.37 Therefore, in this section, the 
voting outcomes of the lobbying firms are examined to determine whether shareholder dissent may 
have been an influencing factor in the firm’s decision to lobby the PC Inquiry.  Shareholder no-votes 
for lobbying firms for the years 2007 to 2014 are presented in Table 9.8.   
Table 9.8  Strike results for lobbying firms 
Company 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Alumina  37.59 2.31 1.85 2.89 3.99 5.66 49.55 10.86 
Amcor  8.02 6.25 2.27 1.70 3.66 2.50 1.92 2.01 
AMP Capital investors 1.49 2.42 3.82 2.99 3.04 2.18 1.87 2.59 
ASX Ltd 3.41 2.30 3.15 2.43 1.03 3.56 0.88 1.23 
BHP Billiton 5.17 1.66 2.33 3.04 3.42 3.85 2.70 2.78 
BlueScope Steel 3.13 4.65 6.53 4.27 2.12 1.57 1.56 6.04 
Boral  4.70 56.15 5.36 4.95 38.31 10.22 1.12 1.58 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 4.49 7.69 9.02 2.78 11.51 3.47 1.27 2.96 
CSR 23.13 3.47 1.88 6.62 1.80 2.69 2.13 4.67 
Downer EDI 2.99 11.17 58.64 46.05 9.07 6.90 0.96 1.22 
Macquarie Group  21.44 1.17 2.12 5.10 1.43 1.55 2.06 0.81 
National Australia Bank  3.90 5.72 4.33 4.84 4.22 16.54 3.26 8.15 
Origin Energy 2.11 5.40 4.45 3.79 3.90 7.93 4.94 5.93 
Perpetual  3.06 3.87 14.14 8.33 23.39 11.23 3.45 5.24 
Qantas Airways 2.37 40.32 41.44 0.77 3.94 1.24 0.86 1.06 
Sirtex Medical 5.00 38.71 44.98 39.31 33.24 24.99 36.00 18.83 
Suncorp Group 39.64 31.63 3.84 6.62 5.80 4.13 3.04 2.78 
Wesfarmers  4.51 4.63 4.32 7.09 13.95 8.16 3.87 2.70 
Westpac Banking Corporation 4.72 49.90 9.31 7.79 6.88 10.69 7.23 6.89 
Woolworths 1.12 2.64 5.05 5.33 15.79 3.88 2.27 3.61 
Mean 9.10 14.10 11.44 8.33 9.52 6.65 6.55 4.60 
Median 4.50 5.02 4.39 4.89 4.10 4.00 2.20 2.87 
Standard Deviation 11.68 18.02 16.46 11.97 10.65 5.91 12.68 4.27 
Minimum 1.12 1.17 1.85 0.77 1.03 1.24 0.86 0.81 
Maximum 39.64 56.15 58.64 46.05 38.31 24.99 49.55 18.83 
STRIKES 1 5 3 2 2 0 2 0 
Strike percentage 5.00 25.00 15.00 10.00 10.00 0 10.00 0 
Table 9.8 reports the no vote against the remuneration resolution at each of the lobbying firms’ AGM for each year 2007 to 2014.  
Firms that attracted a strike are in bold. 
In the lobbying firm sample, the number of strikes and the average percentage of no-votes have 
decreased over the period 2008 to 2014.  During the period, seven firms (35%) received at least one 
strike.  In 2008, 5 firms received a strike, while in 2014, no firms received a strike, and no firms had 
what would be considered a ‘high’ no-vote (using the 20% threshold discussed in Chapter 6).  The 
mean level of no votes for lobbying firms is comparable to the ASX200 sample in 2008, lobbying 
firms mean no vote was high at 14.1% compared to the ASX200 11.39%.  By 2014 the lobbying firms 
mean no vote had dropped to 4.6% that is below the ASX200 7.11%.  Across the time period 2007 to 
2014, excluding SRX, no lobbying firm attracted high no-votes for more than two years in a row.  Of 
152 year observations, no votes over 20% account for only 9% of observations.  These results suggest 
                                                 
37 As discussed in Section 3.2.4, findings by Monem and Ng (2013) and Bugeja et al. (2016) suggest that shareholder’s 
may use the remuneration vote to express dissatisfaction with issues not related to remuneration, however shareholder 
no-votes are agreed to be a proxy for shareholder dissatisfaction with some aspect of the management of the firm.    
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that lobbying firms were not the target of persistent shareholder dissent, which in turn suggests that 
firms were not lobbying in response to persistent high shareholder dissenting votes.   
Closer examination of the strike data in 2008 indicates that firms with strikes attracted no votes above 
30%: Boral (BLD) 56.15%, Qantas Airways (QAN) 40.32%, Sirtex Medical (SRX) 38.71%, Suncorp 
Group (SUN) 31.63% and Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC) 49.9%.  Of these five, SRX were a 
unique case, attracting high no-votes in for five successive years.  These votes were reported driven 
by a disaffected shareholder, the details of that are discussed in the next section.  A search of media 
releases indicates that for the other four firms, pay was considered to be out of sync with firm 
performance.  Media reports indicate that prior to the 2008 AGM season several proxy advisors and 
shareholder groups had engaged in awareness campaigns to encourage shareholders to vote against 
remuneration reports that weren’t sensitive to the economic crisis of the time.  QAN received a second 
strike in 2009, but BLD, SUN and WBC all recorded votes in 2009 of less than 10%, suggesting that 
companies had addressed shareholder concerns.  In 2010, QAN received a no vote of less than 1%.  
These results suggest that firms that received high no votes before the introduction of the two-strikes 
rule eventually addressed concerns to the satisfaction of the shareholders. 
Since the introduction of the two-strikes rule in 2011, only one no vote over 20% was reported.  In 
2013, Alumina (AWC) received a 49.5% no vote.  In 2014, AWC’s dissenting vote had reduced to 
10.8%, that appears to be in line with the interpretation that shareholders were satisfied that the paid 
remuneration or the disclosure of the remuneration had improved from 2013 to 2014.38  In 2013, Egan 
Associates, in their review of the 2013 AGM season, suggested that many of the firms that received 
strikes against their remuneration report did so because companies focused on ‘what’ was paid and 
they did not disclose ‘why’ remuneration was paid.  Egan Associates advised that to avoid a no vote, 
companies should ‘Disclose, disclose, disclose! Investors that are kept guessing are unhappy 
investors’ (Wohlthat, 2013).  In 2014, Egan Associates believed that AWC avoided a second strike 
because they changed the payment of STIPs to executives and AWC ‘revised disclosure for greater 
transparency’ (Egan Associates, 2014).  Over the same period, AWC’s DiscTOT score increased 
from 49.56% in 2008 to 65.18%, and their transparent disclosure score increased from 44.4% in 2008 
to 85.19% in 2014.  This is consistent with AWC board improving the transparency of the 
remuneration report in response to shareholder dissent, but also suggests that lobbying firms did not 
                                                 
38 A search of Factiva does not indicate there were matters other than remuneration that may have impacted on the no 
vote at the 2013 AGM. Media reports suggested that the high no vote was due to the CEO receiving ‘a bonus worth more 
than half of his salary’ while at the same time the company had reported a net loss of $US62.1 million in 2012 and 
‘ordinary shareholders had received no dividends and the share price had fallen’ in 2013. 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/investors-send-first-strike-to-alumina-after-62m-loss-20130503-2iyjo.html Greg 
Roberts ‘Investors send first strike to Alumina after $62m loss’ The Sydney Morning Herald May 4, 2013. Accessed 5 
December 2016.   
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resist changing their disclosure behaviour despite lobbying against the changes that were 
subsequently introduced following the PC Inquiry. 
In summary, this analysis does not suggest that persistent high levels of shareholder dissent prior to 
the PC Inquiry was a characteristic of firms choosing to participate in the standard setting process.  
While the number of strikes was higher in 2008 than other years, there were confounding events in 
2008 that suggest this was an atypical year for all firms, and not particular to lobbying firms.  In light 
of this evidence, it appears that previous high levels of shareholder dissent did not motivate firms to 
participate in lobbying in an attempt to influence regulatory outcomes to conceal poor behaviour. 
9.6.3 Drivers of Lobbying Strategy  
In a final analysis of the relation between lobbying behaviour and remuneration disclosure policy in 
particular, unique cases are examined, in particular, SRX and the group of five firms that made written 
submissions to phase one and phase two of the PC Inquiry.   
As discussed previously, SRX had very short remuneration reports, the lowest disclosure scores of 
the sample and attracted high no-votes for five successive years.  Media reports indicate that at the 
time the PC Inquiry conducted, SRX were dealing with a disaffected shareholder, Dr Bruce Gray, the 
founder and former chair and CEO of the organisation.  In 2004, the University of Western Australia 
started legal action against the company.  In 2006, Dr Gray had resigned from the board when Sirtex 
made a cross-claim against him for breach of director’s duties.  In August 2013,  
Dr Gray sold 7.27 million shares.  This suggests that the high dissenting votes included Gray’s votes.   
This issue was reflected in SRX’s lobbying submission to the PC Inquiry.   
SRX’s submission to the PC Inquiry was very strongly opposed to the binding vote recommendation.  
They outline several unintended consequences that they predict to be associated with the binding vote 
proposal.  In particular, they were concerned about the impact of disaffected shareholders with large 
shareholdings, as demonstrated in this statement written by Richard Hill, Chairman of the SRX board 
in 2009: 
“This concern is particularly apposite in a Company such as Sirtex, where there is a single 
Shareholder who holds in excess of 24% of the Company’s shares.  Of course, there are many 
listed public Companies (particularly smaller ones) in that situation.  However, in Sirtex’s case, 
the concern is even more acute, given that the Shareholder (who holds approximately 33%) is 
disaffected, and, although he seeks no Board representation himself, consistently seeks to 
destabilise the incumbent independent Board for reasons quite unrelated to any issues around 
Executive remuneration.  The draft Recommendation will, if it is to be implemented, afford such 
Shareholders an inappropriate and unintended vehicle for continuing such de-stabilising tactics, 
in direct conflict with, and abuse of, the best interests of all other Shareholders in the Company.” 
(SRX, 2009:3) 
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In this unique case, there is a clear link between shareholder dissent and the decision to participate in 
the standard setting process.  Further research would be necessary to determine how regularly this 
type of situation occurs for lobbying firms before conclusions regarding motivation for participation 
could be drawn. 
As reported in Chapter 4, the multi-period nature of the PC Inquiry presents a unique opportunity to 
examine the strategy of how firms lobby.  This unique setting also present an opportunity to examine 
firms who adopted a strategy of repeated contact, in the context of their disclosure policy. There were 
five firms that lobbied the PC Inquiry with written submission in both phase one and phase two: 
MQG, ASX, BHP, BSL and ORG.  Analysis of these five firms does not immediately reveal a relation 
between disclosure policy choice and a reason for participating in lobbying, that is, their disclosure 
policy does not appear to drive their lobbying participation. 
As can be seen by looking at the page length, transparent disclosure scores and total reported CEO 
pay of these five firms (see Table 9.9), these firms appear to have a disclosure policy that is 
comparable to the mean of the ASX200 firms.  Apart from MQG, who are discussed in detail in the 
next section, these firms have average length reports, average disclosure scores, and average CEO 
remuneration levels.  While the transparent disclosure score indicates that lobby firms do not chose a 
‘fully transparent’ disclosure policy, their disclosure behaviour is not ‘poor’ at the time of the Inquiry.  
This suggests that on this occasion, lobbying firms did not engage in a strategy of repeated contact 
when lobbying the PC Inquiry in an attempt to influence the political process to ensure an outcome 
that allowed the continuation of poor disclosure practices or to promote managers’ self-interest.    
All of the firms that made two written submissions to the PC Inquiry ‘voted’ similarly with regard to 
the 15 recommendations made in the draft report.  All firms opposed any change to the existing non-
binding vote in their first written submission.  Upon release of the draft report, all five firms supported 
the non-binding nature of the first part of recommendation 15, and all lobbied very strongly against 
the ‘two-strikes and board spill’ component of the recommendation (15b).  All five firms opposed the 
introduction of the ‘no vacancy’ board rule (recommendation 1), and generally, all five lobbying 
firms supported the other recommendations to varying degrees.39  None of this voting behaviour 
appears to be in contrast to intuitive expectations of firm lobbying behaviour, companies do not 
appear to be strongly opposing all changes, and none appear to be targeting an area of the report 
specific to their firm.   
  
                                                 
39 See Chapter 4 for full details of how lobbying firms ‘voted’ in their lobbying submissions. 
 177 
 
 
Table 9.9  2008 & 2014 Summary statistics - firms that made two written submissions 
 2008 2014 Change 
ASX200 Mean    
Pages in remuneration report 12.00 18.35 6.35 
Total disclosure % 42.78 61.78 19.00 
Transparent disclosure % 42.57 65.80 23.23 
No vote % 11.39 7.11 (4.28) 
Reported total CEO pay $      4,408,727.00     3,907,624.00  (501,103.00)  
ASX    
Pages in remuneration report 16 12 (4) 
Total disclosure % 59.29 64.29 5.00 
Transparent disclosure % 66.67 64.58 (2.09) 
No vote % 2.30 1.23 (1.07) 
Reported total CEO pay $      3,059,359.00     3,350,334.00          290,975.00  
BHP    
Pages in remuneration report 15 32 17 
Total disclosure % 65.49 91.07 25.58 
Transparent disclosure % 68.75 95.83 27.08 
No vote % 1.66 2.78 1.12 
Reported total CEO pay $     13,023,184.00     7,123,000.00  (5,900,184.00)  
BSL .   
Pages in remuneration report 17 24 7 
Total disclosure % 54.55 68.47 13.92 
Transparent disclosure % 55.32 76.60 21.28 
No vote % 4.65 6.04 1.39 
Reported total CEO pay $      2,323,353.00     4,948,138.00        2,624,785.00  
ORG    
Pages in remuneration report 13 17 4 
Total disclosure % 48.18 64.55 16.37 
Transparent disclosure % 50.00 77.08 27.08 
No vote % 5.40 5.93 0.53 
Reported total CEO pay $      4,898,432.00     7,280,052.00        2,381,620.00  
MQG    
Pages in remuneration report 50 35 (15) 
Total disclosure % 53.10 65.49 12.39 
Transparent disclosure % 52.08 64.58 12.50 
No vote % 1.17 0.81 (0.36) 
Reported total CEO pay $     51,507,342.00    13,080,432.00  (38,426,910.00)  
While not conclusive nor generalizable, in this case of these firms, lobbying behaviour does not 
appear to be related to remuneration disclosure policy.  These results also lend some limited support 
to prior research that suggests that remuneration strikes are not necessarily related to remuneration 
policy but are a proxy for shareholder dissatisfaction in other areas or are a move by majority 
shareholders to create instability in the company.  In light of this evidence, it appears that lobbying 
behaviour is not linked to remuneration disclosure choice. 
9.7 Conclusion 
The third stage of the thesis examines the costs and benefits of regulatory change from a qualitative 
perspective in order to gain a deeper insight into the effects of the two-strikes rule on disclosure 
policy.  Prior research has found that some firms that participate in lobbying are poor corporate 
citizens, and that their participation is an attempt to influence regulators to protect their self-interest 
 178 
 
over the interests of shareholders.  The findings of Stage 3 suggest that the firms that participated in 
the PC Inquiry were ‘good disclosures’ before the Inquiry and have improved their disclosure 
concurrent with the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  Stage 1 finds that firms were attempting to 
influence the regulator to ensure further black letter disclosure requirements weren’t introduced.  The 
results of this study demonstrate that lobby firms, on average, had better total and transparent 
disclosure than the ASX200 sample in 2008.  Over the period, total disclosure scores have increased 
by 15% and transparency scores have increased by 22%.  On a whole, these results indicate that the 
motivation for these firms to lobby was unlikely to be driven by a desire to influence a regulatory 
outcome that would allow firms to conceal poor disclosure behaviour.   
Overall, Stage 3 enhances the findings of Stage 2, indicating that lobbying firms appear to have 
improved their disclosure practices over time, with the largest improvement being between 2010 and 
2012, consistent with the conduct of the PC Inquiry and the subsequent introduction of the two-strikes 
rule.  In particular, the content analysis finds evidence of improvement in the discussion and 
explanations of remuneration policy.  While overall transparency has improved, there are some areas 
where disclosures appear not to have improved as much, such as short-term bonuses, and poor 
disclosure practices such as sticky disclosure, repetitive disclosure, boiler-plating and omissions are 
also identified.  There is no evidence to suggest that poor disclosure behaviour motivated these firms 
to participate in the political process of lobbying.   
The following chapter summarises the findings of this thesis, discusses the contributions and 
limitations, and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 10.  Conclusion 
This chapter provided the conclusions to this thesis in four sections.  Section 10.1 reviews the 
objectives of the thesis.  Section 10.2 provides a summary of the results.  Section 10.3 outlines the 
limitations.  Section 10.4 identifies the contribution and areas for future research. 
10.1 Research Objectives 
Improved transparency and accountability in executive remuneration was the primary goal of the 
introduction of the two-strikes rule in Australia in 2011 (Bradbury, 2010).  Transparent disclosure 
alleviates agency problems by providing shareholders with information that allows CEO contracts to 
be monitored.  This thesis aims to provide evidence useful to regulators and other interested parties 
in assessing the conduct of the PC Inquiry, improvement in the transparency of remuneration 
disclosures, and the operation of the accountability mechanism.   
The three stages of the thesis have been presented as follows: 
Stage 1:  An examination of the political process surrounding the PC Inquiry that resulted in the 
development of the accountability mechanism. 
Stage 2:  A quantitative analysis of the impact of the introduction of the accountability mechanism 
on firm remuneration disclosure policy. 
Stage 3:  A qualitative study: examining the ‘real effects’ of the accountability mechanism on firm 
remuneration disclosure behaviour.    
10.2 Summary of Findings 
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the evolution of remuneration reporting in 
Australia from 2008 to 2014.  The focus is on the improvements in board accountability around CEO 
remuneration following the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  The thesis is conducted in three 
stages, and the findings of each stage are discussed separately here. 
10.2.1 Stage 1:  The Standard Setting Process 
In 2009, after several serious market failures, the Productivity Commission conducted an extensive 
inquiry into the effectiveness of the executive remuneration framework in Australia.  The Inquiry 
engaged in extensive public consultation, having contact with 166 respondent groups, and produced 
a report that ultimately resulted in the introduction of the two-strikes rule.  The introduction of the 
two-strikes rule represented an exogenous shock to the market, which was accompanied by extensive 
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negative feedback and media attention at the time of the PC Inquiry draft report.  In light of the 
opposition to the rule, and the severity of the nature of the board spill consequence, this stage of the 
thesis was motivated by a lack of evidence describing how the two-strikes rule eventuated.  The 
analysis of the lobbying behaviours of respondents involved in the PC Inquiry into executive 
remuneration revealed consistent with prior expectations, the lobbying behaviours of the various 
groups appeared related to their preference for change, the costs of regulatory change relative to the 
costs of lobbying, and their need to develop reputational capital.  Specifically, respondents from the 
Industry group clearly adopted a strategic posture during their lobbying activities.  It is also found 
that the final recommendations are largely aligned with the views expressed by the Representative 
Bodies and to a lesser extent with those expressed by the Professional Bodies, perhaps suggestive 
that the input from these two bodies was viewed favourably by the Commission.  In contrast, the final 
recommendations almost exclusively conflict with the strong positions adopted by the Industry group 
in their second phase submissions where they explicitly voiced their opposition to four specific 
recommendations.   
10.2.2 Stage 2: Disclosure and Accountability 
In the second study, the thesis provides empirical evidence pertaining to the remuneration disclosure 
behaviour of ASX200 firms.  Consistent with expectations, the results indicate that both total and 
transparent disclosure levels have increased significantly between 2008 and 2014.  Results of post-
hoc tests confirm that in all categories of disclosure except share-based disclosures, the largest 
increases occurred between the years 2010 and 2012, which is concurrent with the introduction of the 
two-strikes rule.  Most importantly, results from the multivariate analysis indicate that company 
boards of directors appear to manage the level of disclosure provided in the remuneration report in 
response to shareholder voting in the previous year.  In the year following no votes in excess of 20%, 
remuneration reports exhibit significantly higher levels of total disclosure, and even higher levels of 
transparent disclosures.  Interestingly, in the year following no votes of less than 5%, remuneration 
reports exhibit significantly lower levels of transparent disclosure.  These findings are consistent with 
the expectation that boards respond to shareholder dissent by managing the level of transparent 
disclosure in the remuneration report.  The association between shareholder dissent and changing 
disclosure levels is consistent with the two-strikes rule acting as an accountability mechanism. 
10.2.3 Stage 3: Accountability: Real Effects & Lobbying Strategy 
The third stage of the thesis examines the costs and benefits of regulatory change from a qualitative 
perspective in order to gain a deeper insight into the effects of the accountability mechanism on 
disclosure policy.  To achieve this, a comprehensive analysis is conducted of the disclosure behaviour 
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of firms involved in lobbying the PC Inquiry.  This analysis presents examples of transparent 
disclosure behaviour, and finds that these firms are providing more involved discussions about CEO 
contracts and payments in 2014 than in 2008.  Lobbying firms do not appear to disclose transparent 
information pertaining to short-term bonuses.  As well as improvements in total disclosure, in 
contrast, this study finds wide spread evidence of poor disclosure practices such as ‘boiler-plating’, 
sticky disclosure and ‘impressions management’.  The analysis finds no evidence that these firms 
participated in lobbying behaviour in an attempt to influence the legislators because they had a need 
to conceal poor behaviour practices, however they may have lobbied as a reaction to the 
implementation of the pre-existing non-binding shareholder vote. 
10.3 Limitations 
While this research aims to consider the ‘transparency’ of remuneration disclosures, it does not 
consider the ‘understandability’ of those disclosures.  Barth and Schipper (2008) discuss the balance 
required by firms, suggesting that without knowing the expertise of the reader, it is difficult for firms 
to provide enough information to enable the underlying economics of the transaction to be 
understood, without providing so much information that the understanding is incomprehensible.  
Smith and Taffler (1992:93) find that ‘even users of the greatest sophistication have difficulty in fully 
comprehending financial narratives’.  They go on to suggest that understandability will be restricted 
to a very small target audience.  To address the issue of what ‘type’ of items of disclosure are 
considered transparent, this thesis has enlisted users and preparers of remuneration reports to classify 
the items of disclosure.  This does not, however, resolve the problem of whether the information can 
be ‘understood’.  If the information is unable to be understood, then by definition, it is not 
‘transparent’.  This issue does not invalidate the importance of measuring transparent disclosure 
items.  Given the complex nature of remuneration contracts, legislators have indicated that this 
information should be available to the market.  This research addresses the question of whether 
transparent items of information are present in the market.   
To examine lobbyists’ behaviour, study one of this thesis relies on respondents’ written submissions 
to the PC Inquiry.  The decision to focus on written forms of lobbying means the results of the thesis 
may lack generalisability to other forms of lobbying because all opinions of all respondents are not 
represented.  As indicated in Section 1.1, written submissions have been demonstrated in the literature 
to be likely to be a good proxy for lobbying activity in general.  In addition, the written submissions 
in this study represent a large percentage of all lobbying activity of the PC Inquiry.  This approach is 
consistent with prior research that gives a reasonable level of assurance as to the validity of this 
approach.   
 182 
 
In study two of this thesis, the proxy for shareholder dissent against the remuneration report is the 
percentage of negative votes as a percentage of all votes cast at the annual general meeting of the 
firm.  This proxy is limited in several ways.  First, anecdotal evidence indicates that shareholder 
attendance at AGM’s is very low.  The AICD reported that in 2013, 0.13% of shareholders attended 
the AGM of Australia’s top 300 companies, and 0.08% of shareholders attended an ASX50 AGM 
(AICD, 2015).  This indicates that dissent measured as a show of hands at the AGM may not be 
representative of the true level of shareholder dissent against the remuneration report.       
Finally, the generalisability of the results of this thesis is limited to the listed companies in the sample 
and to the extent that those companies are representative of the broader market.   
10.4 Contributions and Future Research 
This thesis makes a contribution to three bodies of literature: the political process of standard setting, 
say on pay and disclosure.  First, study one makes a contribution to the knowledge of strategic 
lobbying behaviour in the standard setting processes utilising a unique setting.  In this setting, iterative 
lobbying behaviour has been examined to reveal preference and strategies employed by respondents.  
Study three identifies a unique relation between industry respondent behaviour and lobbying 
behaviour that has not been explored in the literature previously.  Second, this thesis contributes to 
the growing literature on say on pay, and provides insights into the drivers of shareholder dissent, and 
the reactions of firms at varying levels of shareholder no votes.  Finally, this thesis contributes to the 
disclosure research by presenting a unique measure of transparent remuneration disclosure and 
providing additional evidence of the drivers of disclosure policy choice.   
As discussed previously, this research examines the existence of transparent disclosure in 
remuneration reporting, however does not address the use or understandability of the disclosure.  As 
De George et al. (2016) indicate, while the existence of transparent information may be useful to 
market participants, there is no evidence about how much transparency necessarily promotes overall 
efficiency or usefulness to shareholders.  This creates many opportunities for future research.  First, 
it would be valuable to identify if an optimal level of remuneration transparency exists, or if the level 
of transparency impacts the market in particular ways.  It would be insightful to identify if the market 
for executives has been impacted by the availability of additional remuneration disclosures in the 
market.  In particular, the claims that increasing remuneration disclosure has led to ratcheting of 
executive pay is an interesting empirical question.    
Further to this, it would be insightful to see if increasing levels of transparent disclosure translates 
into more understandable disclosures.  Research identifying the users of remuneration disclosure and 
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their level of understanding of the disclosure would contribute to the cost benefit analysis of the 
implementation of legislation such as the two-strikes rule.    
In summary, this thesis addresses and interesting and topical area of accounting and identifies a fertile 
ground for future research.  The findings provide evidence that accountability mechanisms such as 
the two-strikes rule influence the board’s remuneration disclosure decisions in the Australian setting.  
Notwithstanding the identified limitations, the evidence provided contributes to increasing 
knowledge and understanding of remuneration disclosure policy in a regulated setting and therefore 
makes a positive contribution to academic literature, regulators and industry.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Leximancer Analysis of Written Responses to PC Inquiry 
The purpose of this Appendix is to present the results of computerised content analysis of the written 
submissions made by respondents to the PC Inquiry undertaken with the text analytics tool 
Leximancer. Leximancer utilises algorithms and count statistics to analyse text documents and 
present themes and related concepts present in the data. As described in Chapter 4, the Leximancer 
tool was used in the ‘data reduction’ and ‘data display’ stages of the analysis of lobbying behaviour 
by respondents (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The purpose of using the Leximancer program at the 
beginning of the content analysis, was in an attempt to reduce researcher bias by employing 
computerised text analysis in the process of conceptualising and operationalising the variables and 
measures that would be used in the coding scheme of the content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002). Despite 
this approach, some researcher judgement remains, as after the first round of analysis, certain words 
needed to be removed from the coding in order to obtain meaningful themes.40 The results from the 
Leximancer analysis of the Phase 1 written submissions is presented in Section D.1, while the results 
from Phase 2 written submissions are presented in Section D.2. These results ultimately provided 
support for the decision to develop a coding scheme and coding form based on the Terms of Reference 
provided to the Commission by the Treasury Department.  
D.1 Stated preferences of respondent groups – Phase 1 Initial Written Submissions 
Adopting the exploratory approach described by Miles and Huberman (1994), Leximancer is used to 
analyse the content of all written responses and identify prominent themes and related concepts for 
each respondent group. The top five themes by respondent category identified by Leximancer in the 
105 written submissions in Phase 1 are reported in Table A.1. 41 When analysed on a respondent 
group basis, ‘performance’ was the common theme for the industry, individual, professionals and 
representative bodies groups. However, the most prevalent theme for industry respondents was 
‘equity’, for individuals was ‘government’, for the professional group was ‘plans’, academics’ was 
‘governance’ and the representative bodies strongest theme was ‘boards’. The government respondent 
group had three equally weighted themes, ‘remuneration’, ‘determination’ and ‘allowances’. This is 
likely due to the small number of government responses. In order to gain greater understanding from  
                                                 
40 Words removed from the Leximancer analysis were: board, company, remuneration, corporate, executive, financial, 
large, people, shareholder, manager, and business.  These concepts were removed as it was expected all submissions 
would intuitively have these themes present, and the researchers were interested in the themes as they relate to these 
words.  Some verbs were also removed, for example, saying, question, looking.  
41 ‘Remuneration’ was identified as the top theme in all submissions in the first round of analysis, which is not tabulated. 
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Table A.1 Phase 1: Leximancer Themes and Concepts by Respondent Group 
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these themes we consider the associated concepts and refer to direct quotes from submissions to 
appreciate the context and tone of the responses.  
Leximancer also discovers concepts related to the themes, and ranks these in order of connectivity. 
While four of the respondent groups are identified as having ‘performance’ as one of five most 
prevalent themes, the concepts related to the theme are different for each group. The industry group 
discuss performance with reference to concepts such as ‘period’, ‘incentive’, ‘reward’, ‘annual’ and 
‘growth’, while ‘system’, ‘pay’, ‘senior’, ‘current’ and ‘share’ are the related concepts in the 
individuals group. The concepts related to ‘performance’ for the representative bodies include 
‘incentive’, ‘period’, ‘equity’, ‘share’ and ‘payments’, which appears to be more aligned with the 
industry group than the individuals. On the other hand, the professionals appear to have concepts 
similar to both industry and individuals, but have a different concept, ‘interests’, related to 
‘performance’ in their submissions. Combined with the unique theme of ‘Governance’, the 
Professionals analysis may reflect the nature of the legal profession and the accounting bodies’ 
interest in the overall governance and reporting requirements of firms.  
D.2 Phase 2 - Responses to the Discussion Draft 
The 65 submissions received in Phase 2 in response to the Discussion Draft were analysed using a 
similar process to the analysis in Phase 1. In the first step, Leximancer was used to identify key themes 
and concepts and in the second step researcher-based content analysis was under taken. Written 
submissions were analysed to ascertain whether respondents agreed, disagreed or made no comment 
on each of the 15 recommendations in the Discussion Draft. Data was also collected on whether 
respondents indicated that they agreed or disagreed in principle with the findings of the Productivity 
Commission.  
Table A.2 collates the major themes and related concepts from Leximancer. It can be seen from these 
results that ‘vote’ is the prominent theme across all respondents except individuals. This is a shift in 
the focus from Phase 1 where the dominant theme was ‘performance’.  
The highest ranked theme for the industry group is ‘equity’. Interestingly, this is also the top theme 
for this group in Phase 1. This indicates that the primary concern of the industry group related to 
issues around remuneration contracts as they specifically relate to shareholdings.  
The second major theme for the industry group was ‘vote’. From reading the submissions, it can be 
seen that the industry group were concerned about the costs associated with the vote, particularly the 
potential for a board spill. Many industry respondents stated that they felt that the vote as it already 
appeared in the Corporations Act was sufficient. 
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The Leximancer analysis of the industry group also highlights the prominence of the related concept 
of ‘performance’. ‘Performance’ appears as a related concept under four of the five top themes, 
suggesting that industry is still focused on the link between remuneration and performance in this 
round of lobbying. 
Unlike industry, the main theme for the individual respondent group is ‘investment’. This suggests 
that individuals continue to be concerned about their return on investment and whether remuneration 
contracts are achieving this goal. The second theme for individuals is ‘tax’, with related concepts 
‘carbon’, ‘income’, ‘land’ and ‘superannuation’. This suggests that this group of respondents used 
this opportunity as a platform to lobby about other unrelated issues.  
The key theme for the professional respondents was ‘disclosure’. This might be expected given that 
disclosure issues relate specifically to the activities for which these groups provide professional 
services. The second main theme is ‘relation’. From reading the submissions it can be seen that this 
theme is concerned with how the recommendations are related to other elements of the framework, 
such as the timing of the implementation of the recommendations and the connection to the 
Corporations Act.  
Representative body respondents focused strongly on the theme of ‘vote’ in their submissions. Other 
themes important to this group were governance and pay, which is again consistent with what we 
might expect from respondents that are focused on representing the interests of particular interest 
groups.  
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Table A.2 Phase 2: Leximancer Themes and Concepts by Respondent Group 
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Appendix B: Productivity Commission Draft Recommendations 
Board Capability 
Recommendation #1 
The Corporations Act 2001 should specify that only a general meeting of shareholders can set the maximum number of 
directors who may hold office at any time (within the limits in a company's constitution). 
Conflicts of Interest 
Recommendation #2 
A new ASX listing rule should specify that all ASX300 companies have a remuneration committee of at least three 
members, all of whom are non-executive directors, with the chair and a majority of members being independent. 
Recommendation #3 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council's current suggestion on the composition of remuneration committees should be 
elevated to a 'comply or explain' recommendation which specifies that remuneration committees: 
• have at least three members 
• be comprised of a majority of independent directors 
• be chaired by an independent director. 
Recommendation #4 
The Corporations Act 2001 should specify that company executives identified as key management personnel and all 
directors (and their associates) be prohibited from voting their shares on remuneration reports and any other 
remuneration-related resolutions. 
Recommendation #5 
The Corporations Act 2001 should prohibit all company executives from hedging unvested equity remuneration and 
vested equity remuneration that is subject to holding locks. 
Recommendation #6 
The Corporations Act 2001 and relevant ASX listing rules should be amended to prohibit company executives identified 
as key management personnel and all directors (and their associates) from voting undirected proxies on remuneration 
reports and any other remuneration-related resolutions. 
Recommendation #7 
The Corporations Act 2001 should be amended to require proxy holders to cast all of their directed proxies on 
remuneration reports and any other remuneration-related resolutions. 
Disclosure 
Recommendation #8 
Section 300A of the Corporations Act 2001 should be amended to specify that remuneration reports should additionally 
include: 
• a plain English summary statement of companies' remuneration policies 
• actual levels of remuneration received by executives 
• total company shareholdings of the individuals named in the report. 
Corporations should be permitted to only disclose fair valuation methodologies of equity rights for executives in the 
financial statements, while continuing to disclose the actual fair value for each executive in the remuneration report. 
Recommendation #9 
Section 300A of the Corporations Act 2001 should be amended to reflect that individual remuneration disclosures be 
confined to the key management personnel. The additional requirement for the disclosure of the top five executives 
should be removed. 
Recommendation #10 
The ASX listing rules should require that, where an ASX300 company's remuneration committee (or board) makes use 
of expert advisers, those advisers be commissioned by, and their advice provided directly to, the remuneration committee 
or board, independent of management. 
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Recommendation #11 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council should make a recommendation that companies disclose the expert advisers 
they have used in relation to remuneration matters, who appointed them, who they reported to and the nature of other 
work undertaken for the company by those advisers. 
Recommendation #12 
Institutional investors should disclose, at least on an annual basis, how they have voted on remuneration reports and 
any other remuneration-related issues. How this requirement is met should be at the discretion of institutions. 
Remuneration Principles 
Draft Finding 1 
Remuneration structures are company and context-specific and a matter for boards to resolve rather than being amenable 
to prescriptive direction. That said, there are some key dimensions that often warrant being explained clearly to 
shareholders, and, where appropriate, could usefully be addressed in companies' treatment of their remuneration polices 
in the remuneration report:  
• how the remuneration policy aligns with the company's strategic directions, its desired risk profile and with 
shareholder interests 
• how the mix of base pay and incentives relates to the remuneration policy 
• how comparator groups for benchmarking executive remuneration and setting performance hurdles and metrics 
were selected 
• how incentive pay arrangements were subjected to sensitivity analysis to determine the impact of unexpected 
changes (for example, in the share price) 
• whether any 'incentive-compatible' constraints or caps to guard against extreme outcomes from formula-based 
contractual obligations apply 
• whether alternatives to incentives linked to complex hurdles have been considered (for example, short-term 
incentives delivered as equity subject to holding locks) 
• whether employment contracts have been designed to the degree allowable by law, to inoculate against the 
possibility of having to 'buy out' poorly performing executives in order to avoid litigation 
• whether post-remuneration evaluations have been conducted to assess outcomes, their relationship to the 
remuneration policy and the integrity of any initial sensitivity analysis. 
Recommendation #13 
The cessation of employment trigger for taxation for equity-based payments should be removed, with the taxing point 
for equity or rights that qualify for deferral being at the earliest of where ownership of, and free title to, the shares or 
rights is transferred to the employee, or seven years after the employee acquires the shares. 
Shareholder Engagement 
Recommendation #14 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission should issue a public confirmation to companies that electronic 
voting is legally permissible without the need for constitutional amendments - as recommended in 2008 by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. 
Recommendation #15 
The Corporations Act 2001 should be amended to require that where a company's remuneration report receives a 'no' 
vote of 25 per cent or higher, the board be required to report back to shareholders in the subsequent remuneration report 
explaining how shareholder concerns were addressed and, if they have not been addressed, the reasons why. 
If the company's subsequent remuneration report receives a 'no' vote above a prescribed threshold, all elected board 
members be required to submit for re-election (a 'two strikes' test) at either an extraordinary general meeting or the 
next annual general meeting. 
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Appendix C: Disclosure Index 
  
Disclosure Item
(shaded lines are headings only)
1 Remuneration report is included in directors report
2 Remuneration Report is included in the Index
3 Remuneration report is presented in a separate section clearly labelled "Remuneration Report"
4 The date of AGM where the Remuneration was approved by the shareholders
Remuneration Committee
5 Discloses if a remuneration committee exists
If 'yes' committee
6 The Charter is disclosed
7 It is disclosed that there are 3 members
8 The attendance at meetings is disclosed
9 The details of the remuneration committee are disclosed in the remuneration report (not in the corporate governance section)
OR if no committee
10 The remuneration report discusses the process for setting pay level and composition 
11 The remuneration report discusses how the appropriateness of pay is determined
12 The remuneration report discusses the measures taken to ensure remuneration is not excessive
Remuneration consultant
13 Discloses that consultant was\was not used
14 Details of the name of the remuneration consultant
15 The fees paid to the remuneration consultant
16 The type of work performed by the remuneration consultant
17 A statement that the consultant made a remuneration recommendation
18 Information about how the company ensures the remuneration consultant’s recommendation was free from undue influence
19 A statement that the board is satisfied that the remuneration consultant’s recommendation was free from undue influence
Other advice - Remuneration consultant
20 The nature and extent of all  other kinds of advice received from this consultant
21 The nature and amount paid by the company for the other advice from the consultant.
General Remuneration Policy
Discussion of policy for determining nature of remuneration
22 The policy for determining the nature of remuneration is stated
23 The policy for determining the nature of remuneration is explained
24 The proportions of performance based remuneration v not performance based remuneration is disclosed
Discussion of policy for determining amount of remuneration
25 The policy for determining the amount of remuneration is stated
26 The policy for determining the amount of remuneration is explained
27 The relationship between the nature of remuneration and executive performance is discussed
28 Alterations to the CEO remuneration contract are discussed and explained
29 The details about remuneration of each key management personnel are disclosed
30 The remuneration report discloses each of the directors’ remuneration separately
Disclosed discussions about performance of a company in a year refers to: 
31 Company's earnings
32 Impact of performance on shareholders' wealth
33 Dividends paid
34 Changes in the share price from beginning to end of the year
35 Return of capital by the company to shareholders
36 Cancellation of shares
37 Premiums paid to shareholders
38 Discussion of how above performance is related to remuneration
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PART B Share-based remuneration payments
All types of equity payments
80 Vesting requirements
81 Maximum term of options granted
82 Method of settlement
NUMBER of share-based payments :
83 Outstanding at beginning of period
84 Granted during year
85 Forfeited during year
86 Exercised/vested during year
87 Expired during year
88 Outstanding at end of period
89 Exercisable at end of period
Weighted average exercise PRICES of share-based payments:
90 Outstanding at beginning of period
91 Granted during year
92 Forfeited during year
93 Exercised/vested during year
94 Expired during year
95 Outstanding at end of period
96 Exercisable at end of period
97 Weighted average exercise prices of options exercised during the year at date of exercise
98 Range of exercise prices/weighted average remaining contractual l ife for options outstanding end of year
99 Information as to how fair value of equity instruments granted was determined
100 How fair value was not measured on the basis of an observable market price, how it was determined; 
Weighted average exercise FAIR VALUE of options granted during period:
101 Option pricing model used
102 Inputs to option pricing model
103 Assumptions used to incorporate the effects of early exercise
104 How expected volatil ity was determined
105 Extent to which expected volatil ity was based on historical volatil ity
106 How other features of the option grant were incorporated into the measurement of fair value
107 Whether and how expected dividends were incorporated into fair value 
108 Whether and how any other features of the equity instruments were incorporated into fair value 
Other:
109 Number of other equity instruments granted during period
110 Weighted average fair value of other equity instruments at measurement date
111 An explanation of modified share-based payments
112 Incremental change to fair value of modified share-based payments
113 How incremental change to fair value (in 33) was calculated
114 Total expense for period from all  share-based transactions
115 Liabil ities from all  share-based transactions
116 Carrying amount at end of period
117 Total intrinsic value at end of the period of vested rights
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